Risk Regulation in the European Union: Between enlargement and internationalization by MAJONE, Giandomenico
Risk Regulation
in the European Union:
Between Enlargement
and Internationalization
Edited by
Giandomenico Majone
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
Risk regulation in the European Union:
Between Enlargement and Internationalization
Giandomenico Majone (ed.)
The European Forum
The European Forum brings together at the European University Institute for a given
academic year a group of experts, under the supervision of annual scientific director(s),
to research on a specific topic primarily of a comparative and interdisciplinary nature.
This book originated in the context of the 2002-3 European Forum programme on
'Europe after Globalisation: International regulatory competition and cooperation in an
enlarging European Union' directed by Professor Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and co-
directed by Professor Giandomenico Majone and Professor Claudio Radaelli.
T he For um exami ned thr ee major themes: ‘E xpl ai ni ng Inter nati onal Regul at ory
Com peti t ion’ , ‘Ri sk Regul at ion in Com parati ve Per specti ve’ , and ‘Mul ti -l evel Gover nance
and Regulation: The choice of governance level’. The European Forum Fellows’ projects
covered several policy areas, such as financial regulation, regulation of the public
utilities, health and safety regulation, foodstuff regulation, international taxation,
international trade, interplay between labour market regulation and product regulation,
company law, and competition policy.
Giandomenico Majone
Emeritus Professor of Public Policy at the European University Institute. Co-director of
the 2002-3 European Forum. In this framework, he organised six seminars on risk
regulation in which texts collected in this publication were presented and discussed.
Sara Poli
Has a research and teaching contract in European Law with the University of Trieste. Her
contributions in this book are the fruit of her research on 'The Regulatory Framework for
Genetically Modified Organisms in the European Community and International Law: A
threat to consumers' health and the environment or to free international trade?', carried
out during her stay at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies as a Jean
Monnet Fellow in the a 2002-3 European Forum.
Aleksander Surdej
Professor of European Public Policies at the Cracow University of Economics. His
contribution in this book is the outcome of his research on 'Regulatory Process and
Public Concern: Institutional adjustments in food safety regulatory regime in Poland and
selected central Europe countries in the perspective of EU membership', carried out
during his stay at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies as a Jean Monnet
Fellow in the a 2002-3 European Forum.
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
The RSCAS carries out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of
European integration and public policy in Europe. It hosts the annual European Forum.
Details of this and the other research of the Centre can be found on
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/. Research publications take the form of Working
Papers, Policy Papers, Distinguished Lectures and books. Most of these are also available
on the RSCAS website: http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Publications/.
Edited by
Giandomenico Majone
Risk Regulation in the European Union:
Between Enlargement and Internationalization
European University Institute
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
Florence, Italy
 2003 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies; and
selection and editorial matter © Giandomenico Majone;
individual chapters © contributors.
All rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be reproduced or utilised
in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, or otherwise,
without the prior permission in writing from the publisher.
Permission for quotation should be addressed directly to the author(s).
Source should be acknowledged.
ISBN 92-9084-000-5
Published by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
European University Institute
Via delle Fontanelle, 19
I – 50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/
Printed in Italy in December 2003.
Contents
Introduction Giandomenico Majone .............................................................  1
Chapter  1 Foundations of Risk Regulation: Science, Decision-Making,
Policy Learning and Institutional Reform
Giandomenico Majone .............................................................  9
Chapter 2 What Price Safety? The Precautionary Principle and
its Policy Implications
Giandomenico Majone ...........................................................   33
Chapter 3 European Regulatory Agencies: The Dilemma of
Delegation of Powers in the European Union
Giandomenico Majone ...........................................................   55
Chapter 4 The Emerging EU Regulatory Framework on Genetically
Modified Organisms: Dilemmas and Challenges
Sara Poli .................................................................................   79
Chapter 5 Setting Out International Food Standards: Euro-American
Conflicts Within the Codex Alimentarius Commission
Sara Poli ...............................................................................   125
Chapter 6 Enlarging the EU Food Safety Regime: Selected Problems
in Adjusting the Polish Food Safety Regime to EU Food Safety
Requirements
Aleksander Surdej ................................................................   149
Introduction
Giandomenico Majone
The 2002-3 European Forum organized by the Robert Schuman Centre for
Advanced Studies of the EUI dealt with regulatory cooperation and regulatory
competition in an integrating world economy. Within this broad theme, a series of
six seminars on risk regulation were held in the period January-March 2003.
Although six seminars are hardly sufficient to cover a fast expanding field like risk
regulation, I hope the reader will find the texts collected in this publication useful
as an introduction to some of the key issues and concepts in this increasingly
important area of EU regulation and international harmonization. Like few other
policy areas, risk regulation requires a clear understanding of basic principles of
decision-making under uncertainty—principles which cannot be ignored even by
those who are interested in the legal, political or psychological aspects of risk
rather than in technical risk analysis. Indeed, it could be argued that many current
debates would be easily settledor at least reduced to their ultimate political
dimensionif only the participants understood the most elementary principles of
coherent decision-making under uncertainty. These principles, and some of their
policy and institutional implications, are the topic of the three first chapters of the
present publication.
Risk is commonly defined as the product of the probability of an adverse event
times the severity of the loss if the event occurs; it is, in other words, a numerical
value of the expected loss. Thus, probability and utility (or loss = negative utility)
are the key concepts of risk regulation. These two concepts are so intimately related
that the modern view of probability developed in an attempt to understand decision
making in the face of incomplete knowledge. It is assumed that an individual, when
2faced with the necessity to make a decision that may have different consequences
depending on events about which she has incomplete knowledge, can express her
preferences and uncertainties in a way consistent with some basic principles of
rational behavior. It can then be deduced that the individual has a ‘utility
function’which measures the value to her of each course of action when each of
the uncertain possibilities is assumed to be the true one and a ‘subjective
probability distribution’, which expresses quantitatively her beliefs about the
uncertain events. The individual’s optimal decision is the one that maximizes her
expected utility with respect to her subjective probability.
Before briefly indicating the relevance of these theoretical principles to the
practice of risk regulation, a few additional observations may be helpful. First, note
that the modern view of probability as expressing the strength of our knowledge or
beliefs, is much broader than the old (‘objective’) view of probability, which only
applies to phenomena or experiments that can be indefinitely repeated under
essentially the same conditions. But each political, managerial, or regulatory
decision is essentially unique—it can never be repeated under the same
conditionsand hence may be analyzed only by means of the modern, subjective,
notion of probability. From this modern viewpoint, ‘objective’ probabilities
represent only special cases, but as in all good generalizations in science, the same
principles (‘axioms’) apply to both kinds of probability. Second, what is really
important about subjective probabilities is the procedure (known as Bayes theorem)
by which they can be revised in the light of new information. Hence, and this is my
third observation, ‘subjective’ in this context, is not at all equivalent to ‘arbitrary’.
Both subjective probabilities and utilities are derived according to precisely
defined rules that guarantee their internal consistency, and also learning—in the
sense of transforming prior into posterior probabilities in the light of new
evidence—follows a well-defined procedure, as just noted.
Again, the theoretical framework sketched here has being criticized for being
normative rather than positive or descriptive. It is said that laboratory experiments,
as well as casual observation, prove that people do not choose under uncertainty,
nor update their beliefs, in the manner prescribed by the theory. It can be shown,
however, that this criticism is naïve, primarily because it overlooks the complex
interdependence between the normative and the positive in social life. Grammar,
logic, arithmetic, and legal codes are all examples of normative systems that are
often violated in practice, but are not discarded as a consequencesociety could
not function without them. What is true is that social practice is guided by norms,
which in turn develop under the influence of social practice. Thus, the normative
theory of decision-making under uncertainty needs some modifications when
applied to group, rather than individual, decisions; but this does not mean that the
basic principles are no longer relevant. A final point. Most contemporary
philosophers of science agree that scientific knowledge grows through a series of
conjectures and refutations; there is no definitive scientific truth, but a scientific
3method by which scientists are able to eliminate conjectures that are unsupported
by sufficient empirical evidence. This means that also in the field of natural
science, and a fortiori in regulatory science, probabilistic statements about the
occurrence or non-occurrence of certain events are essentially subjective (which, to
repeat, does not mean ‘arbitrary’).
Chapters 1-3 spell out in somewhat greater detail the ideas briefly sketched
here, and discuss their implications for risk regulation in the European Union. In
particular, it is argued that the recent attempts by the European Commission to
promote the precautionary principle as a ‘key tenet’ of Community policy, and as a
general principle of international law, deserve critical attention not only from a
political-economy, but also from a methodological perspective. Even an elementary
understanding of basic principles suggests that this effort is likely to founder on
the logical inadequacies—not to mention the political problems mentioned in
chapter 2of the principle being promoted. For example, in the absence of any
generally accepted definition, the principle is often taken to mean that incomplete
scientific knowledge is not a valid excuse for regulatory inertia or, more explicitly,
that ‘taking regulatory measures to prevent possible risks may be legitimate, even
when strong scientific evidence on causal relationships or the extent of damage is
lacking’. Thus interpreted, the precautionary principle is said to provide ‘the
philosophical authority to take decisions in the face of uncertainty,’ when in fact it
simply restates the obvious, namely that all regulatory decisions are taken under
conditions of (greater or lesser) uncertainty. Equally empty is the distinction,
allegedly drawn by the European Court of Justice in its jurisprudence on food
safety, between certain and uncertain levels of evidence (‘sichere und unsichere
Erkenntnislagen’)—where ‘uncertain level of evidence’ is supposed to mean that
no level of safety can be definitely established on the basis of the current state of
research. Again, this is the normal state of affairs in regulatory science, as shown in
chapter 1, so that the distinction is hardly helpful for identifying situations where
the precautionary principle could be used as an alternative decision rule.
The difficulty of using the precautionary principle as a consistent rule for
decision making under uncertainty is also revealed by Sara Poli’s analysis of the
emerging EU regulatory framework on genetically modified organisms in
chapter 4. According to a widespread interpretation, one of the important
implications of the precautionary principle is a reversal of the burden of proof:
before an authorization is granted, it is up to the developer of a new product to
prove that the product poses no health or environmental risk. Since no such proof
is, strictly speaking, possible, the reversal of the burden of proof implies a zero-risk
approach to regulation. In conformity with this strict interpretation of the principle,
Article 3.1 of the Novel Food Regulation (Regulation 258/97) states that
genetically modified food can be authorized only if ‘it does not present a danger to
the consumer’. However, a zero-risk approach, besides being logically untenable,
effectively impedes scientific and technical innovation. The Commission has
4officially espoused the precautionary principle, but it also wants to favor the
development of biotechnology research in Europe. Caught in this dilemma, it has
sought a way out by softening the rigorous standard of the Novel Food Regulation.
The new regulation for genetically modified food now being proposed, lowers the
threshold: genetically modified food may be authorized if it does not present an
unacceptable risk for human health or the environment. Moreover, traces of
unauthorized GMOs are now acceptable, under certain conditions, whereas
previously they were not allowed to circulate in the market under any condition. In
sum, the shift from ‘no danger’ to ‘acceptable risk’ represents a significant
weakening of the precautionary philosophy in the direction of a more reasonable
‘balancing approach’ (see chapter 1). At the very least, as Sara Poli points, the new
emphasis on acceptable risk should prevent recourse to outright bans, since under
the new regulation, the Commission would be bound to take measures that are
proportional to the chosen level of protection.
Among the many other important issues discussed in chapter 4, two will be
mentioned here since they relate directly to questions raised in other parts of the
present volume. Chapter 3 criticizes the institutional design chosen for the new
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). The tension between the desire to
improve the credibility of EU risk regulation by appealing to independent expertise,
and the Commission’s refusal to delegate regulatory powers to the agency, has been
temporarily resolved by the doubtful expedient of separating institutionally risk
assessment (the task assigned to the authority) and risk management, which
remains the responsibility of the Commission. This institutional separation is likely
to be unsatisfactory because while risk analysis and risk management are
conceptually distinct functions, they are closely intertwined in practice. The
consequences of this institutional separation are even more serious if, in fact, the
role of the expert agency in the regulatory process is kept to a minimum. Poli
points out that the Authority is not consulted systematically on all issues pertaining
to the safety of genetically modified food/feed and products. In some cases,
decisions are taken by the Commission, in the framework of the comitology
committees, without consulting EFSA at all. It is even possible for the member
states and the Commission to decide on an application to market GM food and feed
disregarding the scientific opinion of the Authorityprovided only that they state
the reasons for doing so. The author concludes that the broad discretion of the
European institutions in taking risk management measuresa discretion which has
been upheld by the European courts in recent decisionsappears to distinguish the
European approach from the American one.
The problems raised by too broad executive discretion are compounded when
the accountability structure is poorly defined. One of the advantages of the
American model of independent regulatory agencies is that the agency head, having
been given the authority to take final decisions, is also held responsible for the
outcomes of those decisions. By contrast, in the EU it is unclear who is politically
5accountable in case of regulatory failure. Should there be a food scandal involving
the use of GMOs, Poli asks, who will be held responsible? The executive director
of the EFSA? The Commissioner responsible for health and consumer protection or
the college of Commissioners? Unfortunately, such questions are not answered, or
even mentioned, in the draft regulations or elsewhere. From a strictly legal
viewpoint responsibility should lie with the Commission, which takes the final risk
management decisions. However, the Commission has no scientific expertise and
hence is dependent on the opinion of the expert agencyunless it chooses to
disregard it for political reasons. In the American model, the head of the
agencyoften a former expert—is responsible for the entire regulatory process and
thus cannot use the separation of risk assessment and risk management to evade the
accountability problem. Precisely because all risk determinations are ultimately
‘subjective’, it is essential that all stages of the rule-making process be explicit and
open to public scrutiny, and that somebody be given final responsibility for putting
together in a coherent way the separate components of the process. The practice of
American agencies, as shaped by the Administrative Procedure Act and later
statutes, and by court-imposed procedural requirements, is a good illustration of the
notion of ‘procedural rationality’ discussed in chapter 1. By contrast, risk
regulation in the EU is still far from satisfying the test of procedural rationality.
Chapter 5, also by Sara Poli, adds a very important international dimension to
the debate on food safety regulation in the EU. The chapter draws attention to the
gr ow ing importa nce , within the WT O and in the EU lega l syste m, of the food
sa fe ty sta ndar ds se t by the Codex A lime ntar ius Commission—a n intergovernmental
body set up in 1962 under the auspices of the Food and Agriculture Organization
and the World Health Organization. The growing role of the Codex Commission in
international economic law explains the interest of the EC to become full member
of the organization, along with its member states. The political and legal
complications raised by the accession of the Community are clearly explained in
the text. It seems likely that in the future the EU will eventually become a full
member of the Codex Commission, but only under fairly restrictive conditions. At
present, the Community appears to be rather isolated on many important issues, as
shown by the contrasting views on the role of the precautionary principle within the
Codex Commission. The position of the EC in favor of including the precautionary
principle among the general principles of risk management, is opposed not only by
the United States, Canada, and other major trading partners of the EU, but also by
many Latin American and other developing countries. Chapter 5 provides a very
useful summary of the different positions. The opponents of the European position
stress the lack of a precise definition, which facilitates the use of the precautionary
principle for protectionist purposes. It is also pointed out, particularly by the United
States, that a precautionary approach is already built into risk assessment, since any
competent analysis must consider all the uncertainties present in a situation,
together with the consequences for each possible course of action. In this sense,
6rational decision-making under uncertainty is always ‘precautionary’, but the idea
of precaution should not be used by risk managers to overrule risk assessments.
Also, Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement already addresses the issue of insufficient
scientific evidence (see chapter 2 in this volume).
The attentive reader will note the different implications of scientific uncertainty
at the national and international level. At the national, and to some extent also at
the European level, risk regulators—who always operate under conditions of
uncertaintycannot refuse to decide simply because the evidence at their disposal
is incomplete. The situation is different for international organizations like the
Codex Commission or the International Standards Organization. The standards set
by such bodies are not legally bindingalthough they provide increasingly
important guidelines for national regulators and generally are reached by
consensus. Hence, when the scientific evidence is not sufficient to produce a
convergence of opinions, it makes perfect sense for an international organization
not to proceed to elaborate a standard, but to limit itself to adopt a code of practice
or other recommendations directed to the national regulators, leaving to the latter
the responsibility for standard setting.
Among the other topics discussed in chapter 5 are the debates in various Codex
committees concerning conditions for the marketing of food derived from
biotechnology, especially the issue of ‘traceability’. Unsurprisingly, given the
preceding discussion, also on this and related issues the positions of the EU and of
its major trading partners are still quite distant. Another issue of great
contemporary interest is the role of factors other than science (other legitimate
factors or OLFs) in Codex decision making. This debate is closely related to,
indeed is an offshoot of, the controversy on the precautionary principle, and is
equally divisive. The fear is, again, that too flexible a definition of such OLFs as
economic factors or consumers’ concerns, could open the door to all kind of
protectionist measures. The author succeeds in summarizing in a few pages all the
key points of a complex debate which is bound to continue into future.
W hile cha pte r 5 conside r s the inte r nationa l conte xt of EU food regula tion, 
c hapte r 6, written by A leksa nde r Surde j, ana lyz e s the impa c t of EU food saf e ty
r e quir e me nts on a ca ndida te countr y like Pola nd. He doe s this first by ske tc hing the 
ma in tr ends in the de ve lopme nt of EU food sa f ety regula tion, and the n, discussing
the fa c tor s whic h ha ve inf lue nc ed the tr ansposition of EU food law into dome stic
la ws and re gula tions, and whic h might influe nce the imple me nta tion of suc h
r e gula tions in the ne ar futur e . T he ma in the sis is that the la c k of controve r sy over 
the tr a nsposition of EU food sa fe ty re gula tions se ems to be a re sult of the low 
sa lie nc e of food sa f e ty issue s in the pe rc e ption of Polish consume r sw ho te nd to
be lie ve tha t domestic food is saf e , or eve n saf e r tha n impor te d food stuf f sa nd also
a re sult of the fa c t tha t the democ r atic alte rna tion of gove rnme nts tends to de -c ouple 
the ac t of committing a countr y to inte r na tiona l agr e e ments fr om the re sponsibility
f or imple me nting the rule s a nd de liver ing expec te d r e gula tor y outc ome s. 
7Surdej points out that the EU is changing its strategy to assure a reasonable food
safety level across member states by putting an increasingly stronger emphasis on
monitoring the national, as well as the company, control systems. This change,
although in tune with theoretical developments in the area of risk regulation,
creates special difficulties in a candidate country such as Poland whose agriculture
and foodstuffs sector is highly fragmented, and whose institutional setup for food
safety control is still evolving. The author predicts problems with implementing EU
food safety rules in candidate countries, although the consequences of possible
violations of such rules are attenuated by the fact that food trade between Poland
and the present EU member states is at a relatively low level. He also reminds us
that food safety is not only an internal issue of the EU, but a broader problem of
how to create a regime for international trade in foodstuffs, which would respect
the rules of free trade, while paying attention to the concerns for food safety. This
brief summary of chapter 6 does not do justice to the wealth of empirical material
presented there, much of it not easily available elsewhere, nor to the many
interesting theoretical insights scattered throughout the text.
As was said at the beginning of this introduction, the six seminars whose texts
are collected here, cover only a relatively small range of issues arising in risk
regulation in the EU, in the candidate countries, and internationally. The focus is on
logical foundations, legal principles, and substantive policy problems. For example,
nothing is said about the political economy of food safety in general, or of the
regulation of GMOs, in particular. At a deeper level, one could investigate the
correlation between electoral systems and the emergence of particular topics in the
public debate on risk regulation. It is rather striking, for example, that in
majoritarian, winner-takes-all electoral systems, like the United States or the
United Kingdom, the precautionary principle never became a serious topic of
political discussion, whereas in continental Europe, where more or less pure forms
of proportional representation prevail, it has moved toward the top of the political
agenda during the 1990s, and in some cases even before. Intuitively, this seems to
be due to the prevalence of coalition governments under PR, and the possibility of
small, single-issue parties playing a pivotal role in such coalitions. At any rate, the
influence of the electoral system on the shape and agenda of risk regulation seems
to deserve much more attention than it has received by political scientists so far.
Again, the importance of policy learning in situations of great cognitive complexity
like risk regulation, is emphasized in chapter 1. The examples given there suggest
that a separation-of-powers system has certain advantages in this respect. The
question is, how to improve the policy-learning capacity of parliamentary
governments, or of a polity like the EU, which is neither a separation-of-powers nor
a parliamentary system.
The regulation of risk raises a wealth of interesting problems for the political
economist, the psychologist, the political analyst, and the lawyer. It is, however,
impossible to reach significant conclusions using any of these valuable approaches
8without a clear understanding of the basic principles of the logic of decision-
making under uncertainty. If this small volume succeeds in conveying this
message, it will have achieved its main objective.
9Chapter 1
Foundations of Risk Regulation:
Science, Decision-Making, Policy Learning
and Institutional Reform
Giandomenico Majone
1. From Substantive to Procedural Rationality
The long subtitle of this introductory chapter identifies what I take to be the key
terms of the current debate on risk regulation. It is impossible to understand the
evolution of risk regulation during the last three decades, in Europe and the United
States, without a good grasp of how these concepts, and the corresponding
practices, interact. How, for example, does a particular institutional design affect
the way scientific uncertainties are resolved? Which are the appropriate decision
rules in situations of high scientific uncertainty? Which institutions can facilitate
policy learning and the achievement of credibility in the area of risk?
By definition, uncertainty is pervasive in risk regulation, but what is less well
understood, is that in many cases scientific uncertainty cannot be significantly
reduced. Closer analysis of recent controversies about the analysis and management
of risk shows that the issues over which expert disagreement is most serious are, in
Alvin Weinberg’s terminology, trans-scientific rather than strictly scientific or
technical. Trans-scientific issues are questions of fact that can be stated in the
language of science but are, in principle or in practice, unanswerable by science
(Weinberg 1972). One of Weinberg’s examples is the determination of the health
effects of low-level radiation. It has been calculated that in order to determine by
direct experimentation, at the 95 per cent confidence level, whether a level of X-
rays radiation of 150 millirems would increase the spontaneous mutation in mice
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by 50 per cent, would require about 8 billion mice. Time and resource constraints
make such an experiment all but impossible. Similarly, the choice of a particular
dose-response function must be treated at present as a trans-scientific question. A
dose-response model establishes a relationship between different dose levels of a
substance and the probability of a lifetime response. But the relationship can be
represented by many different functions and a firm scientific basis for choosing a
particular functional representation is usually lacking. However, such a choice can
have a major effect on the determination of the virtually safe dosemore than a
100,000-fold effect, according to a study conducted some years ago by the
Committee on Safety Evaluation of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.
Analogous conceptual and technical difficulties attend calculations attempting to
determine the probability of extremely unlikely events like catastrophic reactors
accidentas far as any direct verification of the calculations is concernedor the
issue of when animal data alone form a sufficient basis for standard-setting.
Since the level of scientific (or trans-scientific) uncertainty is so high, concepts
like ‘acceptable risk doses’, ‘virtual safety’, and ‘no observed effect level’ (NOEL)
commonly used by risk regulators, especially with reference to potentially toxic
substancesleave ample room for discretionary choices and rules of thumb. What
a distinguished statistician wrote in the 1970s remains largely true today:
All present safety evaluation procedures, whether involving the use of
NOEL’s, or of some favored non-threshold dose-response function with
a ‘virtually safe’ level, must be regarded as mathematical formalisms
whose correspondence with the realities of low-dose effect is, and may
long remain, largely conjectural (Cornfield, 1977, p. 698).
Thus, the first, and arguably most important, question facing political leaders,
citizens, and experts is how to limit regulatory discretion and enforce
accountability in policy areas characterized by high uncertainty and cognitive
complexity, and which are also politically very sensitive. I shall argue that the
solution to this apparently intractable problem depends in large part on the
distinction between substantive and procedural rationality.
The preoccupation with methods of analysis and evaluation that emphasize
outcome rather than process, and the interest in what decisions are made, rather
than in how they are madeare typical of situations where certainty is assumed.
Indifference toward procedures and the formal layout of arguments is
understandable if one assumes that there exists a one best decision in a given
situation. If the correctness of the outcome can be determined unambiguously, the
manner in which the decision is made is largely immaterial; only results count. This
is the reason why the key concept in the theory of decision making under certainty,
whether in economics or in management science, is optimization. But
‘optimization’ has no well defined meaning when the consequences of each
feasible course of action are uncertain (one should not, for example, maximize the
expected return without considering also its variance). Hence, the key concept in
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the theory of decision making under uncertainty is not optimization but, as we shall
see, consistency, a characteristically procedural notion. Indeed, when the factual or
value premises of a decision are moot, when no generally accepted criterion for the
correctness of a solution exists, then the process or procedure of decision making
acquires special significance. This is the basic insight on which the classical
theories of judicial and legislative procedures are based; the reason why procedures
play such an important legitimating function in the decisions of courts and
legislatures (Luhmann, 1975). In general terms, the more complex a system, the
greater the reliance on procedural rationality, for, as Talcott Parsons writes: ‘Only
on the basis of procedural primacy can the system cope with a wide variety of
changing circumstances and types of cases without prior commitment to specific
solutions’ (Parsons, 1966, p. 27). In the following pages, as well as in the next two
chapters, I shall work out in some detail what procedural rationality means and
what it entails in the case of risk regulation. I begin by considering the important
topic of procedural harmonization.
2. Procedural Harmonization
The purpose of harmonization, as the term is used in the present context, is to make
the regulatory requirements or public policies of different jurisdictions more
similar, if not identical. Regulatory regimes, and the political and institutional
systems in which they are embedded, can differ in numerous aspects. Hence,
several broad types of harmonization may be usefully distinguished (Leebron,
1996). First, specific rules or standards that prescribe the desired characteristics of
the outputs of production processes, institutions, or transactions could be
harmonized. For example, emission limits for polluting factories located in
different countries may be made more similar. We may call this ‘output
harmonization’ since the goal is to reduce pre-existing differences in certain
characteristics of the relevant outputs or outcomes. Second, international regulatory
harmonization may relate to certain governmental policy objectivesfor example,
the central banks of the G-7 countries attempt to keep inflation within agreed
limits or to general policy principles such as the ‘polluter pays’ and the
precautionary principles.
Finally, harmonization of institutional structures, procedures or methodologies
is often sought. Thus, some of the provisions of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA; the reference here is to the NAFTA ‘side agreement’ on the
environment) require that certain procedures for enforcement of domestic laws,
including appellate review, be harmonized. Procedural harmonization usually
serves to reinforce other types of harmonization. If the aim is to harmonize
decisional outcomes, both substantive criteria and decisional processes are
implicated. Rules, policies, and principles will generally not be truly harmonized
unless the procedures and institutions for implementing them are made more
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similarly effective, and doing so may mean making them more similar (Leebron,
1996, p. 46). This, incidentally, is the reason why EU-level harmonization, for
example in the environmental field, fails to produce identical, or at least very
similar, results across the Union. EU measures are typically implemented by
national administrations, but the Community is not competent to harmonize
national administrative procedures and processes. The problem has been
recognized for some time, and certain directives attempt to harmonize not only
national laws and policy objectives, but also the institutional design of the
‘competent authorities’ at national level (E.g. with respect to their independence in
the case of telecommunications). The results so far have been rather disappointing
(Majone, 2000).
There are, however, situations where procedural harmonization is not meant to
reinforce other types of harmonization, but is the only type which is politically,
economically, or technically feasible. Thus, in the case of the NAFTA
environmental side-agreement it would have been impossible to impose on Mexico
the same environmental standards used in Canada or the United States. Hence,
Article 3 of the agreement rec ognize s ‘the right of ea ch Par ty to establish its own
levels of domestic environmental protec tion…’, while Article 5 re quires that ‘each
Par ty sha ll eff ective ly enf orce its environme ntal laws and regulations through
appropria te government action…’; and Ar ticle 6 requires that ‘interested pe rsons’ be
able to request a Par ty’s regulatory authorities to investigate possible violations of
dom estic environmental laws a nd regulations.
An important example of purely procedural harmonization is provided by the
WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPMs), to be further
discussed in the next chapter in connection with a critical evaluation of the
precautionary principle. Harmonization is discussed in Article 3, which states, in
part, that: a) In order to harmonize SPMs on as wide a basis as possible, member
states shall base their measures on international standards, guidelines or
recommendations, where they exist; b) SPMs that conform to international
standards shall be deemed to be necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health; c) Member states may, however, introduce or maintain SPMs which result
in a higher level of protection than would be achieved by measures based on the
relevant international standards, provided there is ‘scientific justification’ for the
stricter measures; d) Member states are required to ‘play a full part, within the
limits of their resources, in the relevant international organizations and their
subsidiary bodies’, such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission (see chapter 5).
This article is noteworthy in several respects. First, nothing substantive is said
about the level of the international standards, not even of a qualitative nature. By
way of comparison, the NAFTA Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
stipulates that ‘each Party shall ensure that its laws and regulations provide for high
levels of environmental protection and shall strive to continue to improve those
laws and regulations’. At the same time, the Agreement recognizes ‘the right
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of each Party to establish its own levels of domestic environmental protection’.
Thus, at least according to a widely accepted interpretation, a member of NAFTA
is permitted to set its own levels of protection, as long as those levels are ‘high’
by some more or less objective standard (cp. Also Article 95[3] TEC, according
to which ‘The Commission, in its proposals […] concerning health, safety,
environmental protection and consumer protection, will take as a base a high level
of protection…’).
By contrast, the approach of the WTO SPS Agreement is purely procedural, as
shown also by the requirement that the member states play an active role in the
activities of the international standardization bodies. Also the requirement that a
country provide ‘scientific justification’ if it wishes to adopt a higher level of
protection than what is provided by international standards, goes in the same
procedural direction: given the uncertainty surrounding the scientific basis of risk
regulation, ‘scientific justification’ can only mean that the relevant arguments
should satisfy generally accepted rules of scientific methodology. This
interpretation seems to be supported by Article 5 (on Assessment of Risk and
Determination of the Appropriate Level of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Protection),
which imposes purely methodological constraints on the freedom of each member
state to choose its own levels of safety: risk assessments based on the available
scientific evidence and on relevant inspection, sampling, and testing methods;
consideration of relevant economic factors and of the relative cost-effectiveness of
alternative approaches to limiting risks; consistency in the application of the
concept of the appropriate level of protection, and so on.
It seems clear that in an area as politically sensitive as the protection of health
and life, and where at the same time regulators face great scientific uncertainty and
trans-scientific problems, the only way to promote international regulatory
cooperation is through the harmonization of procedures. This, at any rate, is how
progress has been achieved in the international harmonization of testing procedures
for new medical drugs: the so-called ICH process, in which the European Agency
for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA) has played a leading role
(Majone, 2002). Precisely for this reason, as we argue in chapter 2, it is essential
that the procedural requirements of the SPS Agreement, and all other requirements
of the same nature, be respected and, if possible, improved, rather than weakened
or circumvented, allegedly in the name of risk prevention but in fact, for short-term
political or economic advantages.
3. Consistency in Decision-Making
It has already been suggested that our intuitive notions of means-end rationality and
optimality must be revised when decisions are made under uncertainty (strictly
speaking, all human decisions are uncertain in their outcomes, but here we consider
situations where it is impossible to rely on some simple ‘certainty equivalent’ such
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as an average value). Probabilistic thinking does not come naturally, even to
scientists or to intellectually sophisticated persons, but it is essential to a logically
defensible regulation of risk. It seems more natural to think of decisions and
institutions in teleological terms. According to this conception, as formulated by
John Rawls in his critique of utilitarianism, ‘those institutions and actions are right
which of the available alternatives produce the most good, or at least as much good
as any of the other institutions and acts open as real possibilities’. Rawls adds:
Teleological theories have a deep intuitive appeal since they seem to
embody the idea of rationality. It is natural to think that rationality is
maximizing something… Indeed, it is tempting to suppose that it is self-
evident that things should be arranged as to lead to the most good
(Rawls, 1973, p. 24-25).
Also modern decision theory prescribes to maximize something, namely,
expected utility, but this decision rule has procedural, not substantive, significance:
it ‘only’ guarantees consistent decision-making. Here I can do no more than sketch
the argument, starting with the key assumption of the theory: that there is only one
form of uncertainty and that all uncertainties can be compared. Thus decision
theory does away with all old-fashioned and theoretically untenable distinctions
such as that between statistical and non-statistical events, or Frank Knight’s (1971)
distinction between risk and uncertainty. By saying that there is only one kind of
uncertainty, and that therefore all uncertainties can be compared, it is meant that if
E and F are any two uncertain events then either E is more likely than F, F is more
likely than E, or E and F are equally likely. Moreover, if G is a third uncertain
event, and if E is more likely than F, and F is more likely than G, then E is more
likely than G. The first requirement expresses the comparability of any two events;
the second expresses a consistency in this comparison.
The comparability and consistency requirements are then used to define the
probability of any uncertain event E. This can be done in several, equivalent, ways.
For example, the probability of E can be obtained by comparing it with the
probability of a point falling at random within a set S contained in the unit square.
Because S is a subset of the unit square, its area is a probability, i.e., it is a number
between 0 and 1, which satisfies all the rules of the probability calculus.
Now, consistent comparability implies a unique value for the uncertainty of E, i.e.,
the probability of S (its area), is judged to be as likely as the uncertain event E,
in the sense that a prize awarded on the basis of E occurring could be replaced
by an equal prize dependent on a random point falling within S. The interested
reader can find the details in any good textbook on decision theory, such as the
one by Dennis Lindley (1971, p. 18-26). In addition to a numerical measure of
probabilities, we need a numerical measure for the consequences of our decisions.
We proceed as follows.
Let cij be the consequence if we choose alternative Ai and event Ej occurs, i = 1,
2, …, n; j = 1, 2, …, m. Note that the consequences may be qualitative as well as
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qua ntitative. Denote by c and C two conse quence s such that all possible conse quence s
in the decision problem are better than c and less desirable than C (it can be shown
that the precise choice of c and C does not matter, as long as the condition of
inclusion is satisfied; thus, we could choose as c the worst possible outcome in the
payoff table, and C as the best outcome). Now take any consequence cij and fix on
that. Consider a set S of area u in the unit square (the reason for using ‘u’ will be
clear in a moment; also, keep in mind that the area of S is a probability). Suppose
that if a random point falls in S, consequence C will occur, while c will occur if the
random point falls elsewhere in the unit square. In other words, C occurs with
probability u and c with probability 1-u. We proceed to compare cij with a ‘lottery’
in which you receive C with probability u and c with probability 1 - u. Thus, if
u = 1, ‘C with probability u’ is better than (or at least as good as) cij, while if u = 0
then ‘C with probability u’ is worse than cij. Furthermore, the greater the value of u
the more desirable the chance consequence ‘C with probability u’ becomes.
Using again the principle of consistent comparisons it can be shown that there
exists a unique value of u such that the two consequences, cij and ‘C with
probability u’, are equally desirable in that you would not mind which of the two
occurred. The argument consists in changing the value of u, any increase making
the ‘lottery’ more desirable, any decrease, less desirable, until ‘C with probability
u’ is as desirable as cij. We indicate this value with u and call it the utility of cij:
uij = u(cij). We repeat the process for each of the possible consequences in the
payoff table, replacing each consequence by its utility. The crucial point to
remember is that all these utilities are probabilities and hence obey the rules of the
probability calculus.
The final step consists in calculating the (expected) utility of each of the
alternatives: u(A1), u(A2), …, u(An). Using the basic rules of probability, it is
easy to show that u(Ai) is simply the average (more precisely, the ‘expected’) value
of the utilities of all the consequences corresponding to Ai : u(Ai) = u(ci1)p1 +
u(ci2)p2 + … u(cim)pm. A moment’s reflection will show that the expected utility of
Ai is simply the probability of obtaining C, when this particular alternative is
chosen. It follows that the best alternative is the one with the highest utility, being
the one which maximizes the probability of getting C. This is the principle of
maximization of expected utility, the major result of decision theory. Note that this
principle, or decision rule, has nothing to do with the notion of an indefinite
r epetition of the sa me de cision, as in some inte r pr etations of expe c te d gain in
re pe ate d games of chanc e. The principle follows dire ctly from the rules of probability
and hence ca n be a pplie d to any de cision situation, whe the r repetitive or unique.
The discussion so far may be summarized as follows. A decision problem can
be expressed as a list of alternatives and a list of possible events. On the
assumption of consistent comparison of events and of consequences, probabilities
can be assigned to events, and utilities to consequences. Each alternative can also
be assigned a utility, calculated as the expected value of the corresponding
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consequences. The best alternative is the one with the highest utility. A few more
comments on the general approach follow.
First, the consistency argument is essentially one that hinges on how separate
assessmentsprobabilities of events, utilities of individual consequences and of
alternativesare going to fit together and make a consistent whole. Second, the
rule of maximization of expected utility does not guarantee better actual results
than other decision rulesincluding decisions made in purely intuitive fashion. It
does, however, guarantee consistency in decision-making, and no other known
decision rule can claim the same. Third, consistency is important not only logically
but also practically: it facilitates communication among experts, between experts
and policy makers, and with the general public; by showing how to break down the
whole decision problem into separate but coherent components, it also facilitates
accountability; moreover, as mentioned in the following section on learning, the
method provides a way of consistently updating one’s beliefs in light of new
information. The type of decision analysis sketched here may even facilitate risk
taking. Thus, if managers are evaluated exclusively on outcomes, they will
naturally be reluctant to engage themselves in very risky undertakings. A more
sophisticated method of evaluation, which in addition to results also includes the
quality of the decision process, can reduce the cost of failure by distinguishing
between foresight and outcomes due to chance.
One final point. Any decision under uncertainty, even one which does make
explicit use of probabilities, in fact implies at least a partial probability assessment.
There is nothing mysterious in this statement, which is only a straightforward
application of a line of reasoning frequently used also in elementary game theory;
see, for example, James D. Morrow’s Game Theory for Political Scientists (1994,
p. 170-180). Suppose a decision maker has to choose between two alternatives with
the consequences indicated below:
E1 E2
A1 10  1
A2 3  2
Without attempting to estimate the probabilities of the uncertain events E1 and
E2, but only taking the consequences in the payoff table into account, she chooses
alternative A2. This choice suggests that our decision maker is very risk-averse. In
fact, she has used the maximin decision rule, according to which one should take
the worst consequence for each alternative, and then select the alternative which
offers the maximum of these minima; hence the name of the decision rule.
Although the maximin does not use probabilities, the choice of A2 indicates that the
decision was taken as if the probability of E1 was less than 1/8. In fact, letting p be
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the unknown probability of E1, hence 1-p the probability of E2, the expected values
of the two alternatives are:
M(A1) = 10p + (1-p) = 9p + 1
M(A2) = 3p + 2(1-p) = p + 2
Thus, our decision maker is indifferent between the two alternatives if 9p + 1 =
p + 2, i. e., if p = 1/8. Any value less than 1/8 makes A2 preferable to A1. Since A2
was chosen, we infer that the decision maker implicitly assumed that the
probability of E1 is less than 1/8, q. e. d.
4. Policy Learning
One serious limitation of the decision-theory approach sketched above is that, in
principle, it applies only to the decisions of an individual. Decision theory does not
provide unambiguous advice for group decisions, if the different members of the
group have different attitudes toward risk. Even in this situation, however, the
methodology can help, without providing a complete solution. As already noted,
the process of breaking down the decision problem into its main
componentsalternatives, uncertain events, consequences, numerical measures of
probabilities and consequences by identifying the particular sources of
disagreement, can facilitate interpersonal communication, and the emergence of a
common position. Moreover, an important, if elementary, result known as Bayes’
theorem, enables probabilities to be modified, in a consistent manner, by
incorporating the information provided by new data. This means that the pooling of
information among the members of a group, e.g., a committee, may serve as a
device for bringing the probability assessments of the members into reasonable
agreement. Even more is true: it has been shown (Blackwell-Dubins theorem) that
with increasing information the probability assessments of different individuals
tend to converge, provided the initial assessments are not mutually exclusive.
In the remainder of this section we are going to discuss policy learning, in the
area of risk regulation, in a broader, but less rigorous, sense than that of decision
theory and Bayesian statistics. However, in this and in the following chapters, we
should always keep in mind the fundamental lesson of the preceding discussion,
namely, that ideas should not be considered in isolation, but should be related to
other relevant ideas to see how they fit together in a coherent manner. To a large
extent, policy learning means learning this lesson, as we try to show by considering
the slow but steady, improvement in the conceptual foundations of risk regulation
in the United States. It is convenient to trace this development through a sequence
of four regulatory principles: prohibitions; lowest feasible risk; elimination of
significant risk; balancing the costs and benefits of risk reduction. While this is not
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a linea r ly pr ogre ssing, or monotone inc re asing, seque nc e since diff er e nt principle s
c oe xist even in the sa me ar ea , suc h as food sa fe tyw e shall a rgue that a tr e nd c an be 
detec te d in the dir e ction of a broade r inclusion of rele va nt fa ctor s, and of gr e ater 
c onsiste nc y in putting toge ther the var ious eleme nts of the regulatory pr oble m. 
Prohibitions represent one of the earliest and least sophisticated approaches to
risk regulation. To say this is not to deny that in some cases an outright ban may be
the most appropriate regulatory response, but only to say that the appropriateness of
such a radical measure has to be proved, rather than simply assumed. One of the
best-known illustrations of the problems raised by an apparently clear-cut
prohibition is provided by the so-called Delaney Clause in the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act. The Clause appears in the provision of the Act that empowers
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to license food additives. The Food
Additives Amendment was added to the law in 1958, and it directs the FDA to
refuse approval of any food additive not shown to be safe. To this general
instruction the Delaney Clause adds the proviso that:
No additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to induce cancer
when ingested by man or animal, or if it is found, after tests which are
appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of food additives, to induce
cancer in man or animals.
According to FDA officials, this proviso authorizes the agency to exercise
scientific judgment in determining whether a test is an appropriate one, and
whether the results demonstrate induction of cancer. Once the agency has made its
determinations concerning these two matters, however, no further inquiry is
allowed. For example, the agency may not establish a maximum level of safe use,
or authorize further use of an additive based on a judgment that the benefits of
continued use outweigh the risks involved (Mashaw et al. 1999). For nearly twenty
years the Delaney Clause had little influence on FDA’s actions, since only very few
additives had been shown to cause cancer in animal experiments. On March 9,
1977, however, the FDA announced its intention to ban the use of the artificial
sweetener saccharin because of a recent Canadian study showing that saccharin (in
doses equivalent to 800 cans of diet soft drinks a day!) induced cancer in test
animals. At the time no other non-nutritive sweetener was approved for use in the
United States. Hence the FDA announcement threatened the marketing of all
artificially sweetened foods and beverages and, consequently, precipitated intensive
public controversy. Representatives of health organizations testified at
congressional hearings, that saccharin provides enormous health benefits to
persons, such as diabetics, who must restrict the intake of sugar.
Responding to these concerns, Congress, through the Department of Health
and Human Services, commissioned two studies by the National Academy of
Sciences, one to assess the scientific evidence concerning saccharin’s safety; the
other to evaluate the law’s current food safety standards and suggest alternative
approaches. The Academy’s assessment of the scientific evidence confirmed
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that saccharin was a carcinogen in laboratory animals, although a weak one. It
found no reliable evidence that saccharin caused cancer in humans, but it stressed
that epidemiological methods were not capable of detecting increases in the
incidence of bladder cancer of the magnitude the animal data suggested saccharin
could cause.
The second Academy study found that the standards for regulating food
additives were inadequate. One proposal was to amend the law to allow FDA to
rank additives in three risk categories: those so serious as to merit prohibition;
those so trivial as to warrant no regulatory action; and those whose acceptability
should depend on an assessment of benefits and on the availability of alternatives.
The proposals did not lead to any radical amendment of the legislation, but the
FDA found other means to avoid a ban if a food additive presented only slight
risks, or offered substantial benefits. Thus, the agency has sometimes concluded
that a substance is not a ‘food additive’, and hence subject to the Delaney Clause,
even though it occurs in food, arguably through human agency (Mashaw et al.,
1998, p. 129-134). For example, FDA has refused to regulate compounds such as
PCBs and aflatoxin. Proceeding in this fashion, by the mid-1980s the agency had
effectively narrowed the application of the Delaney Clause to direct food additives.
In retrospect, we can see that the drafters of the Clause believed that only a few
additives caused cancer, but that they were extremely dangerous. By the 1980’s it
was clear that many substances are carcinogenic, but many of them create
exceptionally minor risks. The new information severely undermined the
assumptions of the Clause, suggesting that it may well cause more deaths than it
prevents. This is because vastly improved detection techniques prevent basically
safe, but weakly carcinogenic, substances from coming on the market, whereas
cruder and older technology used to test previously authorized substances allowed
them to be approved. The result is less rather than more safety (Sunstein, 1990).
4.1 Least Feasible Risk
According to this principle, human exposure to health risks should be reduced to
the lowest possible level. This is a sort of second-best rule. The first-best regulatory
policy would be one that ensures a risk-free working and living environment, but
because of technical and economic constraints a risk-free environment is
unattainable; hence the need of a second-best rule. Thus, Section 6(b)(5) of the
1970 Occupational Safety and Health Act directs the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA), in regulating worker exposure to toxic substances,
to set standards that:
[M]ost adequately assure, to the extent feasible, […] that no employee
will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if
such employee has regular exposure to the hazard […] for the period of
his working life (emphasis added).
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Trade union representatives claimed that this instruction obliged OSHA to
mandate the use of whatever available technology an industry could afford without
bankrupting itself. Justice Brennan of the U.S. Supreme Court expressed a similar
view: ‘Congress itself defined the basic relationship between costs and benefits, by
placing the “benefits” of worker health above all other considerations save those
making attainment of the “benefit” unachievable’ (cited in Graham et al., 1988,
p. 97). The meaning of ‘feasibility’ is crucial in the present context. A body of
analysis and case law has thus emerged to clarify this term.
According to some court decisions, a standard may be considered
technologically feasible even if no existing devices would allow industry to comply
with the standard, as long as there is evidence that companies ‘acting vigorously
and in good faith’, can develop the technology. This ‘technology forcing’ approach
implies that regulatory agencies are not limited to set standards based on existing
devices, but may require improvements in existing technology, or even the
development of new technology. This may be quite expensive, so the issue of
technical feasibility is inseparable from the issue of economic feasibility. It is clear
that regulators estimate the costs of proposed standards, but it is less clear which
criteria they use to judge whether a given standard is ‘affordable’.
At least as far as the Occupational Safety and Health Act is concerned,
American courts have ruled that an expensive standard is not necessarily
economically infeasible. Although some firms may find safety standards
particularly expensive or even financially prohibitive, courts have not excused
individual firms from such standards. As one court put it in a 1978 case:
It would appear to be consistent with the purposes of the [OSH] Act to
envisage the economic demise of an employer who has lagged behind
the industry in protecting the health and safety of employees and is
consequentially financially unable to comply with new standards as
quickly as other employers (cited in Graham et al., 1988, p. 99).
Thus, economic feasibility has been interpreted quite strictly: a standard is to be
considered ‘infeasible’ only if it would cripple or bankrupt an entire industry, rather
than some technologically backward firms.
It is clear that the least-feasible-risk approach is very far from any sort of
balancing of marginal costs and benefits. In fact, marginal considerations are
rejected on the ground that the two sides of the basic relationship are
incommensurable. As the opinion of Justice Brennan, cited above, makes clear,
health benefits have to be considered ‘above all other considerations’. Even if one
accepts this value judgment, however, serious conceptual problems remain. First,
the approach fails to consider possible alternatives to standards, such as
information disclosure or greater reliance on liability rules. It also omits any
consideration of probabilities of possible events, so that standards are set without
any knowledge of the expected number of deaths or accidents prevented.
21
Second, setting standards strictly is a significant cause of the slow pace of the
standard-setting process. This means that relatively few standards can be set, so
that many hazards remain unregulated; hence, over-regulation leads to under-
regulation (Mendeloff, 1988). Third, the emphasis on industry viability means that
very dangerous occupations in marginally profitable industries may be unregulated,
while other jobs may be made so safe at such high cost that employment levels and
wages shrinkanother instance of over-regulation leading to under-regulation.
Finally by ignoring one of the key lessons of economics and policy analysisthat
decisions should be based on marginal costs and benefitsthe approach wastes
resources that could have been used to control more risks.
4.2 The Significant-Risk Doctrine
As was indicated above, federal courts generally upheld OSHA’s standards. The
striking exception was the benzene standard, which reduced the occupational
exposure to this carcinogen from 10 parts per million (ppm) to 1 ppm. In the case
American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA (1978), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
held the regulation invalid on the ground that the agency had not shown that the
new exposure limit was ‘reasonably necessary and appropriate to provide safe or
healthful employment’ as required by the statute. Specifically, the court argued that
OSHA had failed to provide substantial evidence that the benefits to be achieved by
the stricter standard bore a reasonable relationship to the costs it imposed. The
court added:
This does not mean that OSHA must wait until deaths occur as a result
of exposure levels below 10 ppm before it may validly promulgate a
standard reducing the permissible exposure limit. Nevertheless, OSHA
must have some factual basis for an estimate of expected benefits before
it can determine that a one-half billion dollar standard is reasonably
necessary (cited in Mendeloff, 1988, p. 116-117).
What the court required was some sort of quantification of benefits as a
necessary step to carry out a benefit-cost test of the new standard. Without a
quantification of risk, and hence of the expected number of lives saved by the
regulation, it is clearly impossible to weigh the benefits against the costs. Unlike
other agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), OSHA had always maintained that quantitative
risk analysis is meaningless. Thus, in the preamble to the benzene standard it stated
that it was ‘impossible to derive any conclusions regarding dose-response
relationships’. As Mendeloff notes, OSHA’s reluctance to follow the example of
the EPA and the FDA reflected trade union pressures, combined with staff
preferences for protection to override any interest in the use of more analytic
approaches. It was feared that if the agency performed quantitative risk assessments
(QRAs), these might be used as a weapon by those who opposed strict standards.
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On the other hand, an agency like EPA with a much broader mandate, was aware
that not every risk could be reduced to the lowest feasible level.
The Fifth Circuit Court’s decision stunned OSHA’s leaders, who viewed it as a
total challenge to their regulatory philosophy and to their idea of the agency’s
mission (Mendeloff, 1988, p. 117). They decided to appeal the decision. In
Industrial Union Department (AFL-CIO) v. American Petroleum Institute (1980), a
badly split Supreme Court (the nine justices issued five separate opinions!) upheld
the Fifth Circuit’s decision, but not all parts of its argument; in particular, it
expressed no opinion about the requirement of a cost-benefit assessment. Justice
Powell, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, did however note that
A standard-setting process that ignored economic considerations would
result in a serious misallocation of resources and a lower effective level
of safety than could be achieved under standards set with reference to
the comparative benefits available at a lower cost (cited in Mashaw et
al., 1998, p. 815).
Expressing the view of a four judge plurality (in a separate opinion, Justice
Rehnquist provided the fifth vote for overturning the standard) Justice Stevens
explicitly rejected the lowest-feasible-risk approach:
We think it is clear that the statute was not designed to require
employers to provide absolute risk-free workplaces whenever it is
technologically feasible to do so, so long as the cost is not great enough
to destroy an entire industry. Rather, both the language and structure of
the Act, as well as its legislative history, indicate that it was intended to
require the elimination, as far as feasible, of significant risks of harm
(cited in Graham et al., 1988, p. 100. emphasis added).
In other words, zero risk cannot be the goal of risk regulation. Justice Stevens
insisted that ‘safe’ is not the same as risk-free, pointing to a variety of risks in daily
life ranging from driving a car to ‘breathing city air’ that people find
acceptable. Hence, before taking any decision, the risk from a toxic substance must
be quantified sufficiently to enable the agency to characterize it as significant ‘in an
understandable way’. Conceding the difficulty of quantifying risks, the plurality
opinion emphasized the scientific elements of the significant-risk determination. In
fact, OSHA was not required to support its finding that a significant risk exists with
anything approaching scientific certainty. So long as the determination is supported
by a body of reputable scientific thought, the agency is free to use conservative
assumptions in interpreting the data, risking error on the side of overprotection.
The problem with the proposed regulation was procedural rather than
substantive: the question was not whether the standard of 1 ppm was ‘correct’, but
whether sufficient justification for this determination had been provided. According
to the plurality opinion, this had not been done, hence the standard-setting process
was flawed. Thus, OSHA did not ask for comments as to whether or not benzene
presented a significant health risk at exposures of 10 ppm or less. Rather, it asked
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for comments as to whether 1 ppm was the minimum feasible exposure limit. Also
the evidence of adverse health effects of benzene exposure at 10 ppm was sketchy
at best. OSHA had not attempted to make any estimate, based on the available
scientific studies, of how significant the risk would be at exposure of 10 ppm or
less. Rather, it stated that because of a lack of data it was impossible to construct a
dose-response curve at this time, even rejecting an industry witness’ testimony that
a dose-response curve could be constructed on the basis of the reported
epidemiological studies. In short, the agency had simply concludedfrom the
government’s generic carcinogen policythat, in the absence of definitive proof of
a safe level, it must be assumed that any level above zero presents some increased
risk of cancer. But, as the justices pointed out:
In view of the fact that there are literally thousands of substances used in
the workplace that have been identified as carcinogens or suspect
carcinogens, the Government’s theory would give OSHA power to
impose enormous costs that might produce little, if any, discernible
benefit (cited in Mashaw et al., 1998, p. 813).
Since the government’s generic carcinogen policy provides no guidance as to
which substances should be regulated first, an important merit of the significant-
risk doctrine is to raise the crucial issue of regulatory priorities. Most risks are
regulated in response to petitions or pressures from labor unions, public-health
groups, environmentalists, and other political activists, with little analysis by the
agency of other possible regulatory targets. Given that resources are always limited,
the real (opportunity) cost of a regulation is the number of lives that could be saved
by using the same resources to control other, perhaps more significant, risks. By
requiring OSHA to show significant risk as a prelude to standard setting, the
justices were insisting on some analysis in priority setting: regulatory priorities
should be directed toward the most important risks—which are not necessarily
those that are politically most salient.
In conclusion, the significant-risk doctrine places a higher analytical burden on
regulators than the lowest-feasible-risk approach. Not all potential risks are treated
equally; only those substances shown to pose a significant risk of cancer will be
regulated, focusing limited agency resources on the most important health risks. In
addition, the doctrine, without requiring a formal marginal analysis of benefits and
costs, does place a constraint on the stringency of standards. If exposure to a
carcinogen is reduced to the point that the residual risk is insignificant, then no
further tightening of the standard is appropriate (Graham et al., 1988, p. 103-105).
Industrial Union Department (AFL-CIO) v. American Petroleum Institute is a
landmark case also from the point of view of the methodology of risk analysis.
The U.S. Supreme Court not only confirmed the legitimacy of quantitative risk
assessment; it effectively made reliance on the methodology obligatory for all
American agencies engaged in risk regulation. In most subsequent disputes over
regulatory decisions to protect human health, the question has not been whether a
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risk assessment was required but whether the assessment offered by the agency was
plausible (Mashaw et al., 1998, p. 823-825). This historical background
may explain American advocacy of science-based risk assessment at the
international level, as well as that country’s opposition to the precautionary
principle as interpreted by the European Commission. As we shall see in the next
chapter, risk assessment is the standard by which trade-restricting health
regulations are evaluated as necessary and compatible with the rules of the World
Trade Organization.
4.3 Balancing Costs and Benefits
Until the 1970s judicial review was the only effective control on the quality of the
decision-making process of American regulatory agencies. Congress can, of course,
pass legislation requiring that an agency take a particular type of action. However,
congressional oversight is output rather than process-oriented. At any rate,
routine regulatory measures seldom receive congressional scrutiny. Most
important, there is no need for congressional approval for a regulatory agency to
take action, provided that it can survive judicial review. By contrast, the courts
have been important agents of policy learning, as we just saw in the benzene case.
Nevertheless, judicial oversight, too, suffers from serious shortcomings. First, it is
only exercised ex postthough it true that a judicial doctrine like the significant-
risk doctrine, will influence a stream of future agency decisions. Also, the principle
of separation of powers prevents any sustained interaction between courts and
agencies before proceedings are formally initiated. Again, there is a serious
mismatch between the leisurely time of judicial decision-making and the hectic
pace of agency rule-making, while heavy reliance on judicial review creates,
according to many observers, an adversarial atmosphere which does not always
facilitate the achievement of regulatory objectives.
From the point of view of policy learning, the most serious limitation of judicial
review, however, is the unpredictability of court decisions. In the benzene case, for
example, the Supreme Court criticized the logic of the least-feasible-risk decision
rule, and effectively mandated the use of quantitative risk assessment, while taking
no position on the issue whether an agency should undertake a formal cost-benefit
analysis (CBA) to justify its decisions. More precisely, the question that was not
answered in the benzene case was: is the use of CBA by OSHA required,
permitted, or outlawed? At any rate, Justice Stevens’ opinion, strongly suggests
that the plurality shared the belief that the benzene standard imposed high costs
with limited benefits. But only a year later the Courtin the cotton-dust case
(American Textile Mfrs. v. Donovan, 1981) held explicitly that OSHA standards
need not show a positive cost-benefit ratio; they must only be shown to be
technologically achievable and ‘affordable’. Clearly, unpredictable court decisions
do not help systematic policy learning. The decision on the cotton-dust standard
seemed to interrupt an ongoing learning process, and for this reason it has been
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severely criticized by students of the regulatory process. No judicial decision,
however, could conceal the growing economic impact of risk regulation.
With the great expansion of environmental, health, and risk regulation in the
1970s, the need to calculate more precisely the costs of the proliferating
regulations, as well as the corresponding benefits, became increasingly evident.
According to many advocates of regulatory reform, only the executive could
provide a continuous and systematic oversight of the regulatory process. Important
steps to improve the quality of federal regulation were taken under President
Carter, when the notion of a ‘regulatory budget’ was first introduced. The oversight
mechanism was perfected in the late 1980s, during the second term of the Reagan
administration. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in the president’s
executive office, was given responsibility for setting the budgets of all regulatory
agencies, and for monitoring the rule-making process. Instead of simply imposing a
cost-effectiveness requirement, as previous presidents had done, Reagan moved to
a fully fledged cost-benefit test with his Executive Order No. 12291 of 1981:
regulatory action was not to be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society
outweigh the potential costs; among alternative approaches to any given regulatory
objective, the alternative involving the least net costs to society has to be chosen;
finally, agencies are required to set regulatory priorities with the aim of maximizing
the aggregate net benefits, taking into account the condition of the particular
industries affected by regulations, the condition of the national economy, and other
regulatory measures contemplated for the future. If the cost-benefit test conflicts
with the agency’s legislative mandate as it did at the time for most risk and
environmental regulationsthe test is not binding, in the sense that the standard
need not be based on the result of the cost-benefit calculations; but a complete
analysis must be submitted to the OMB nevertheless.
Executive Order No. 12498 of 1985 added to the oversight processthe review
by OMB of the regulation proposed by an agency, and of the analysis supporting
itthe development of a formal planning process whereby the agencies would
have to clear a regulatory agenda (a ‘regulatory calendar’) with OMB. The exercise
was meant to alert administration officials and the public at large as to the future of
regulatory policy. In practical terms, however, the regulatory calendar has not had
as much impact on policy outcomes as the formal review process, coupled with a
cost-benefit test. Although OMB has frequently been unable to enforce completely
the test because of conflicts with the agency’s legislative mandate, the quality of
rule-making has improved significantly over the last two decades. The usefulness
of the regulatory oversight process designed by the Reagan administration explains
why subsequent administrations, democrat as well as republican, have continued to
use it in a form that has not substantially changed from the original model. In the
meantime, also Congress was undergoing a learning process, resulting in a more
balanced appreciation of the many dimensions of risk regulation. In 1995,
regulatory legislation was passed. Its net effect is to strengthen the test that must be
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passed by new regulations. The key congressional concerns were that regulations
be based on an accurate assessment of the risks involved, rather than on worst case
scenarios, and that regulatory agencies proceed with regulations only if the benefits
exceed the costs (Viscusi et al., 1996, p. 27-28).
This brief survey of policy and institutional developments in the United States
reveals a steady improvement in the understanding of the various dimensions of
risk regulation scientific, economic, legal, and political and of the
methodologies for fitting together these partial analyses in a coherent manner. The
progress from the early reliance on outright bans or simple ‘feasibility’ tests to the
applications of key principles of decision theory not only to agency rule-making
but also to the enabling legislation, is an outstanding, and in many respects unique,
example of policy learning. Compared to these developments, risk regulation in
Europe, especially perhaps at Union level, is still at a rather primitive stage. Indeed,
in comparative terms, some recent episodessuch as the strenuous advocacy of the
precautionary principle, to be discussed next weekappear to be manifestations of
an infantile disorder of risk regulation rather than progressive moves. As we have
seen, policy learning in America has been made possible by the interaction among
different, partly cooperating, partly competing institutions. A more detailed study
would have revealed also the importance of a style of policy discourse that puts a
high premium on reliable quantitative information and on analytic sophistication.
While American institutions and political culture cannot be replicated on this side
of the Atlantic, a discussion of the foundations of risk regulation would be
seriously incomplete without at least mentioning some of the institutional issues
still waiting a satisfactory solution at European level.
5. Institutional Reform
A serious problem of Community regulation in general, and of risk regulation in
particular, is the mismatch between the growing complexity of the tasks and the
inadequacy of the existing regulatory institutions. The root cause of this problem is
to be found in the non-delegation doctrine promoted since the 1950s by the
European Court of Justice, and enthusiastically supported by the European
Commission Incidentally, it is interesting to note that in the United States a
corresponding non-delegation doctrineprohibiting the delegation of rule-making
powers by Congress to regulatory agencieshas not been applied by the federal
courts since the 1930s, despite the centrality of separation-of-powers in the federal
constitution. The ECJ’s ‘Meroni doctrine’, dating from 1958 (case 9/56, Meroni v.
High Authority) and relating specifically to the European Coal and Steel
Community Treaty, remains ‘good law’, and is supposed to apply to all European
treaties. It still acts as a barrier to the delegation of tasks to institutions not
mentioned as such within the European treatieseven when the scientific or
technical complexity of the tasks exceed the expertise of a generalist administration
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like the European Commission. In the Court’s reasoning, the Commission could, in
fact, delegate tasks to bodies not named in the treaty, but such delegation was
subject to strict constraints:
– Delegation must relate to the preparation and performance of
executive acts only;
– As a consequence of this, independent bodies may not be granted
any discretionary powers;
– Thus, the Commission must retain oversight over the delegated
competence and will be held responsible for the manner in which
it is performed;
– Finallyand this is the crucial pointsuch a delegation must
not disturb the ‘institutional balance’ embedded within the
Community method.
Such a narrow reading of Article 4 of the Treaty of Rome (now Article 7 EC
Treaty), is reflected in the structure and modus operandi of the European agencies,
which are subject to direct Commission oversight and largely engage only in
preparatory executive acts (or in what the Commission chooses to define as
‘preparatory’ acts).
Of the ten European agencies created in the 1990s (‘second generation’
agencies) only two have been delegated authority to make final determinations in
narrow technical fields: the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market, and
the Community Plant Variety Office. The rationale for this delegation, according to
the Commission’s Legal Service, is that in both cases the task is simply to verify
that individual applications satisfy certain conditions precisely defined by the
relevant EC regulations. Hence, agency decisions do not entail any use of
regulatory discretion beyond a purely technical evaluation of the applications
against fixed criteria. On the other hand, the most important of the second
generation agencies the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal
Products (EMEA)has not been granted the power to authorise the marketing of
new products: under present rules such authorisations can be given only by the
Commission, on the recommendation by the agency, and subject to the usual
comitology controls.
This pragmatic solution can perhaps be defended as a reasonable compromise
between the rigidity of the official non-delegation doctrine and the need of
regulatory discretion in highly technical matters. However, such a compromise
entails costs which a clearer delegation of authority would avoid. First, as the
agency itself complains, the need to wait for the Commission’s formal decision
means that precious time is lost before a new, and possibly life-saving, product
reaches the market. Moreover, the present situation blurs the line of accountability,
and because of its ambiguity presents risks for the Commission, which some day
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might be called upon to bear the responsibility of decisions in whose formation it
did not play any substantive role.
In the case of the European Food Safety Authority, the tension between the
desire to improve the credibility of EU regulation by appealing to independent
scientific expertise, and the refusal to delegate regulatory powers to the agency, has
been temporarily resolved by the doubtful expedient of separating institutionally
risk assessment (the task assigned to the Authority) and risk management (which
remains the responsibility of the Commission). Such institutional separation has
been tried in several countries, usually with disappointing results. For example, the
already mentioned U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 created the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), directing it to
perform research and risk assessments for the newly established regulatory agency,
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). While NIOSH is an
independent agency within the Department of Health and Human Services, OSHA
has been placed within the Department of Labor—an institutional design largely
dictated by political reasons. This organisational separation, however, yielded
functional separation to only a limited extent. On the one hand, NIOSH’s ‘criteria
documents’ not only provided risk assessments, but also recommended
occupational standards. On the other, OSHA tended to take on more of the risk
assessment function itself. NIOSH continued to assist OSHA in the preparation of
risk assessments, but gradually OSHA asserted control over the entire standard-
setting process. As the author of a detailed case study writes:
Despite its separation from OSHA, or indeed perhaps because of it,
NIOSH’s criteria documents were often found to be deficient as bases
for issuing standards. OSHA regulators found them to be little beyond
compendium summaries of the literature, with little effort to evaluate the
quality of relevant studies or to resolve scientific disputes. The lesson
appears to be that such complete organisational separation of functions is
counterproductive (Greenwood, 1984, p. 118).
The institutional separation of risk assessment and risk management is
counterproductive because while the two functions are conceptually distinct, they
are closely intertwined in practice. Thus, the setting of rational regulatory priorities
entails scientific, economic, and political judgements that are not easily separable.
Again, under conditions of scientific uncertainty the determinations of the risk
analysts can effectively pre-empt the decisions of the risk managers. For example,
it is often impossible to know whether a dose-response function follows a linear or
a non-linear (threshold) model, yet the scientists’ choice of one or the other model
is crucially important for the determination of the acceptable level of safety. If risk
assessment and risk management are not separable in practice, then it follows that
accountability and efficiency are best achieved when an expert agency, rather than
a collegial body of political executives like the Commission, is solely responsible
for the entire regulatory process. As in the case of pharmaceuticals so in the case of
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food safety, the refusal to delegate powers to independent bodies creates a serious
accountability deficit, as well as a growing credibility problem.
The credibility of Community regulation suffers also from the growing
politicisation of the Commission. The idea of reducing the democratic deficit of the
EC policy-making process by assigning a larger role to the European Parliament,
and in particular by involving the EP in the appointment of the Commission, is not
new. However, the procedure introduced by Article 214 EC contains a number of
radical changes with respect to previous practices, amounting to a deep
transformation of the relationship between the EP and the Commission. In the
future, the Commission will be fully responsible to the Parliament, whose influence
will be felt in all its activities, whether legislative, administrative, or regulatory. Of
course, an increasing level of politicisation of EC policy-making becomes
unavoidable as more and more tasks involving the use of political discretion are
shifted to the European level. At the same time, the progressive parliamentarisation
of the Commission raises important questions about the coherence and credibility
of EC regulation.
Both theory and experience suggest that regulatory powers should be delegated
to independent European agencies. However, because of the above-mentioned
Meroni doctrine, such a solution appears to be infeasible without changing the
Treaty. In the opinion of many legal scholars, and even of some Commission
officials, the required changes could be effected at the next IGC, by analogy with
the inclusion in the Treaty of Nice (Article 229a) of a clause allowing the creation
of judicial bodies in specialised areas. However, for the powerful anti-delegation
faction within the Commission (led by the Legal Service) an ad hoc change of the
Treaty would not be sufficient to overcome the doubts about the legality of
delegating rule-making powers to independent agencies. An isolated modification
of the Treaty in order to make possible the delegation of such powers to bodies
other than the Council, the European Parliament, and the Commission, it is argued,
would necessarily upset the institutional balance within the EC/EU. Moreover, the
argument continues, even a partial limitation of the regulatory competencies of the
Commission could compromise the technical capacities of its departments, thus
affecting the exercise of other essential competencies, in particular the monopoly of
legislative initiative. Such an amendment would undermine the very foundations of
the Community method, and thus could not be contemplated without a prior
constitutional debate on the future of the Community institutions.
The obvious counter-argument is that the balance of powers between the
policymaking institutions has changed continuously since the creation of the
European Communities; in fact, the rate of change has increased since the
Maastricht Treaty introduced the pillar structure of the Union. In addition the
delegation of rule-making powers to agencies could actually strengthen the
Commission, by allowing it to concentrate its limited resources on policy initiation
and on the other Treaty-based powers, as well as on the new managerial and
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political tasks entailed by enlargement. The crucial point, however, is that the
growing complexity of the Community policy-making system should be matched
by greater functional differentiation, in particular, by the explicit assignment of an
autonomous role to a ‘European regulatory estate’ the extended network of
national, sub-national, and supranational, organisations operating in the various
areas of regulatory policy making The lack of a European administrative
infrastructure means that between the supranational level of rule-making and the
national, or sub-national, levels of enforcement there is an institutional vacuum
which is supposed to be filled by the loyal cooperation of all the competent
authorities. Unfortunately, in many cases such cooperation is not forthcoming,
while significant differences in the resources, expertise, and political independence
of the various regulators differences which can only increase with the
enlargement of the Unionimpede a uniform application of the common rules.
One important function of a European regulatory estate would be to fill this
institutional vacuum by straddling the line that still separates the supranational
from the national (or sub-national) levels of regulatory governance. This would
send a clear signal to the various economic and social interests whose plans depend
on a reasonably consistent enforcement of EC regulations, that henceforth they will
be able to operate in a predictable environment.
In an globalizing world, managing international regulatory interdependence is
almost as important as filling the institutional vacuum separating the European and
the national levels of regulation. One of the negative consequences of the
politicisation of the Commission is the risk of international isolation on regulatory
issues. Thus, as we shall see in greater detail in the next chapter, the Commission,
spurred on by the Council and the European Parliament, is currently engaged in a
major effort to have the precautionary principle adopted as a ‘key tenet’ of
Community policy and as a ‘full-fledged and general principle of international law’
(Commission, 2000). While some progress has been made in the field of
international environmental law, the EU’s commitment to, and application of, the
principle has been repeatedly challenged by the WTO, the United States, and by
many other developed and developing countries. Thus, the proposals presented to
the Codex Alimentarius Committee on General Principles in April 2000 were
opposed by the U.S. and other third countries, which fear that the principle may be
too easily misused for protectionist purposes. Such fears are fed by episodes like
the proposed aflatoxin standardswhich would seriously affect the agricultural
exports of the poorest African countries for negligible health benefits to
Europeansand the beef hormones dispute which for years has opposed the EU to
its major trading partners. In this dispute the Commission found itself in the
position vis-à-vis the WTO bodies which various Member States have found
themselves vis-à-vis the Community, being sanctioned for introducing a public
health and consumer protection measure which was not sufficiently supported by
scientific evidence (de Búrca and Scott, 2000).
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Problems of accountability and credibility arise in all areas of European
regulation, but are particularly severe in risk regulation. The stubborn refusal to
delegate rule-making powers to independent agencies, coupled with the growing
politicization of the Commission, can only aggravate these problems in the future.
In fact, the controversy about the use and abuse of the precautionary principle may
be interpreted as the sign of a widening gap between the political objectives of
European integration and the correct setting of regulatory objectives and priorities.
In the past it was generally assumed that the two sets of objectives were largely
coincident or, at least, compatible. The assumption was justified as long as the
overriding priority was the establishment of the single European market. Today,
when this objective has been achieved in most sectors of the economy, Europeans
are entitled to demand that regulatory decisions in sensitive areas like food safety
should be taken, not for political reasons, however noble, but to pursue health and
safety objectives in the most efficient and effective way possible. As long as there
is no functional and institutional separation of regulatory and executive powers at
European level, so that the Commission retains the monopoly of policy initiation, it
will be difficult to dispel the suspicion that regulatory objectives and priorities may
be distorted for the sake of integration or, more cynically, in order to augment the
power and competencies of the Brussels bureaucracy. For this reason, the next IGC
should create the conditions that make possible the creation of full-fledged
regulatory agencies, independent from both the national governments and the
European executive, but subject to a stringent system of accountability and control.
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Chapter 2
What Price Safety?
The Precautionary Principle and
its Policy Implications∗
Giandomenico Majone
1. Introduction
Like the English constitution according to Walter Bagehot, the precautionary
approach includes two distinct sets of elements: the ‘dignified’ parts (‘those which
bring it force’), and the ‘efficient’ parts (‘those by which it, in fact, works’). In its
‘dignified’ aspect the approach purports to provide a legitimate basis for taking
protective regulatory measures even when reliable scientific evidence of the causes
and/or the scale of potential damage is lacking. Thus it appeals to many Europeans
who are increasingly concerned about the ‘globalisation of risk’: the transmission
of environmental and health risks through the channels of free trade.
In its ‘efficient’ aspect, however, the approach tends to expand regulatory
discretion at national and international levela discretion which can be used for a
variety of purposes: to meet legitimate public concerns, but also to practice
protectionism, or to reclaim national autonomy in politically sensitive areas of
public policy. Even the Commission, which considers the precautionary principle a
‘key tenet’ of its policy, admits that the principle may be used as a disguised form
of protectionism (Commission, 2000, p. 3 and passim).
                                                           
∗ This paper has been published in the Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 1,
March 2002, p. 89-109. It is reproduced here by kind permission of the editors and publisher of
the Journal.
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In sum, the precautionary approach is deeply ambiguous, and as we shall see in
the following pages, this ambiguity is abetted by a lack of clear definitions and
sound logical foundations. In the EC Treaty the precautionary principle appears
only in the Title on the environment. It is not defined there or anywhere else in the
Treaty. Nonetheless, the Commission, pushed by the Council and the European
Parliament (see section V), is presently engaged in a sustained effort to promote the
principle to the status of a ‘central plank’ of Community policy and, more
ambitiously, to the status of a general principle of international economic and
environmental law.
However, given the conceptual deficiencies and disturbing policy implications
discussed at some length in this paper, it seems unlikely that the other members of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) will accept the precautionary principle, at
least in the permissive interpretation advocated by the Commission. In the end the
major beneficiaries of this promotional campaign may well be the member states of
the EC/EU, which can use the approach to reclaim significant portions of their
regulatory autonomy in the management of environmental and health risks.
There are, in fact, indications that the member states are quickly learning to rely
on the principle of precaution as an argument to justify stricter national regulations.
In theory, the Commission allows member states to rely on the precautionary
principle only when the Community’s scientific committees consider that the
scientific evidence presented by the member states is justified in light of new
evidence, or by a particular national situation. The problem is that member states
seem to be increasingly suspicious of the findings of the Community’s scientific
committees, and increasingly inclined to rely on the determinations of their own
regulatory bodies (Scott and Vos, 2001). For example, the precautionary principle
has recently been invoked by Denmark as an argument for the annulment of the
Commission’s refusal to grant that country’s derogation request for its stricter
national regulations on the use of certain food additives (ibid., p. 22).
The politically significant question is why the Commission is willing to risk
international isolation and the segmentation of the European market for the sake of
a controversial and ill-understood principle. This paper offers some suggestions
which may help to explain this puzzle, but its focus is on the conceptual problems
and policy implications of the principle itself. A full discussion of the politics and
the political economy of the precautionary approach would require a separate
treatment. At any rate, a useful discussion along such lines presupposes some
knowledge of the substantive issues analysed in the following pages.
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2. Regulatory Science and Free Trade
Increasingly, science is playing a significant role in the regulation of international
trade. In particular, the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures introduces a new science-based regime for disciplining
health regulations which may affect international trade in agricultural products and
foodstuffs. Annex A to the Agreement defines a sanitary or phytosanitary (SPS)
measure as any measure applied to protect animal or plant life or health from a
variety of risks, including ‘risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or
disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs’.
Article 2(2) of the Agreement states, inter alia, that members of WTO shall
ensure that any SPS measure ‘is based on scientific principles and is not maintained
without sufficient scientific evidence, except as provided for in paragraph 7 of
Article 5’. Article 5 deals with risk assessment as a method for determining the
appropriate level of health protection. Risk assessment is the standard by which
SPS measures are to be judged as necessary and justified. In other words, for such
measures to be necessary, based on scientific principles and not maintained without
sufficient scientific evidence, they must be supported by a risk assessment
conducted according to the criteria, and taking into account the factors, mentioned
in Article 5. As interpreted by the WTO Appellate Body in the beef hormones case
(see Section IV), this article says that there must be a rational relationship between
the SPS measure and the risk assessment.
The exception provided by Article 5(7) applies to cases where relevant
scientific evidence is insufficient, in which case a member state may provisionally
adopt a measure
On the basis of available pertinent information… Members shall seek to
obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective
assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure
accordingly within a reasonable period of time (emphasis added).
Article 5(7) is the only reference to a precautionary approach in the entire
Agreement, and we shall come back to it in a later section. The aim of the
immediately following pages is simply to introduce the reader to some of the
conceptual and technical complexities surrounding the notions of ‘scientific
justification’ and ‘risk assessment’ as they apply to regulatory measures.
T he pr oc e ss of st a nda r d se t ting is at the cor e of r isk r e gula tion . If we 
und e r sta nd th e ex te nt of sc ie nti f ic unc e r ta int y in sta nd a r d se tti ng, w e ar e in a good 
pos ition to a ppr e c ia te the pr obl e ms of re gula t or y sc ie nc e . Ex tr a p ola ti on is a ke y
e le me nt in th e es ta bli shme n t of envir onme nta l and he a lth sta n da r d s, he nc e a good 
pa r t of the unc e r ta int y inh e r e nt in sta nd a r d se ttin g or i gina t e s in va r ious type s of 
e xt r a pol a tion pr o c e sse s. 
There is, first, the problem of extrapolating from animal experiments. A major
issue in regulatory science is the determination of the animal species that best
36
predicts the response in humans. There is little hope that one species could provide
the broad range of predictive potential needed to assess the responses of a highly
heterogeneous human population to different types of toxic substances. The
heterogeneity of human populations leaves the public authorities with an almost
impossible regulatory task. In an effort to find a way out of this dilemma, scientists
have developed several mathematical models expressing the probability of a
lifetime response, P, as a function of dosage D: P = f (D). This is the dose-response
function. Different choices of f lead to different models.
Regardless of the choice of model, however, one has always to extrapolate from
data points at high doses (the type of data provided by animal experiments) to the
low levels relevant to the regulation of risk to humans. However, the same data
points are compatible with a variety of extrapolating functions (Calabrese, 1978).
Thus, under a threshold (non-linear) dose-response model it would be possible to
establish a ‘virtually safe’ level of exposure, at the numerical value of the
threshold, even though high doses produce adverse health effects. Instead, if one
uses a linear dose-response relationship, adverse health effects are predicted at
every level of exposure, so that there is no obvious point at which a reasonable
standard could be set.
It may be arguedas do many advocates of the precautionary principlethat if
there is no firm scientific basis for choosing among different dose-response models,
then one should prefer the safest or most conservative procedure. One problem
with the conservatism argument is that it is not clear where one should stop. A no-
threshold model is more conservative than one that admits the existence of
thresholds for carcinogenic effects. But within the large class of no-threshold
models many degrees of conservatism are possible. Again, in designing a
toxicological experiment one could use the most sensitive species, the most
sensitive strain within the species, and so on down to the level of the most sensitive
animal. In short, it is difficult to be conservative in a consistent manner unless one
is prepared to propose a zero level of exposure in each case. This, in a nutshell, is
the main conceptual problem with the precautionary principle.
Now, extrapolating from the high doses shown to cause harm in animal
experiments or in epidemiological studies, to the much lower exposures normally
faced by humans is the essence of quantitative risk assessments. From what has
been said above it follows that uncertainty is a pervasive characteristic of
regulatory risk assessments. But the technique has been accepted and continues to
be used because there are no better alternatives. Thus the United States Supreme
Court in AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute (448 U.S. 607 [1980])the
landmark benzene casenot only confirmed the legitimacy of quantitative risk
assessment; it effectively made reliance on the methodology obligatory for all
American agencies engaged in health regulation. In most subsequent disputes over
regulatory decisions to protect human health, the question has not been whether a
risk assessment was required but whether the assessment offered by the agency was
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plausible (Mashaw et al., 1998, p. 823-825). This historical background may
explain U.S. advocacy of science-based risk assessment at the international level,
as well as that country’s opposition to the precautionary principle as interpreted by
the EU. Today the methodology of risk assessment is used by regulators in all
developed countries. Moreover, as mentioned above, risk assessment is the
standard by which trade-restricting health regulations are evaluated as necessary
and justified. As such, it plays a crucial role in the debate about the application of
the precautionary principle at the international level.
3. An Idea in Search of a Definition
The precautionary principle is an idea (perhaps a state of mind) rather than a clearly
defined concept, much less a guide to consistent policymaking. In fact it will be
shown below (see Section V) that there are logical reasons for its intrinsic
vagueness. Not surprisingly, an authoritative and generally accepted definition is
nowhere to be found. The principle is of German origin (Vorsorge Prinzip), and
has been used in that country since the 1980s in order to justify a number of
important developments in environmental law. However, an eminent legal expert
has distinguished no less than eleven different meanings assigned to the
precautionary principle within German policy discourse (Rehbinder, 1991).
The German approach was taken up by other policy elites in Europe, including
those which drafted the EC’s Fourth Environmental Action Programme, who
sought to develop an approach to environmental policy that was preventive rather
than reactive (Weale, 1992, p. 80). In the EC Treaty the principle appears only in
the Title on environment. Article 174 EC (ex Article 130[r]) provides that
Community environmental policy ‘shall be based on the precautionary principle
and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental
damage should as a priority be rectified at the source and that the polluter should
pay’. No definition of the precautionary principle is provided in this article or
anywhere else in the Treaty. In spite of this, it is argued by the Commission and by
some legal scholars that the principle applies beyond EC environmental policy.
This is because Article 6 EC provides that the environmental protection
requirements be integrated into the definition and implementation of Community
policies and activities referred to in Article 3 EC. In so far as the precautionary
principle is one of the core principles of EC environmental policy, it is concluded
that it should be integrated, as appropriate, into other Community policies (Scott
and Vos, 2001, p. 4).
As mentioned in Section II, there is an indirect reference to a precautionary
approach (again undefined) in Article 5(7) of the WTO SPS Agreement. WTO
member states are allowed to take measures unsupported by a risk assessment when
the relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, but only provisionally. Perhaps the
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best known statement of the precautionary principle is provided by Principle 15 of
the Declaration of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development
(Rio Declaration):
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely used by States according to their capabilities. Where there are
threats of serious and irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation.
It is important to notice that the similarity of some statements of the principle is
often more apparent than real. Even when such statements refer more or less
explicitly to a situation where the probability and extent of damage are poorly
understood, they often differ in the conditions which precautionary measures must
satisfy. Thus, according to the SPS Agreement such measures must be provisional,
but the European Commission chooses to interpret this condition not in terms of
clock time, but of the time necessary to achieve a sufficient level of scientific
certaintya very flexible standard, given the limitations of regulatory science!
Again, the Commission quotes with approval Principle 15 of the Rio
Declaration, even though the standards set by the drafters of the Declaration (a
threat of serious and irreversible damage, measures must be cost-effective) are a
good deal stricter than the ones the Commission advocates. For example, according
to the Commission a precautionary measure may be justified if there are
‘reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially dangerous effects on the
environment, human, animal or plant health may be inconsistent with the chosen
level of protection’ (Commission, 2000, p. 10; emphasis added)a significantly
more permissive standard than the threat of serious and irreversible damage.
Since the precautionary principle lends itself to a wide range of interpretations,
it would be instructive to see how the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the
Court of First Instance have dealt with it. A detailed discussion of relevant cases is
of course beyond the scope of the present papera good survey may be found in
Scott and Vos (2001). A general inference from major decisions appears to be that
in cases of scientific uncertainty, member states have considerable discretion in
deciding to err on the side of caution. They must however provide some evidence
of scientific uncertainty. They must adduce evidence of a specific, concrete risk
and not merely of potential risks based on a general precautionary approach (Scott
and Vos, p. 15). Thus in the famous German Beer case (Case 178/84 [1987]), the
ECJ refused to allow a ban on additives in beer, based on a generic principle of
prevention. The national authorities must come up with more specific scientific
evidence than a mere reference to the potential risks posed by the ingestion of
additives in general.
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4. The Precautionary Principle and the WTO: The Beef Hormones Case
As already mentioned, the EU is currently engaged in a major effort to have the
precautionary principle adopted as a ‘key tenet’ of Community policy and as a
‘full-fledged and general principle’ of international law (Commission, 2000).
While some progress has been made in the field of international environmental law,
the EU’s commitment to, and application of, the principle has been repeatedly
questioned or opposed by the WTO, the United States, and by other developed and
developing countries. Thus, the proposals on the precautionary principle presented
by the EU to the Codex Alimentarius Committee on General Principles in
April 2000 were opposed by the U.S. and many other third countries, which fear
that the principle may be too easily misused for protectionist purposes. Such fears
are fed by episodes like the proposed aflatoxin standards, to be briefly discussed in
Section VI, and the beef hormones dispute which for years has opposed the EU to
some of its major trading partners. In this dispute the European Commission found
itself in the position vis-à-vis the WTO bodies which various EC member states
have found themselves vis-à-vis the Community, being sanctioned for introducing
a public health and consumer protection measure which was not sufficiently
supported by scientific evidence (de Búrca and Scott, 2000, p. 6).
The Commission argued that the precautionary principle applies across the
whole of the SPS Agreement as a general principle of international law. The
WTO’s Appellate Body specifically rejected this argument and stated that the
principle must receive authoritative formulation before it can be raised to the status
sought for it by the EU. The same body also observed that the precautionary
principle has not been written into Article 5(7) of the SPS Agreement as a ground
for justifying measures that are otherwise inconsistent with the obligations of the
WTO set out in particular provisions of the Agreement.
T he controve r sy ove r the use of gr ow th hormone s in ca ttle ra ising, which ha s
opposed the EU to the U. S. and Canada in the fra mew or k of the W TO ’s dispute 
r esolution me chanism, ha s bee n discusse d ma ny times and fr om a va rie ty of 
disciplina ry and polic y per spec tives. The histor ica l ba c kground of the controve r sy is
not w ide ly know n, howe ve r . Be ca use of its re le va nce to the pr esent discussion it will
be br ie f ly re view ed he re . The imme dia te ly follow ing page s re ly he avily on rec ent
w or k by Christian Joe rges (1997, 2001) .
The hormones regime in the EC stems from Directive 81/602 on the prohibition
of ‘certain substances having a hormonal action and of any substances having a
thyrostatic action’. This directive was amended in 1985 by Directive 85/358,
extended in 1988 and consolidated by Directive 96/22. The 1985 directivewhich
was adopted by qualified majority on the basis of Article 43 EEC (now Article 37
EC) dealing with the common agricultural policyprohibited the use of hormones
in livestock farming. Even then the prohibition was controversial. The United
Kingdom brought suit against the directive, arguing inter alia that in view of
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its health objectives the directive should have been based on Article 100 (now
Article 94) on the approximation of laws. This article requires unanimity and hence
would have allowed the UK government to veto the prohibition of growth
hormones in cattle raising and meat products.
The effect of the 1985 directive was also to prohibit the importation of
American and Canadian beef into the Community, although this point was not
addressed in the legal controversy between the UK and the Community. Instead,
the UK asserted that in enacting the directive the Council should have taken into
consideration the scientific report which had been prepared in accordance with
Article 8 of Directive 81/602. According to this report, risk assessment had shown
that growth hormones used according to good veterinary practice would result in no
significant harm. This conclusion of its own scientific experts led the Commission
to reconsider the strict prohibition imposed by Community law.
However, both the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Council
strongly opposed any such policy change. Because of this opposition the
Commission cancelled further meetings of the group of scientific experts (Joerges,
2001, p. 10). At the same time the European Court of Justice rejected the complaint
of the UK government with the flimsy argument that Article 8 of Directive 81/602
imposed an obligation on the Commission only, so that the Council was under no
obligation to take the scientific report into consideration.
Opposition to the Commission’s willingness to accept the result of the risk
assessment and to reconsider the Community’s hormones policy accordingly, led to
change the rationale of that policy from health safety to ‘the interests of the
consumers in general’. As Advocate General Lenz put it, this type of consumer
protection need not be supported by scientific evidence. Once its legitimacy as an
objective of agricultural policy in general, and of the hormones directive in
particular, is accepted, there is:
Really no reason to examine the health problem […] and so the fact that
in the preamble to the contested directive the Council did not go into the
partial findings of the scientific group […] cannot be regarded as a
failure to give reasons (cited in Joerges, 1997, p. 309-310).
Without citing any empirical evidence, the Advocate General added that ‘it could
be seen that meat from animals treated with hormones is widely rejected’.
Some years later the Commission was to take a similar position, and even use
some of the same language, at the WTO level. In 1997 the U.S. and Canada filed
complaints with the WTO against the EC ban of meat products containing growth
hormones, submitting that this measure violates the SPS Agreement. This
agreement, it will be remembered, allows WTO members to adopt health standards
that are stricter than international standards, provided the stricter standards are
supported by risk assessment. Unfortunately, the risk assessment conducted by the
EC scientific experts had shown that the use of growth hormones according to good
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veterinary practice posed no significant health risk. Hence the Commission was
forced to meet the WTO challenge with arguments similar to those used by the
Advocate General in rejecting the UK’s complaint against Directive 85/358. In
particular, it pointed to various incidents since the early 1980s, when hormones that
entered the European food market had allegedly made European consumers wary
of beef. The Commission concluded that a ban of beef containing growth hormones
was necessary to restore consumer confidence.
The WTO’s Dispute Resolution Panel decided against the EC. The Panel raised
three objections: first, more permissive international standards existed for five of
the hormones; second, the EC measure was not based on a risk assessment, as
required by Article 5(1) of the SPS Agreement; finally, the EC policy was not
consistent, hence in violation of the no-discrimination requirement of Article 5(5).
The WTO’s Appellate Body agreed with the panel that the EC had failed to base its
measure on a risk assessment and decided against the EC essentially for two
reasons. First because the scientific evidence of harm produced by the Commission
was not ‘sufficiently specific to the case at hand’ it took the form of general
studies, but did not ‘address the particular kind of risk here at stake’. Second, the
Appellate Body endorsed the finding of the Dispute Resolution Panel that
‘theoretical uncertainty’ arising because ‘science can never provide absolute
certainty that a given substance will never have adverse health effects’ is not the
kind of risk to be assessed under Article 5(1) of the SPS Agreement. The similarity
with some of the older jurisprudence of the ECJ, particularly the German Beer
case, is remarkable.
5. The Commission’s Communication
As the preceding pages have shown, ‘[t]he issue of when and how to use the
precautionary principle, both within the European Union and internationally, is
giving rise to much debate, and to mixed, and sometimes contradictory views’
(Commission, 2000, p. 3). With its Communication on the precautionary principle
of 2 February 2000, the Commission intends to contribute to the ongoing debate
by: outlining its own understanding of the principle; establishing guidelines for
applying it; building a common understanding of how to assess and manage risks
under conditions of scientific uncertainty; avoiding recourse to the precautionary
principle as a disguised form of protectionism.
The document also serves political aims, being a response to pressures
originating from the European Parliament and the Council. In its Resolution of
10 March 1998 on the Green Paper on the General Principles of Food Law, the EP
had invited the Commission ‘to anticipate possible challenges to Community food
law by WTO bodies by requesting the scientific committees to present a full set of
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arguments based on the precautionary principle’. On 13 April 1999, the Council
adopted a Resolution urging the Commission, inter alia:
To be in the future ever more determined to be guided by the
precautionary principle in preparing proposals for legislation and in its
other consumer-related activities and develop as a priority clear and
effective guidelines for the application of this principle (both citations in
Commission, 2000, p. 25).
These political pressures are at least partly responsible for the ambiguity which
pervades the document, undermining its intellectual coherence. On the one hand,
the Commission is well aware of the danger that the member states of the EU may
use the precautionary principle in order to extend their own regulatory autonomy
vis-à-vis the Community. Hence the exhortation to ‘avoid unwarranted recourse to
the precautionary principle as a disguised form of protection’ (p. 3); the insistence
that ‘the precautionary principle can under no circumstances be used to justify the
adoption of arbitrary decisions’ (p. 13); the warning that ‘reliance on the
precautionary principle is no excuse for derogating from the general principles of
risk management’ (p. 18).
On the other hand, there is a strong temptation to use the principle to maximize
the EU’s regulatory discretion at the international level. Thus on page 3 we read:
The Commission considers that the Community, like other WTO
members, has the right to establish the level of protection […] that it
deems appropriate. Applying the precautionary principle is a key tenet of
its policy, and the choices it makes to this end will continue to affect the
views it defends internationally, on how this principle should be applied.
The same demand for maximum regulatory discretion is repeated, in various
forms, throughout the Communication:
A member (of the WTO) may apply measures, including measures based
on the precautionary principle, which lead to a higher level of protection
than that provided for in the relevant international standards or
recommendations (p. 11).
[…]
The Community is entitled to prescribe the level of protection, notably
as regards the environment and human, animal and plant health, which it
considers appropriate (p. 12).
[…]
Application of the precautionary principle is part of risk management,
when scientific uncertainty precludes a full assessment of the risk and
when decision-makers consider that the chosen level of environmental
protection or of human, animal and plant health may be in jeopardy
(p. 13; emphasis added).
While it strives to achieve broad regulatory discretion at the international level,
the Commission insists that the envisioned use of the precautionary principle, ‘far
from being a way of evading obligations arising from the WTO Agreements’, in
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fact complies with these obligations. Now, it is true that under the WTO SPS
Agreement, if a health measure has a scientific basis, there is little other countries
can do to challenge it. However, if a measure lacks an adequate scientific
justification, it will be subject to attack. The requirement of a scientific
justification, and of risk assessment as a prelude to standard setting, may be seen as
a limit on regulatory arbitrariness. But for the requirement to have meaning, there
must be the possibility of a dispute panel finding the absence of a scientific
justification and the inadequacy of a risk assessment (Atik, 1996-97).
As discussed in the preceding section, both the WTO’s Dispute Resolution
Panel and the Appellate Body determined that the EC’s ban on the importation of
American beef was unsupported by scientific evidence and by an adequate risk
assessment. One of the undeclared aims of the Communication is to prevent similar
embarrassments in the future by proposing very elastic interpretations of the
requirements of the SPS Agreement.
Thus, Article 5(7) of the Agreeme nt concedes that when sc ientif ic evidence is
insufficient, a country may adopt measures on the basis of the availa ble pe rtinent
inf ormation, but only provisionally. Moreover , the countr y must obtain the additional
inf ormation nec essary for a more objective risk assessment, and revie w the measur e
acc ordingly within a reasonable period of tim e. The Communica tion interpr ets these
requirements as follows: ‘The measures, although provisional, shall be maintained
as long as the scientific data remain incomplete, imprecise or inconclusive and as
long as the risk is considered too high to be imposed on society’ (Commission,
2000, p. 21; emphasis added). It is difficult to see how a dispute resolution panel
could apply such subjective standards.
Again, according to the Communication, the concept of risk assessment in the
SPS Agreement ‘leaves leeway for interpretation of what could be used as a basis
for a precautionary approach’. It need not be confined to purely quantitative
scientific data, but could include ‘non-quantifiable data of a factual or qualitative
nature’ (p. 12). This interpretation, the Commission claims, has been confirmed by
the WTO’s Appellate Body which, in the hormones case, rejected the panel’s initial
interpretation that the risk assessment had to be quantitative and had to establish a
minimum degree of risk. However, the opinion of the Appellate Body does not
necessarily coincide with the Commission’s permissive interpretation. Between this
interpretation and a quantitative risk analysis of the traditional type, there is a wide
range of possible analytic approaches. One such approach is comparative risk
assessment. Even though scientists may be unable to make exact quantitative
statements about the low-dose risks of particular substances, they can often rank
the risks of various substances at currently experienced doses. For example,
scientists might say that a lifetime exposure to x parts per million (ppm) of
substance A presents in their judgment a larger risk of cancer to a worker than a
lifetime exposure to y ppm of substance B (Graham et al., 1988, p. 200). It is not
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necessary to evaluate precisely the risks posed by both substances in order to have
a reasonable basis for such a comparison.
T he Communic ation insists tha t the pre c a utionar y princ iple of fe r s no excuse for 
de roga ting from the gene r a l pr inc iples of risk ma nage me nt, inc luding an
e xamina tion of the be ne f its and costs of ac tion and ina ction. Howe ve r , cost- be nef it
a nalysis should inc lude not only eva lua tion of the costs ‘to the Community’, but
a lso non- e c onomic conside r ations suc h as ac c e pta bility to the public . Who should
de te r mine public ac c e pta bility re ma ins unc le a r, unle ss this de te rmina tion is se en as
pa rt of the right of the Community to esta blish the le vel of pr ote c tion that it de e ms
a ppr opr ia te at any pa rtic ula r time . An adjustable pe g can justif y any me a sur e , 
ma king cost- be ne fit or risk ana lysis super f luous. 
We have here another manife station of the dee p ambiguity of the Communication.
This document is also a public relations exercise ‘designed to calm the fears of
those who perceive that the precautionary principle serves, in the case of the EU, to
legitimate decisions which are irrational other than in terms of their capacity to
serve protectionist goals’ (Scott and Vos, 2001, p. 31). Hence the emphasis on the
centrality of scientific evaluation and on the generally accepted principles of risk
management. However, the exercise is ultimately unpersuasive because all the
substantive and procedural constraints on regulatory arbitrariness are relaxed to the
point of becoming non-binding.
So far the Commission’s Communication has been criticized for what it says. In
the following pages it will be criticized for what it fails to consider.
6. The Precautionary Principle and the Logic of Decision-Making
A glaring shortcoming of the Communication is the failure to consider the overall
implications of adopting the precautionary principle, not as an exceptional
te mp or a r y me a s ur e but a s a ‘ ke y te n e t’ of Com mu nit y po lic y, a ‘g ui de in 
pr e p a r ing pr op os a l s f or le gi sl a ti on ’ , a ‘f ull - f le d ge d and ge ne r a l pr i nc ipl e of 
in te r n a ti on a l la w ’ . I n the pr e se n t se c ti on we e xa m in e the pr in c i pl e ’ s impl ic a t ion s
for the logic of decision-making. In the following section political and social
consequences will be discussed.
One important factor the Communication does not consider is the opportunity
cost of precautionary measures. The attempt to control poorly understood, low-
level risks necessarily uses up resources that in many cases could be directed more
effectively towards the reduction of well-known, large-scale risks. Thus, one of the
unanticipated consequences of the precautionary principle is to raise the issue of a
rational setting of regulatory priorities at national and European levels. Since
resources are always limited it is impossible to control all actual and potential risks.
Even if a society is willing ‘to pay a higher cost to protect an interest, such as the
environment or health, to which it attaches priority’ (Commission, 2000, p. 20), it
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is still the case that some environmental or risks regulations might be too
expensive. Hence the choice of which risks to regulate and when to regulate them
are crucially important for a rational allocation of resources and for consistency in
policymaking. Precautionary measures taken on an ad hoc basis, often in
response to political pressures may distort priorities and compromise the
consistency of regulatory policies.
More generally, the precautionary principle appears to be seriously flawed as an
aid to rational decision-making under uncertainty. Although lack of precise
definitions makes it difficult to develop a formal critique, the following
considerations may help to grasp the principle’s main theoretical shortcomings.
To begin with, recall that risk is a compound measure (more precisely, a
product) of the probability of harm and its severity. Now, according to the
fundamental theorem of decision theory, the only consistent rule for decision-
making under uncertainty is to choose the alternative which minimizes the
expected loss (or maximizes the expected utility). Consider a situation where there
are various possible events (or ‘states of nature’) E1, E2, …, En, with probabilities
p1, p2, …, pn, alternative actions A1, A2, …, Am, and losses lij for each combination
of alternative Ai and event Ej, i = 1, 2, …, m; j = 1, 2, …, n. The optimal decision
consists in choosing the alternative which minimizes the expected loss, i.e., the sum
of the products of the losses by the corresponding probabilities (formally: the
alternative which minimizes Σj pjlij).
Any good textbook on decision theory (e.g., Lindley, 1971) provides the proof
that any other decision ruleand in particular any rule which does not use both the
losses and the corresponding probabilitiescan lead to inconsistent decisions. One
such decision rule is the minimax principle, which in some respects is quite similar
to the precautionary principle. The minimax approach to decision-making under
uncertainty uses losses but not probabilities, either denying the existence of the
latter, or claiming that the method is to be used when they are unknown (here is an
important similarity with the precautionary principle). This approach makes sense
in special situationszero-sum games where the uncertainty is ‘strategic’, i.e. part
of the strategy of a rational opponentbut not in the general case, as may be seen
from the following examples. Consider first the decision problem described in
Table 1, where the entries indicate losses, e.g. extra deaths due to exposure to a
toxic substance:
Table 1
E1 (p1) E2 (p2)
A1 10 0
A2 1 1
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Following the minimax rule, for each row (i.e., alternative) we select the
maximum loss (10 for A1 and 1 for A2), and choose that alternative having the
minimum of these values. This is A2 with value 1. Hence the minimax rule says:
always choose A2. The principle of expected loss would assign probabilities p1 and
p2 to the uncertain events and choose A2 if 1 < 10 p1, i.e. p1 > 1/10, otherwise A1
should be selected. To see which of the two rules is more reasonable, suppose that
p1 is quite small (say, p1 = 0.01 or 0.001) so that 10 p1 is much less than 1. The
minimax rule would still choose A2, even though it is almost sure that no extra
deaths would occur under A1.
The result is even more striking in Table 2, where only the loss corresponding
to the pair (A1, E1) has been changed:
Table 2
E1  (p1) E2  (p2)
A1 1.1 0
A2 1 1
The minimax rule would still choose A2, even though the expected loss for A1 is
much smaller for all values of p1 less than, say, 0.8. In short, the problem with the
minimax rule is that it does not take account of all the information available to the
decision-maker. The advantage of the expected-loss rule is that it takes account of
both losses and probabilities.
As noted above, one defense of the minimax is that it is to be used when
probabilities are unknown (and perhaps unknowable). This argument is strongly
reminiscent of the distinction made by the American economist Frank Knight in the
1920s between ‘risk’ (when the events are uncertain, but their probabilities are
known) and ‘uncertainty’ (where the probabilities are unknown). Knight attached
great theoretical importance to this distinction, but modern analysis no longer
views the two classes of events as different in kind. Probabilities may be known
more or less precisely, they may be more or less subjective, but there are some
logical difficulties involved in giving meaning to the statement that the
probabilities are unknown. If we insist that we are ‘completely ignorant’ as to
which of the events E1, …, En will occur, it is hard to escape the conclusion that all
the events are equally likely to occur. But this implies that the probabilities are in
fact known, and that P(Ei) = 1/n for all i: the well-known uniform distribution!
The point of this digression on decision theory is to identify with more
precision than would otherwise be possible the logical problems raised by the
application of the precautionary principle. Like the minimax principle, the principle
of precaution tends to focus the attention of regulators on some particular events
and corresponding losses, rather than on the entire range of possibilities. As a
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consequence, regulators will base their determinations on worst cases, rather than
on the weighted average of all potential losses, i.e. on the expected overall loss.
The Commission’s Communication provides a good example. On page 19 we read
that in examining the benefits and costs of different alternatives, ‘[a] comparison
must be made between the most likely positive and negative consequences of the
envisaged actions and those of inaction…’ (emphasis added). Consistent decision-
making under uncertainty requires consideration of all consequences, not just the
most (or, for that matter, least) likely ones. Note, too, that if we are truly ignorant
of the probability distribution of consequencesa condition which is sometimes
invoked in order to justify recourse to the precautionary principle then it is
logically impossible to speak of ‘most likely’ consequences. The phrase implies a
ranking of probabilities, and hence at least an approximate knowledge of the
relevant distribution.
The most serious conceptual flaw, however, is the artificial distinction between
situations where scientific information is sufficient to permit a formal risk
assessment, and those where ‘scientific information is insufficient, inconclusive or
uncertain’. In reality, these are two points on a knowledge-ignorance continuum
rather than two qualitatively distinct situations. The same logic which leads to the
rejection of Knight’s distinction between risk and uncertainty, applies also here. As
we saw, by its very nature regulatory science deals with uncertainties. For example,
for most toxic substances it is still unknown whether the relevant model for
standard setting is a threshold or a linear one. Most scientists favour the latter
model, but this only complicates the regulator’s problem, since it is unclear where a
standard should be set above the zero level. Moreover, the continuous progress of
science and technology produces increasingly precise measurements of toxicity
(e.g. parts per billion) so that the search of safety becomes ever more elusive.
In short, regulatory problems are not solved but only complicated by appealing
to different logics of decision-making, according to the available level of
information. Especially in risk regulation, the normal state of affairs is neither
scientific certainty nor complete ignorance. For this reason a sensible principle of
decision-making is one that uses all the available information, weighted according
to its reliability, instead of privileging some particular hypothetical risk.
The prescriptions of decision theory break down only in one case, namely when
losses (or utilities) are unbounded. In such a case it is clearly impossible to
calculate expected values. An example of potential unbounded loss is the threat of
serious and irreversible damagethe situation envisaged by Principle 15 of the Rio
Declaration (see Section III). In this and similar situations, the precautionary
principle may be a useful tool of risk management. But to acknowledge such
possibilities is to recognize that the principle has a legitimate but quite limited role
in risk management.
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7. Political and Social Consequences
Under the political conditions prevailing today, the sustainability of a regime of
free trade and market integration depends crucially on international regulatory
cooperation and, at least in some areas, on the gradual approximation of national
rules and regulations. This dual process of trade liberalization and harmonization
has gone furthest in Europe, and for this reason the Community has been able to
play a key role in fostering international regulatory cooperation. This is especially
evident in the area of technical standardization. While the United States has very
few standards based on world standards, the EC has pursued a policy of close
cooperation with international standardization bodies. For example, today more
than 70% of European electrotechnical standards are based on world standards.
Given this tight cooperation between the European and the international levels, it is
quite likely that a world standard will automatically provide access to the large EC
market. This provides a very strong incentive for producers from third countries to
adopt world standards. The success of the European strategy has convinced the
United States that reliance on world standards may be critical to the international
competitiveness of American industry (Pelkmans, 1995).
Unfortunately, the situation is quite different in the area of health and safety
standards. As we saw above, the Commission would like to interpret the entire SPS
Agreement in the light of the precautionary principle, in order to be able to
conclude that the EC is free to adopt the level of safety that it deems appropriate,
regardless of the objections other countries may raise. Thus, just as the U.S. is
beginning to appreciate the importance of international regulatory cooperation, the
Community seems to be switching to an isolationist stance. By rejecting
international risk standards in the name of the precautionary principle, it
jeopardizes its role of pioneer in regulatory cooperation.
Finally, we should mention the distributive consequences of measures inspired
by this principle. The search of higher and higher levels of safety leads to
promulgate standards so stringent that the regulatory action ultimately imposes
high costs without achieving significant additional safety benefits. Perhaps we
should not be too concerned if such costs were felt only by exporters in rich
countries like the United States and Canada, and by affluent European consumers.
But what if the cost is borne by some of the poorest countries in the world?
The EU and all its member states are deeply committed to assist, financially and
otherwise, developing countries, especially African ones. However, World Bank
economists have recently estimated the impact on some of the poorest African
countries of new and very strict standards for aflatoxins (carcinogens present in
peanuts and other farm products) proposed by the Commission in the late 1990s in
the name of the precautionary principle. The proposed standards are significantly
more stringent than those adopted by the U.S., Canada and Australia, and also
stricter than the international standards established by the Codex Alimentarius
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Commission, a body advising the Food and Agriculture Organization and the
World Health Organization. Using trade and regulatory survey data for the member
states of the EU and nine African countries between 1989 and 1998, the World
Bank economists estimate that the new standards would decrease African exports
of cereals, dried fruits and nuts to the EU by 64 percent, relative to regulation set at
the international standards (Otsuki et al., 2000). This reduction in agricultural
exports is equivalent to a loss of about USD 700 million a year. Notice that African
countries cannot shift their export to other parts of the world because as former
colonies they are heavily dependent on European markets. Again, while middle-
income developing countries, such as Brazil, can evade the impact of the
precautionary measures by shifting to the export of processed food, poor countries
do not have this option.
At about the same time the World Bank report was published, the Commission,
through its president, was advertising its intention of eliminating all tariffs and
quantitative restrictions on imports from the poorest countries. Of course, the
practical significance of this apparently generous offer is greatly reduced by the
fact that some of the major obstacles to international trade today are not tariffs or
quantitative restrictions, but non-tariff barriers such as the aflatoxin standards and
similar measures inspired by the precautionary principle.
Are the additional costs imposed on African countries justified by the health
benefits for EU citizens? According to studies conducted by the Joint FAO/WHO
Expert Committee on Food Additives, the Community standard of 2 parts per
billion (ppb) for B1 aflatoxin would reduce deaths from liver cancer by 1.4 deaths
per billion, i.e. by less than one death per year in the EU. For the purpose of this
calculation the Community standard is compared to a standard that follows the
international (Codex) guideline of 9 ppb. Since about 33,000 people die from liver
cancer every year in the EU, one can see that the health gain produced by the
precautionary standard is indeed minuscule. Is saving less than two lives in a
billion in Europe worth the misery imposed on African farmers? It is true that,
according to the Commission, in examining the potential costs and benefits of
action or inaction only the ‘overall cost to the Community’ need be examined
(Commission, 2000, p. 5). But given the international commitments of the EUnot
least in the areas of development aid and environmental protectionthis sort of
Euro-centrism is, at best, undiplomatic.
8. Conclusions
T o r e pe at: the pre c a utiona ry pr inc iple has a le gitima te but limite d role to pla y in risk
r e gula tionw hene ve r the re is an imminent dange r of ir r e ver sible da ma ge , and/or 
know le dge of c a usa l proc e sse s is too limite d to br ing about a conse nsus of sc ie ntif ic
opinion. As I ha ve tr ie d to show in the pr ec e ding pa ge s, how eve r , the pr inciple la c ks
a fir m logic al founda tion; it may be misuse d for prote c tionist ends; it te nds to
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unde r mine inter na tiona l regula tory c oope ra tion; and it ma y have highly undesir a ble
distr ibutive consequence s. What is pe rhaps eve n mor e se r ious, the pr inciple , as
inter pr e te d by the Commission, raise s the possibility of a double standa r d for wha t is
per missible inter na tiona lly and in intr a- Community re la tions. Indee d, in the ar e a of 
r isk re gulation member states ar e be ginning to claim, in the ir re la tions with ea ch
other and with the EC, the sa me a utonomy whic h the Commission claims in rela tion
to the inter nationa l c ommunity. 
Given so many disturbing implications of a broad use of the precautionary
principle, how can we explain the Commission’s determination in attributing to it
the status of ‘a central plank of Community policy’? Part of the explanation has to
do with inter-institutional politics. As we saw, the Council and the EP urged the
Commission ‘to be […] ever more determined to be guided by the precautionary
principle in preparing proposals for legislation’, and ‘to anticipate possible
challenges to Community food law by the World Trade Organization and by
third countries’. These two European institutions were responding to domestic
political pressures, as well as to diffuse concerns about the ‘globalisation’ of risk.
In turn, a weakened and demoralised Commission is tempted to see in the
promulgation of the internationally strictest safety standards a promising way of
improving its legitimacy.
Related to this search for legitimacy is the search for credibility. In other words,
the ‘dignified parts’ of the precautionary principle may also serve to conceal a
general reluctance to establish credible regulatory institutions at European level.
Many observers have commented on the striking difference in the attitudes of
Americans and Europeans concerning technological, environmental and health
risks. Cultural factors are often mentioned as explanatory variables, but I believe
that the explanation is simpler, having to do with the different credibility of
regulatory institutions on the two sides of the Atlantic. From the thalidomide
disaster of the 1960s to the recent food scares, Europeans have experienced a series
of regulatory failures, largely unknown to Americans. Hence it is not surprising
that Americans trust their risk regulators while Europeans do not. To re-establish
consumers’ and producers’ confidence it would be necessary to create independent
bodiesEuropean agencies or more likely networks of national and European
regulatorsnot just to conduct scientific studies, but with powers of rule-making
and enforcement (Majone, 2000). For different reasons, however, neither the
Council nor the Commission or the Parliament presently favour such a solution.
Hence the recent emphasis on the precautionary principle could be interpreted as a
strategy to avoid or at least delay difficult institutional choices.
Each of these hypotheses probably contains more than a grain of truth. To test
them, however, would require a separate treatment. What the present paper does
attempt to do, is to raise reasoned doubts about the general applicability of the
precautionary principle. The Commission’s Communication does not pretend to be
the last word on the subject. Rather, it is meant to be ‘a point of departure for a
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broader study of the conditions in which risks should be assessed, appraised,
managed and communicated’ (Commission, 2000, p. 22). This paper is offered as a
contribution to such a study.
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Chapter 3
European Regulatory Agencies:
The Dilemma of Delegation of Powers
in the European Union
Giandomenico Majone
1. Introduction
The Commission’s White Paper on European Governance contains a short section
on ‘Better application of EU rules through regulatory agencies’. The section lists
the main conditions for the creation of such agencies at European level. These
conditions are mostly negative in nature: agencies can be granted the power to take
individual decisions in specific areas but cannot adopt general regulatory measures;
they cannot be granted decision-making powers ‘in areas in which they would have
to arbitrate between conflicting public interests, exercise political discretion or
carry out complex economic assessments’; they cannot be given responsibilities for
which the Treaty has conferred a direct power of decision on the Commission
(CEC, 2001, p. 43).
Now, there is nothing peculiar about the unwillingness of the Commission to
give up its regulatory powers. In any political system the delegation of such powers
always raises political as well as constitutional problems, but this has not prevented
the recent proliferation of more or less independent regulatory bodies in developed
and developing countries. Also in the United States, for example, the creation of a
new agency ‘is viewed always with regret and frequently with hostility. Efforts are
constantly made to entrust the discharge of these new functions to the officials of
an existing branch of government’ (Landis, 1966 [1938], p. 25). This has not
prevented Congress from establishing scores of independent regulatory
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commissions, boards and agencies, and from delegating to them all the necessary
powers of rule-making, adjudication and enforcement.
The delegation of regulatory powers to independent agencies raises normative
as well as political problems. Both in Europe and in America the key normative
problem is, in Richard Stewart’s words, how ‘to control and validate the exercise of
essentially legislative powers by administrative agencies that do not enjoy the
formal legitimation of one-person, one-vote election’ (Stewart, 1975, p. 1688). The
American polity has grappled with this issue for more than a century. The ‘non-
delegation doctrine’ was the first attempt to resolve the normative problems raised
by the emergence of a modern system of administrative regulation. For several
decades the doctrine enjoyed such widespread acceptance that it came to be
regarded as the traditional model of administrative law. The model conceives of the
regulatory agency as a mere transmission belt for implementing legislative
directives in particular cases. Vague, general, or ambiguous statutes create
discretion and thus threaten the legitimacy of agency action. Hence, when passing
laws Congress should decide all questions of policy, and frame its statutes in such
specific terms that administrative regulation will not entail the exercise of broad
discretion by the regulators (Stewart, 1975).
The non-delegation doctrine had already found widespread acceptance when the
first institutionalisation of the American regulatory state, the Interstate Commerce
Commission, was established by the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. The Act,
with its detailed grant of authority, seemed to exemplify the transmission-belt
model of administrative regulation. However, the subsequent experience of railroad
regulation revealed the difficulty of deriving operational guidelines from general
standards. By the time the Federal Trade Commission was established in 1914, the
agency received essentially a blank check authorising it to eliminate unfair
competition. The New Deal agencies received even broader grants of power to
regulate particular sectors of the economy ‘in the public interest’. The last time
the US Supreme Court used the non-delegation doctrine was in 1935, when in
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (293 US 388) and in Schecter Poultry Corp. v.
United States (295 US 495) it held the delegation in the National Industrial
Recovery Act unconstitutional.
The doctrine against delegation unravelled because the practical case for
allowing regulatory discretion is overwhelming. At the same time, however, the
question of whether and under what conditions a legislature should be permitted to
delegate rule-making powers to other institutions or branches of government is
central to the theory and practice of a constitutional democracy based on the
principle of separation of powers. The tension between efficiency in decision-
making and constitutional principles creates the dilemma of delegation of
regulatory powers. At any rate, the US Supreme Court’s reiteration of the non-
delegation principle, coupled with its very sparing use to strike down legislation,
illustrates a continuing judicial effort to harmonise the modern regulatory state with
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traditional notions of separation of powers, representative government, and the rule
of law (Mashaw, Merrill and Shane, 1998).
In the EC/EU the adaptation of the institutional framework to the growing
volume and complexity of regulatory tasks has proved much more difficult, and the
dilemma of delegation is correspondingly more complex. It is the aim of this paper
to explain the reasons of these peculiar difficulties. A first observation is that, while
in the USA the non-delegation doctrine is based on the principle of separation
of powers—Congress rather than administrators should make the law in the
EC/EU the corresponding doctrine is based on the very different principle of
institutional balance. Hence, any attempt to explain the dilemma of delegation of
power at the European level, must start from an explanation of the latter principle.
The recent Commission’s Communication on the role of European agencies in the
Community system of governance (CEC, 2002) provides a convenient starting
point for our analysis.
2. Taxonomic Problems
We start by examining some classificatory problems of the document, for such
problems reveal underlying conceptual and political problems. The Commission’s
opposition to the creation of full fledged European regulatory agencies is well
expressed by the restrictive conditions mentioned at the beginning of the preceding
section. The White Book on governance did not spell out the reasons for this
opposition, but it did anticipate a document defining in greater detail the criteria for
the creation of new regulatory agencies, and the framework within which they
should operate, as well as setting out the Community’s supervisory responsibilities
over such agencies. That document has now appeared: it is the Communication on
The Framework for European Regulatory Agencies of 11 December 2002 (CEC,
2002). This document is useful, not only for understanding the current position of
the Commission concerning this specific problem, but more generally, for assessing
the capacity of the Community method to evolve and adapt to new tasks and new
situations. I shall conclude that the reluctance to delegate regulatory powers is a
revealing indication of the rigidity of the methoda rigidity which creates serious
obstacles to policy and institutional innovation. The implications of this conclusion
become clear when one realises that much of the work of the constitutional
convention boils down to various attempts to answer the single question: what is
the role of the Community method in the next stages of the integration process?
Before tackling these more general issues, however, it may be instructive to
examine the political roots of some of the terminological and conceptual
ambiguities of the Communication.
The scope of this document at first sight appears to be rather limited. The
proposed ‘operating framework’ only applies to a fairly small, if strategically
important, subset of European agencies: those which come within the heading of
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regulatory agencies (see below), and that have been set up within the institutional
framework of the EC Treaty. At present there are 15 agencies created under the EC
Treatyranging from the European Centre for the Development of Vocational
Training, and the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and
Working Conditions, both established in 1975, to the three bodies established in
2002: the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the European Maritime Safety
Agency, and the European Aviation Safety Agency. Currently pending is also a
proposal for a Regulation establishing a European Railway Agency. One agency
has been created under the Euratom Treaty (the Euratom Supply Agency, created in
1958), while four more bodies have been established under the second and the third
pillar of the European Union: the European Police Office (‘Europol’, established by
the Convention of 26.07.1995); the European Union Institute for Security Studies
(Joint Action of 20.07.2001); the European Union Satellite Centre (Joint Action of
20.07.2001); and Eurojust (the prosecution agency established by Council Decision
of 28.02.2002).
Of the 15 EC agencies, the Commission’s Communication identifies the profiles
of two main types: executive and regulatory. Executive agencies are ‘responsible
for purely managerial tasks, i.e. assisting the Commission in implementing the
Community’s financial support programmes and are subject to strict supervision by
it’ (CEC, 2002, p. 3). Note, however, that in other parts of the same document the
term ‘executive agency’ is used in a somewhat different sense, to characterise a
subset of regulatory agencies, namely ‘those which have no independent power of
decision vis-à-vis third parties but perform all other regulatory tasks […] in order to
enable the Commission to discharge its duties’ (CEC, 2002, p. 8). In this sense,
both the European Agency for Reconstruction and the European Agency for the
Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA) are ‘executive agencies’ a
terminological confusion produced by a conceptual oxymoron: a regulatory agency
without regulatory powers! The confusion is not dispelled by the formal definition:
‘The concept of European Regulatory Agency designates agencies required to be
actively involved in exercising the executive function by enacting instruments
which contribute to regulating a specific sector’ (ibid., p. 4).
The Commission recognises that the executive/regulatory dichotomy does not
cover some of the existing European agencies, but seems unwilling to acknowledge
that its taxonomic difficulties are the consequence of deeper conceptual and
political problems. In fact, also the proposed trichotomy of regulatory agencies is
far from being exhaustive. The document identifies three groups of regulatory
agencies: those, such as EMEA and EFSA, whose function is primarily to provide
assistance in the form of opinions and recommendations, which form the technical
and scientific basis for the Commission’s decisions; those, like the European
Maritime Safety Agency, providing assistance in the form of inspection reports,
in order to enable the Commission to meet its responsibilities as guardian of EC
law; finally, those empowered to adopt individual decisions which are legally
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binding on third parties: the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market
(Trademark Office), the Community Plant Variety Office, and the European
Aviation Safety Agency.
It will be noted that the European Environment Agency (EEA) does not fit into
any of these three groups, in fact it does not even qualify as a regulatory agency
since it is not ‘actively involved in exercising the executive function’. Yet, all
member states, political parties, and European institutions voiced support for the
proposal of an environmental agency at European level, made by Commission
President Delors in January 1989. However this general agreement concealed deep
divisions concerning specific institutional choices, especially those concerning the
regulatory powers and effective independence of the new agency (Majone, 2002a,
p. 308-9). The European Parliament, green parties, and some top Commission
officials, like the then Environment Commissioner, Ripa di Meana, wanted a body
with regulatory ‘teeth’. In varying degrees all member states opposed the idea that
the agency could monitor the implementation of EC environmental legislation,
preferring to restrict its task to collection of environmental information. The idea
that the EEA could become a sort of inspectorate of national environment
inspectorates, along the lines of the existing Fisheries Inspectorate, had a number of
influential supporters in the Commission. Being aware of the opposition of the
member states, however, in the end the Commission did not propose any inspection
tasks for the agency. At any rate, the majority of the college of Commissioners
were reluctant to surrender any significant regulatory powers to an agency
operating at arm’s length.
Thus, the political struggle over institutional choice led to the establishment of
an agency that does not fit into any of the categories now proposed by the
Commission. The main task assigned to the EEA is to provide the Community and
the member states with information on the state of the environment in Europe, and
in particular ‘to provide the Commission with the information that it needs to
be able to carry out successfully its task of identifying, preparing, and
evaluating measures and legislation in the field of the environment’ (Article 2 of
Regulation 210/90 of 07.05.1990). The wording is sufficiently vague, however, that
it is not clea r whe ther the age nc y would be allow e d to inf luenc e dir e ctly polic y
f ormula tion, for exa mple by eva lua ting alte r native pr oposa ls for environme nta l
r e gula tor y mea sure s. In fa ct, until now the EEA ha s not be e n allow e d to ca rr y out
r e se a r c h tha t is dir e ctly polic y re leva nt. This example re ve als with pa r ticula r cla r ity
the politic a l roots of the ta xonomic and conc eptua l diff ic ultie s which be se t the 
Communica tion. Othe r exa mple s could be cite d. T hus, the re ason tha t the Eur opea n
Ma ritime Sa f ety Age nc y and the Eur opea n Avia tion Saf e ty A ge ncy have bee n give n
diff e r e nt ta sks and henc e assigne d to diff e r e nt ca te gor ie s (se e above ), is ve r y like ly
politic al: the membe r sta tes pr ef e r to have mar itime sa fe ty re gula te d by an
inte r na tiona l or ga nisation, the Inte rna tiona l Ma r itime Or ga nisa tion, tha n by a
Community body with the powe r to ta ke le ga lly binding dec isions (I ow e this
60
obse r va tion to Sar a Poli) . One is re minded of Te r r y Moe’ s obse r vation conce r ning
the politic s of institutiona l choic e :
However grand and lofty the policies that emerge from the political
process, it is virtually guaranteed that the bureaucratic arrangements that
go with them are the product of compromise and, thus, in part, are
designed by opponents to ensure that policies are not achieved (Moe,
1990, p. 27).
3. The Proposed Framework
Before discussing the extent to which the Commission is prepared to delegate
powers to regulatory agencies, it is useful to examine the legal, organisational
and financial arrangements proposed by the Communication. Concerning the
creation of agencies, the document introduces some significant innovations with
respect to the practice generally followed so far. Arguably, the most important
innovationor, rather, codification of the most recent practiceconcerns the legal
basis. In the past, agencies were created using Article 308 of the EC Treaty,
according to which:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain […] one of
the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the
necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal
from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take
the appropriate measures.
Now it is proposed that the legal base for establishing an agency be the same as that
which authorises the corresponding Community policy. The argument is simple and
convincing: since the regulatory agency is an instrument of implementation of a
specific policy, the legal act creating it should be based on the same provision of
the treaty which constitutes the specific legal basis for that policy. This logic has
already been followed in the creation of the Food Safety Authority and of the two
agencies dealing with transport safety.
This innovation in no way affects the Commission’s monopoly of policy
initiationso that it is always up to the Commission to decide whether an agency
is needed in a given policy areabut it changes significantly the role of the
European Parliament. Under Article 308 the EP had only to be consulted. Hence its
capacity to affect the institutional design and the powers of the agency was
minimal. But if the basis of the legal instrument creating the agency is the same
provision of the EC Treaty which authorises the policy the agency is supposed to
(help to) implement, then in all areas of co-decision (which is to say, in most
internal market legislation) the EP should be able to influence the design of the
agency, rather than seeing its proposals ignored by the other European
institutionsas in the case of the European Environment Agency, see above and
Majone (2002a, p. 308-10).
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Another apparently quite sensible proposal concerns the location of the
agencies. Disagreements among the member states over the siting of various
European bodies and institutions have been a constant feature of institutional
development in the EC/EU. The legislation creating most of the existing agencies
did not specify the location of their headquarters. Hence, the siting decision was
taken at the level of the European Council, applying by analogy Article 289 EC
which says that the seat of the institutions of the EC is to be determined by
common accord of the national governments But it often took years before such an
agreement could be reached. Now the Commission proposes that the seat of each
agency should be specified in the instrument of establishment. The proposal is
sensible, in principle, but it may be politically infeasible because of the foreseeable
opposition of the member states. Even if accepted, it could simply move the
conflict over siting from the diplomatic to the legislative stage, further delaying
approval of the Commission’s proposal. Under the present system, as long as there
is no agreement in the Council about siting, the agency can at least operate in
provisional headquarters, in Brussels or elsewhere.
Concerning organisational arrangements, the Communication challenges the
composition of the management boards of existing agencies. These management
(or administrative) boards are the steering bodies of the agencies, having
responsibility for defining their general operating guidelines and work
programmes, approving their budgets, and appointing their executive directors. At
present, the boards are composed of one or two representatives of each member
state, a Commission representative; in some cases, they also include members
appointed by the European Parliament or the social partners. The Commission
argues that such arrangements are administratively too cumbersome, especially in
view of the upcoming enlargement of the Union, and too dominated by the member
states. Because of the numerical dominance of the national representatives, it is
claimed, the boards fail to take sufficient account of the Community interest. The
Communication argues in favour of smaller boards where national and
supranational interests are more evenly represented. Concretely, it suggests a 15-
member administrative board, including six representatives appointed by the
Commission, six by the Council, and three, with no voting rights, representing the
interested parties.
In an earlier proposal for the organisation of the Food Safety Authority, the
Commission had suggested that the management board of that body should include
four representative appointed by the Council, four appointed by the Commission,
four appointed by the EP, and four representatives of consumers and industry, to be
designated by the Commission. This proposal, and a similar arrangement for the
Maritime Safety Agency, were rejected by the member states. In the case of the
EFSA, however, the member states did draw some lessons from the BSE crisis.
They recognised the need to give up, at least in part, the principle of national
representation in the board of the authority in order to stress its independence and
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the scientific quality of its advice on food safety. In the end, the member states
accepted the idea of a rotation of the different countries of origin of the members of
the management board ‘without any post being reserved for nationals of any
specific Member State’ (Recital 41 of the Preamble of Regulation 178/2002 of the
European Parliament and the Council, OJ 2002, L 031/1). As a result, the board of
EFSA is composed of one Commission representative and 14 members appointed
by the Council, in consultation with the EP, on the basis of a list drawn up by the
Commission. Of these 14 members, four must have experience of working with
consumer organisations and other relevant interest groups. To compensate for the
partial loss of national representation, an Advisory Forum was established. It is
composed of representatives of national regulatory bodies, one for each member
state; its task is to advise the executive director of the agency on the EFSA’s
working programme and on other matters, such as the resolution of conflicts of
scientific opinion. At any rate, the case of EFSA is exceptional. The principle of
national representation was again adhered to in case of the maritime and aviation
safety agencies.
Thus, it seems doubtful that the national governments will accept the
Communication’s proposal of smaller boards, with rotating national representatives
and an equal number of Commission representatives. Another proposal may have
better chances of being accepted. While in the past the Commission always pleaded
in favour of including EP representatives in the boards, now the Communication
argues that appointments by the EP are:
Inappropriate in view of the regulatory agencies’ work and the fact that
the Parliament must be free to exercise external political supervision
over their activities, without feeling tied by its membership of the
administrative board (CEC, 2002, p. 9).
The point seems to be well taken, since most agencies depend at least for part of
their revenue, on Community subsidies. As non-compulsory expenditures, these
subsidies are ultimately determined by the EP. Discharge for the implementation of
agency budgets being given by the Parliament (on the recommendation of the
Council), the presence of MEPs in the agency boards could create situations of
conflict of interest. In order to increase the financial control which EP and
Commission can exert on the agencies, the Communication suggests that all
European agencies should receive subsidies from the EC budget. At present, some
of the key regulatory agencies charge service fees which cover in whole (the case
of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market) or in part (e.g., EMEA)
their operating expenses.
Finally, the Communication proposes a procedure for the appointment or
dismissal of agency directors that would greatly strengthen the influence of the
Commission on the functioning of the agencies. At present, the director is
appointed by the Commission only at the two ‘first generation’ agencies: the
European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training and the European
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Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. Both agencies
were created in 1975, and cannot be considered as regulatory agencies in the sense
defined in this document. In all other cases, the appointment of the director is one
of the most important functions of the administrative boards which, as we saw, are
largely dominated by the member states. The new proposal differentiates between
decision-making agencies and those agencies which only assist the Commission in
the implementation of regulatory policies. In the former case, appointment (and
dismissal) should be by the Commission on the basis of a list of candidates put
forward by the administrative board, while in the case of ‘executive’ agencies the
procedure is reversed: appointment by the administrative board from a list of
candidates put forward by the Commission. Making the Commission the appointing
authority in the case of the decision-making agencies is necessary, it is argued, if
this institution ‘is to assume its responsibility for the executive function at
European level effectively while respecting the autonomy of the decision-making
agency’. The director must be able of gaining and maintaining the confidence of
the administrative board and, ‘especially, of the Commission as the authority
ultimately in charge of implementation’ (CEC, 2002, p. 10).
4. Delegation of Powers and Institutional Balance
As we saw, the Commission has changed its traditional position on a number of
points concerning the organisation and the functioning of European regulatory
agencies. On the central issue of the delegation of rule-making powers, on the other
hand, its official position has hardly changed over the years: agencies may not be
empowered to adopt legislative measures of general applicability. The only
exception to a strict non-delegation doctrine is the admission that agencies may be
allowed to adopt individual decisions in clearly specified areas of Community
legislation, ‘where a single public interest predominates and where they do not
have to arbitrate on conflicting public interests, exercise powers of political
judgement or make complex economic assessments’ (CEC, 2002, p. 11). The
Office of Harmonisation in the Internal Market, which deals with trademarks and
industrial property, the Community Plant Variety Office, and the European
Aviation Safety Agency, have been deemed to satisfy these conditions and hence
have been allowed to adopt legally binding decisions in the adjudication of
particular cases.
The Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products and the Food Safety
Authority seem to satisfy the same conditions: EMEA is exclusively concerned
with the safety and efficacy of new medical drugs; EFSA, with the safety of the
food we eat. Yet, these agencies have been denied any decision-making power: in
both cases, the Commission makes, at least formally, the final determinations. Once
more, the lack of logical consistency reveals the unwillingness to surrender
politically and economically important powers. What interests us here are the
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arguments used in order to justify this unwillingness in the debate now taking place
not only in public, but also within the Commission itself. In fact, the official
position expressed by the White Paper on European governance and by the
Communication on the operating framework for the European regulatory agencies
is not shared by everybody. A number of Commission officials now openly
advocate the creation of European agencies with powers of rule-making as well as
adjudication. This internal opposition is particularly vocal in the Commission
services dealing with policy areas, such as transport, energy, telecommunications,
and risk regulation, where the shortcomings of the traditional legal approach to
market integration are most evident. The reformers are not yet strong enough to
overcome the resistance of the traditionalistsin 2001 the Directorate General for
Transport had to withdraw its original proposal of a fully fledged agency for
aviation safetybut feel that time is working in their favour (Yataganas, 2001;
Majone, 2002b).
A striking feature of the debate taking place within the Commission between
opponents and advocates of independent European agencies, is the importance both
groups attach to the principle of institutional balance. In a sense, this agreement is
not surprising since the Court of Justice itself attaches constitutional value to the
notion of institutional balance or, equivalently, ‘balance of powers’. In Meroni
(case 9/56 Meroni v. High Authority [1957-8], ECR 133) the Court justified the
limitations on the lawful delegation of powers by referring to ‘the balance of
powers which is characteristic of the institutional structure of the Community’, and
which must be seen as ‘a fundamental guarantee granted by the Treaty in particular
to the undertakings [...] to which it applies’. The Court concluded that ‘to delegate
a discretionary power, by entrusting it to bodies other than those which the Treaty
has established to effect and supervise the exercise of such power within the limits
of its own authority, would render that guarantee ineffective’. Thus for the ECJ
‘balance of powers’ plays in the Community system a role analogous to that of
‘separation of powers’ in modern constitutional democracies.
Separation of powers is the centrepiece of modern constitutionalism. When
countervailing branches of government are correctly arranged, then, in
Montesquieu’s words, ‘power arrests power’. Elaborating on suggestive remarks by
the French philosopher, James Madison clarified how separation of powers could
be maintained by giving each branch of government a ‘constitutional control’ over
the others. This control consisted in ‘a partial agency in the acts of the others’, for
instance the presidential veto over measures passed by Congress, or the Senate’s
power of refusing consent to certain of the President’s appointments (citation in
Beer, 1993, p. 284). What separation of powers is to modern constitutionalism,
institutional balance is to the much older type of polity known as ‘mixed
government’. As I have argued elsewhere (Majone, 2002b), the European
Community is best understood, in constitutional terms, as a latter-day version of
mixed government. Here it is sufficient to point out that both the theory of
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separation of powers and the theory of mixed government share the idea of using
different ‘powers’ (in the EC context, different institutions) to check and balance
one another. But as Samuel Beer (1993, p. 285) has pointed out, the end served by
these controls is quite differently conceived by the two models. While the modern
theory refers to the separation of branches of government, in the model of mixed
government, the division of power among ‘estates’, such as King, Lords, and
Commons in England, was designed to balance different social and political
interests. All the estates shared in the legislative power. ‘Balance’ resulted since
the consent of each was necessary to the exercise of that power. Each, therefore,
was a check on the others since it could withhold its consent. Unlike the control by
partial agency of Madison’s scheme, however, this check was not intended to
confine each to a certain function but to prevent any of the social interests
represented by the estates from becoming dominant.
It is hardly necessary to remind the reader that the constitutional architecture of
the Community is not based on the principle of separation of powers. One of its
characteristic features is the impossibility of mapping functions onto specific
institutions. Thus the EC has no legislature but a legislative process in which the
Council, the Parliament, and the Commission have different parts to play.
Similarly, there is no identifiable executive since executive powers are exercised
for some purposes by the Council acting on a Commission proposal, for other
purposes by the Commission, and overwhelmingly by the Member States in
implementing European policies on the ground (Dashwood, 1996).
Perhaps the most striking violation of separation-of-powers is the Commission’s
monopoly of legislative initiative: not a rightas in parliamentary systems where
the executive has a right of legislative initiativebut an actual monopoly, so that
the other institutions cannot legislate in the absence of a prior proposal by the
Commission, while the Commission cannot be compelled to take a legislative
initiative when it thinks that such initiative is not in the interest of the Community
(Lenaerts, 1993). This extraordinary grant of monopoly powerwhich has been
only slightly diminished by the right of the European Parliament to submit directly
to the Council its amendments at second reading in the co-decision
procedureshould be understood as a form of pre-commitment to the process of
European integration by the framers of the Treaty. If the Council had a right of
legislative initiative, it could undo previous pro-integration legislation any time this
appeared to be politically advantageous. By the same logic, but also to preserve the
balance between Community institutions, the right of legislative initiative is denied
also to the popularly elected Parliamentone of several instances where the value
of integration trumps democratic values.
The persuasiveness of the theory of the mixed polity depended on its ability to
involve in the government all of the social orders of the body politicto combine
in the polity the ‘powers of society’, and not simply governmental functions. On
the other hand, the constituent elements of the mixed polity were pre-eminently
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interested in questions of privileges and rights (‘liberties’): rights of the territorial
ruler as against the estates, and vice-versa; or the respective rights of each estate
vis-à-vis the others. Hence the prime theme of the internal political process was, as
in today’s EC, the tug-of-war among autonomous power centres over the extent and
security of their respective jurisdictional prerogatives and immunities. However,
the contest was tempered, again as in the EC, by a high degree of
institutionalisation. In principle, law in the mixed polity could not be modified at
the will of any one party, since it was not seen as the product of unilateral will in
the first place (Poggi, 1978, p. 46-59 ).
It seems unlikely that the framers of the Treaties establishing the European
Communities were directly inspired by ancient theories of government, but they did
make a conscious choice between two distinct conceptions: that of separating the
functional branches of government, and that of mixing the ‘estates’ of the polity in
the legislaturewhere the three ‘political’ estates are not, of course, the Crown,
Lords and Commons, as in the classical English model of mixed government, but
the national governments, the supranational institutions, and the ‘peoples of the
States brought together in the Community’ (Article 20 of the ECSC Treaty;
Art. 107 of the EAEC Treaty; Art. 137 of the EEC Treaty), representedat least
virtuallyfirst in the Common Assembly and then in the European Parliament.
Jean Paul Jacqué has emphasised the fact that the organising principle of the
Community is not the separation of powers but the representation of interests. Each
Community institution is the bearer of a particular interest which it strives to
protect and promote. The nature of the prevailing interest determines the structure
of decision-making. Thus, when the framers of the Treaty deemed that national
interests should hold sway in a policy area of particular relevance to national
sovereignty, such as fiscal harmonisation, they required a unanimous vote in the
Council. On the other hand, where it appeared that national interests had to be
reconciled with the common interest, it was decided that the Council should
legislate by qualified majority, thus enhancing the significance of the Commission
proposal. Again, where it was thought that the common, rather than the national,
interest should prevail, the Commission was given an autonomous power of
decision. In short, each subject matter has its own decision-making procedure
according to the nature of the interest receiving special protection (Jacqué, 1991,
p. 289-91).
In a mixed polity the balance between interests, and between the institutions
that represent those interests, has constitutional value. The principle of institutional
balance does not of course imply an equal allocation of power among the various
institutions. Rather, it refers to the preservation of the relative position of each
interest in the governance of the polity. In fact, the overall order of the mixed polity
results from the harmonious disparitas among its constituent elements (Mannori
and Sordi, 2001, p. 23). In the Community context it is the task of the Court of
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Justice to ensure the respect of a balance of powers which reflects the basic
agreements reached at the constitutional level.
The rule that ‘each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred
upon it by this Treaty’ (Article 7 (1), ex Art. 4 (1), EC Treaty) must be read in the
light of the principle of institutional balance. This means that each institution (1)
has the necessary independence in exercising its powers; (2) must respect the
powers of the other institutions; and (3) may not unconditionally assign its powers
to other institutions or bodies (Lenaerts and Van Nuffel, 1999, p. 414). The
centrality of the norm of institutional balance is what makes the delegation problem
particularly troublesome in the EC.
5. The Community Method and Institutional Rigidity
The official non-delegation doctrine is only one manifestation of the institutional
rigidity induced by the Community method. Let us briefly recall the essential
elements of the method:
– The Commission alone makes legislative and policy proposals,
and is independent of the other European institutions. Its
independence is meant to strengthen its ability to execute policy,
act as the guardian of the Treaty, and represent the Community
in international negotiations.
– Legislative and budgetary acts are adopted by the Council of
Ministers and the European Parliament, always on a proposal
made by the Commission.
– The European Court of Justice guarantees the maintenance of
the balance among European institutions, and respect for the rule
of law.
Several idiosyncratic features of the Community method should be noted. First,
the Commission and the ECJ are major players under the method, while they have
no significant role in the second and in the non-communitarized parts of the third
pillar. Second, these major players are non-elected bodies, operating within poorly
defined accountability structures. For example, even though the Commission may
be submitted to parliamentary censure, in practice censure is often a strategic
instrument in the struggle between the EP and the Council, rather than an
instrument of control of the Commission by the Parliament (Magnette, 2001).
Relative to the political systems of the member states, non-majoritarian institutions
thus play an exceptionally large role in Community governance, a fact which is at
the root of the perception of a ‘democratic deficit’. Again, one should note the
Commission’s aspirationexpressed in the concluding pages of the White Book on
governance, but also pervading the Communication on the European regulatory
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agencies to add to its monopoly of legislative initiative also the role of sole
executive power at European level.
The most striking feature of the Community method is its violation both of the
basic principle of parliamentary democracy the parliament as the source of
legislation—and of the principle of separation of powers, as discussed above. The
Commission’s monopoly of legislative and policy initiativeits agenda-setting
powerhas no analogue in parliamentary democracies. For, if it is true that in such
systems most bills are initiated by the executive, neither civil servants nor their
political masters can preempt the right of initiative of parliamentary parties and
individual members of parliament. Besides, national executives are the expression
of the party or coalition which won the last election, and this is certainly not the
case of the Commission.
It is important to appreciate what is implied by the Commission’s monopoly of
agenda setting. First, other European institutions cannot legislate in the absence of
a prior proposal from the Commission. Second, the Commission can amend its
proposal at any time while it is under discussion in Coreper or in the Council, while
the Council can amend the proposal only by unanimity (except in the conciliation
phase of the co-decision procedure, see below). Thus if the Council unanimously
wishes to adopt a measure which differs from the Commission’s proposal, the latter
can deprive the main Community legislator of its power of decision by
withdrawing its proposal. Finally, neither the Council nor the EP or a member state
can compel the Commission to submit a proposal, except in those few cases where
the Treaty imposes an obligation to legislate.
For these reasons, the Community method, which for several decades has been
a powerful engine of market integration, is increasingly perceived as too rigid to
accommodate the needs of an increasingly complex and diversified polity. As Jean
Paul Jacqué argues, it is not possible for Community institutions to achieve more
than incremental adjustments within the given framework, since the Court of
Justice polices very carefully the principle of institutional balance:
For a significant evolution to take place it would be necessary that an
institution renounces to exercise its prerogatives to align its position on
that of another institution. This is hardly conceivable since each
institution is the representative of interests which it is its duty to protect
(Jacqué, 1991, p. 252; my translation).
This rigidity of the traditional method is the reason why since the early 1990s most
significant institutional innovations and new policy developments have been taking
place outside the Community framework.
In the institutional architecture designed by the 1992 Treaty on European Union
the Community method is confined to the first ‘pillar’. The other two pillars
(Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs) are only
partly adjusted to the Community method. The European Council the only
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distinct organ of the EUdoes not act subject exclusively to a proposal from
Commission, and is not subject to any control by the EP, or to the scrutiny of the
Court of Justice, except indirectly. The Commission is supposed to be ‘fully
associated’ with the tasks in CFSP and JHA, but its power to monitor the
fulfillment of treaty obligations by the member states has been explicitly omitted
and its power of agenda setting, severely restricted. The EP is simply informed
about decisions taken in CFSP and in JHA, and may express its opinion, while the
jurisdiction of the ECJ is excluded not only in these areas, but also with regard to
the ‘Common Provisions’ (Title 1, TEU). Even in the first pillar, the TEU defined
new competencies in a way that limits the exercise of Community power, for
example by excluding any harmonisation of national laws and regulation in the new
policy areas.
6. Two Strategies of Regulatory Reform
Given the rigidity of the legal framework, how is reform of European regulatory
policies and institutions possible? The Commission’s Communication, in spite of
its conceptual ambiguities, indicates rather clearly the limits of what can be
achieved by the Community method, as defined and interpreted by the Commission
and the ECJ. Under this method only the Commission can initiate policy, so that no
significant reforms can be expected from this direction. But without such reforms
the credibility crisis of European regulation (Majone, 2000) will persist and
probably even deepen. I argue that this dilemma can be resolved only by going
outside the Community framework. This could be done following two different
strategies which, if properly implemented, could be mutually reinforcing rather
than mutually exclusive.
The key idea of the first strategy is that the growing complexity of policy-
making at European level should be matched by greater functional differentiation,
in particular, by explicitly assigning an autonomous role to the ‘regulatory
estate’the extended network of national, sub-national and European organisations
operating in the various areas of regulatory policy-making. This autonomous role
would be acknowledged in all the areas of regulation not assigned by the Treaty to
the exclusive responsibility of the Commission. The model here is the European
System of Central Banks (see below) but the notion of a regulatory estatea term
meant to recall the nature of the EC as a mixed polityis analogous to the concept
of the ‘fourth branch of government’ used by American scholars to denote the
distinctiveness and underlying unity of the regulatory process, as well as its
importance to modern governance. This process is not simply an extension of the
executive process. Rather, to quote one of the most distinguished students and
practitioners of regulation in America:
In the grant (to the regulatory process) of that full ambit of authority
necessary for it in order to plan, to promote, and to police, it presents an
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assemblage of rights normally exercisable by government as a whole.
Moreover, its characteristic is the concept of governance, limited, of
course, within those boundaries derived from its constituent statutory
authority (Landis, 1966 [1938], p. 15).
At present, the lack of a European administrative infrastructure means that
between the supranational level of rule-making and the national level of
enforcement there is an institutional vacuum which is supposed to be filled by the
loyal cooperation of the national authorities. Unfortunately, in many cases such
cooperation is not forthcoming, while significant differences in the resources,
expertise and political independence of national regulatorsdifferences which can
only increase with the enlargement of the Unionimpede a uniform application of
the common rules. One important function of the European regulatory estate would
be to fill this institutional vacuum by straddling the line that still separates the
supranational and national (or sub-national) levels of regulatory governance. This
would send a clear message to the various economic and social interests whose
plans depend on a reasonably consistent enforcement of European rules, that
henceforth they will be able to operate in a predictable environment.
As suggested above, the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), composed
of the European Central Bank and the national central banks, provides a
heuristically useful model. As is well known, the ECB is completely independent
from the European institutions (the Bank itself being not an institution within the
meaning of Article 7 TEC, and thus able to escape the constraint of ‘institutional
balance’) as well as from the national governments, while the national banks must
be independent from their respective governments as a condition of membership in
the monetary union. Although regulatory agencies cannot be expected to be as
independent as central banks, the broad relevance of the ESCB model is
increasingly recognised. For example, two well known financial experts, Jacques
de Larosière and Daniel Lebégue, have suggested that the growing integration of
markets in Europe ‘could lead to the creation of a European system of national
regulation in the same vein as the European Central Bank, with decisions taken
centrally but applied nationally’ (Financial Times, 14.9.2000, p. 17).
At this stage of the debate on regulatory reform, it is more important to stress
the importance of a functional separation of the regulatory and executive powers at
European level than to attempt to draw a specific blueprint of an autonomous
regulatory estate and its relations to the European institutions. The design of a
suitable system of accountability and control will be a particularly challenging task,
but the inclusion in the treaty of Nice (Article 229a) of a clause allowing the
creation of judicial bodies in specialised areas points the way towards a novel
system of judicial review.
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7. Back to Negative Integration?
The second strategy that can be followed in order to resolve the dilemma of
delegation of powers in the EC, consists in rethinking the rationale for the
assignment of regulatory powers to the European level. After more than forty years
of market integration, approaches which appeared necessary in the early stages of
the process, are seen now to be either unnecessary or, at any rate, infeasible. We
have already referred to the progressive weakening of the harmonisation
requirements. From the early 1960s to about 1973 the date of the first
enlargement of the EC the Commission’s approach to harmonisation was
characterised by a distinct preference for detailed measures designed to regulate
exhaustively the problem in question to the exclusion of previously existing
national laws and regulationsthe approach known as total harmonisation. Under
total harmonisation, once European rules have been put in place, a member state’s
capacity to apply stricter rules by appealing to the values protected by Article 30
TEC, in particular the protection of the health and life of humans, animals, and
plants, is excluded. Also the ECJ supported total harmonisation as a foundation
stone in the building of the common market.
By the mid-1970s, however, it had become clear that total harmonisation
confers on the Community an exclusive competence which it is ill-equipped to
discharge (Weatherill, 1995). This realisation, together with mounting opposition
from the member states to what they considered excessive centralisation, convinced
the Commission that this approach had to be used so as to interfere as little as
possible with the regulatory autonomy of the national governments. The emphasis
shifted from total to optional and minimum harmonisation. Optional harmonisation
aims to guarantee the free movements of goods while permitting the member states
to retain their traditional forms of regulation. Under minimum harmonisation, the
national governments must secure the level of regulation set at European level but
are permitted to set higher standards, provided the stricter national rules do not
violate Community law. This is the approach currently followed in social
regulation: environmental and consumer protection, occupational health and safety,
food safety.
While total harmonisation was justified by the alleged need of a single set of
rules in a single market, the justification usually given for minimum harmonisation
is the desire to avoid a ‘race to the bottom’ in social regulation within the EC/EU:
minimum standards, it is claimed, are needed because competition for industry
would otherwise lead member states to enact sub-optimally lax social standards in
an effort to attract more investments and to give existing firms a competitive
advantage with respect to firms in countries with stricter standards. However, it has
been shown that race-to-the bottom arguments are theoretically unsound, and lack
empirical support (see, for example, chapters 10-12 in Bhagwati and Hudec, 1996,
and literature cited therein). If countries have different preferences for
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environmental protection or risk regulation, the standards that maximise social
welfare will be different rather than harmonised.
Moreover, even if there was a race to bottom in, say, environmental quality,
European regulation would not necessarily be an appropriate response. As Richard
Revesz has noted, race-to-the-bottom arguments appear to assume that countries
compete over only one variable. But if minimum harmonisation prevents such a
race in environmental quality, countries, under our assumption, would try to
compete along other regulatory dimensions. If other regulatory areas are
harmonised, it would be possible to compete for industry by using fiscal
incentivesor by lax implementation of European rules. Thus, the race-to-the-
bottom rationale for (minimum) harmonisation seeks to solve a problem that can be
addressed only by wholly eliminating the autonomy of the member states. What
Revesz says with reference to American federalism, applies a fortiori to the EU:
The prisoner’s dilemma will not be solved through federal
environmental regulation alone, as the race-to-the-bottom argument
posits. States will simply respond by competing over another variable.
Thus, the only logical answer is to eliminate the possibility of any
competition altogether. In essence, then, the race-to-the-bottom
argument is an argument against federalism (Revesz, 1992, p. 1247,
footnotes omitted).
A return to negative integration means that positive integration (harmonisation)
would take place at the European level only if it could be shown that the EU
represents, relative to a given problem, the optimal regulatory area. In general,
regulatory responsibilities would be left with the people most directly affected by
the problem, with the European institutions monitoring closely the behaviour of
lower jurisdictions to make sure that they do not abuse their autonomy for
protectionist purposes. Both fiscal federalism and functional federalism offer a
number of criteria for identifying optimal regulatory jurisdictions (for a useful
survey see Holzinger, 2000). According to such criteria homogeneous
preferences, scope of negative externalities, similar costs in the provision of public
goods, etc.the EU would be the appropriate level of regulation in a fairly limited
range of situations. On the other hand, fiscal and, especially, functional theories of
federalism tend to produce a great variety of different but overlapping jurisdictions.
The proliferation of ad hoc regions can be reduced if to the above mentioned
economic and functional criteria we add the criterion of political accountability in
case of regulatory failure. This means that an optimal regulatory area should also
include well defined political and legal mechanisms which citizens can activate in
case of regulatory failures. This additional criterion would again tend to exclude the
EU as the appropriate level, but would favour a coincidence of functional
jurisdictions with existing political (national and sub-national) units.
But what about the single European market? Is there a danger that the kind of
regulatory decentralisation envisaged here may lead to its segmentation and,
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ultimately, to a return to separate national economies? An adequate answer to such
questions would require a separate treatment. Here I can only sketch the key points
of my argument. First, to repeat a point already made, if preferences, levels of
economic development, costs of provision of public goods, environmental
conditions etc. vary across jurisdictions, then harmonised rules cannot be welfare
enhancing. Thus, the demand for harmonisation must be driven by a differenta
politicalagenda. Political integration is a perfectly legitimate objective, but it
should be pursued openly as such, rather than under the guise of market integration.
Second, a growing body of theoretical and empirical literature proves that
harmonisation, particularly of social standards, is not necessary for free trade to be
‘fair’ or undistorted. Thus, the Treaty of Rome never mandates that social policies
be harmonised prior to or concurrently with trade liberalisation within the common
market. The single exception to this stance concerns the condition of equal-pay for
male and female workers. The founding fathers expected that a rapid amelioration
of living standards throughout the Community would bring about an ex post
harmonisation of social conditions.
In fact, and this is my third point, it has been recently proved formally (Casella,
1996), not only that an initial difference in standards need not distort trade, but that
it is trade itself that leads to their (ex post) convergence. This is because standards
concerning environmental quality, risk control or consumer protection are
positively correlated with the standard of living. Thus, as wealth grows as a result
of free trade, the endogenous demand for higher standards grows as well. It
follows, paradoxically, that the ex ante harmonisation of standards as a
precondition for free trade could be counterproductive, since it may prevent or limit
free exchange, and the wealth effects it produces.
Finally, market integration is not an absolute value. At least since Keck the ECJ
has recognised that the regulatory autonomy of the national governments is a value
which deserves protection, so that the two valuesmarket integration and national
autonomymay have to be traded off at the margin. In some policy areas, market
integration has been sacrificed for political reasons. For example, laws on
minimum wages, collective contracting, hiring and firing, duration of the working
week, flexible labour contracts, qualifications, and a host of other factors continue
to differ among the member states. In the words of Jacques Pelkmans: ‘Member
States, alone and together, will do everything to protect national labour market
regulation, even at the cost of hardening the fragmentation of the EU’s labour
market’ (Pelkmans, 1997, p. 137). Why do we not take the same relaxed attitude
towards regulatory autonomy in the case of food safety, and other areas of risk
regulation, where national preferences are known to differ widely?
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8. Conclusions
In every political system the delegation of regulatory powers to more or less
independent agencies raises normative and institutional problems, but these
problems are nowhere as severe as in the EC/EU. One could think that resistance to
delegation of rule-making functions to executive bodies would be strongest in a
strict separation-of-powers system, such as the United States. In fact, a strict non-
delegation doctrine was first formulated there. But as we saw, the doctrine
eventually unravelled because the practical case for delegation is overwhelming. At
the same time, the fact that American courts have never formally renounced the
doctrine, while in practice applying it only rarely, indicates that doubts about the
legitimacy of transferring essentially legislative functions to another branch of
government, continue to persist. In order to minimise such doubts an impressive
array of control and monitoring mechanisms have been developed. Congressional
hearings, monitoring by specialised legislative committees, budgetary reviews,
sanctions, procedural constraintssuch as those imposed by the Administrative
Procedure Act and the Freedom of Information Actand judicial review, are some
of the instruments used in an effort to limit regulatory discretion and ensure
democratic accountability.
Also parliamentary systemswhere the principle of ministerial accountability
to the legislature represents the key legitimating mechanism for the activities of the
executivedo not seem to provide a favourable environment for the delegation of
discretion to regulators. Indeed, in most European countries, independent
regulatory agencies are still regarded as constitutional anomalies, but this has not
prevented their proliferation in recent years. Actually, in a country such as the
United Kingdom, where regulatory institutions are both numerous and powerful,
the fear now is that the regulators may have been given too much discretion,
creating the possibility that UK regulation could evolve, in the words of Cento
Veljanovski, into the rule of men (the regulators) rather than the rule of law. Weak
accountability—the Parliament exercises little systematic supervision over the
agencies weak judicial review British courts, unlike their American
counterparts, generally do not interfere on the merits of agency decisions—and
absence of procedural safeguards comparable to those developed in the United
States, are perceived as serious problems, but these concerns have not prevented an
extended delegation of regulatory powers to independent bodies.
Why, then, is the delegation problem so intractable in the EC/EU? The present
paper has attempted to provide an answer. In a sense, the Commission is right when
it argues that it is not sufficient to add an article to the Treaty in order to make
delegation of rule-making power constitutionally possible at the European level.
Such delegation would violate the principle of institutional balance, and thus
undermine the very foundation of the Community method. It follows that no
possibility of real institutional innovation can exist as long as the principle is
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interpreted so rigidly, not only by the Commission, but also by the Court of Justice.
The real dilemma the Community is facing today, therefore, is preserving the
Community method, at the price of a mounting loss of efficiency and credibility of
European regulations, or to limit the scope of the method, according to one or the
other of the two strategies outlined above.
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Chapter 4
The Emerging EU Regulatory Framework
on Genetically Modified Organisms:
Dilemmas and Challenges
*
Sara Poli
1. Introduction
In the last ten years, relations between the European Union and the US have grown
increasingly tense in the field of food safety. Whereas the use of growth hormones
in beef has been the object of a trade dispute, which was eventually adjudicated by
the organisms of the WTO, the marketing of genetically modified organisms
(hereafter ‘GMOs’) did not develop into a legal dispute but certainly generated
tension between the two blocs.1 At the origin of the dichotomy2 on the use of
                                                           
* This paper is the outcome of the research activity carried out for the European Forum in the
framework of the 2002-2003 Jean Monnet Fellowship Programme of the EUI. Comments are
very welcome at Sara.Poli@iue.it or spoli@units.it. The author would like to thank
Giandomenico Majone and Grainne de Búrca for their very helpful comments. Special thanks
go to Aleksander Surdej, Nicola Owtram, Ian Rowlands and Richard Gold. Responsibility for
the content of this article remains solely the author’s.
1 On the possible reasons why the trade tension has not so far become a trade dispute, see
Pollack M. A. and Shaffer G. C. (2000) ‘Transatlantic conflict over genetically modified
organisms: why the US is avoiding a trade war’, in The Washington Quarterly, No. 23.
2 On the differences between the EU and the US regulatory approaches to GMOs, see Echols
M. E. (1998) ‘Food safety regulation in the European Union and United States: different
cultures, different laws’, Columbia Journal of European Law, No. 4, p. 525; Vogel D. (2001)
Ships passing in the night: the changing politics of risk regulation in Europe and in the US,
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GMOs was the decision, taken by the European Council in 1999, to suspend the
authorisation procedure leading to the marketing of GMOs.3 The decision was
made as a result of the rising of a consensus amongst the Member States against the
use of these organisms.4 Since the US is the world’s principle producer of GMOs,
the EU stance on GMOs clearly affected American commercial interests. For the
first time, the EU Member States showed their opposition to the use of GMOs for
                                                           (contd.)
EUI Working Papers, RSC No. 2001/16; Princen S. ‘EU regulation and transatlantic trade’,
Kluwer Law International, p. 195-266. For a criticism of some aspects of the United States
regulatory system see Bratspies R. (2002) ‘The illusion of care regulation, uncertainty and
genetically modified crops’, in New York University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 10,
p. 297.
3 See the Environment Council of 25 June 1999. In the minutes of this meeting the Member
States made two declarations. The Danish, Greek, French, Italian and Luxembourg
delegations announced to suspend the release of new GMOs authorisations. The other
delegations invited the Commission to make a proposal for the effective implementation of
the provisions regarding labelling and traceability of GMOs through the Comitology
procedures foreseen in Directive 90/220 (the framework Directive). These delegations also
noted the possibility for Member States to introduce national measures in conformity with the
relevant paragraphs of Art. 95.
4 The Member States’ consensus against the marketing of GMOs was born during the
authorisation procedure for the marketing of a certain variety of GM maize, under Directive
90/220. In the framework of the approval procedure, the Commission asked for the opinion of
three advisory scientific committees on the safety of GM maize. These committees were
consulted after the comitology committee, set up by Directive 90/220, had failed to deliver an
opinion on the request of authorisation to market the variety of GM maize concerned.
The three committees took the position that GM maize did not pose risks for health.
Therefore the Commission authorised the marketing of the GM maize in December 1996.
(Commission Decision 97/98, OJ [1998] L 31/69). Even though the Member States were
bound to accept the Commission’s decision, a majority of them opposed it. In March 1997
Austria, Italy and Luxembourg enacted bans of the GM maize, relying on the safeguard
clause of Art. 16 of the 90/220 Directive. The other Member States supported this initiative.
In this situation, the Commission consulted its advisory scientific committees in order to
understand whether the bans enacted by the Member States were justified. These committees
found that the article 16-ban was not justified since it was not based on new scientific
information capable of affecting the original risk assessment provided by the notifier. (See the 
Opinion a dopted by th e Scie ntific Commi tted o n Plan ts on the in vocati on by Austri a of Art. 16
[30 November 20 00], p ublish ed on http:/ /europ a.eu.i nt/comm/food /fs/sc /scp/o ut85_g mo_en.html;
see also the opinion of the same committee on the invocation by France of Art. 16 against
GM oil seed rape available at the following address: http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/
scp/out37_en.html.) In the light of these opinions, the Commission asked the concerned
Member States to repeal the bans. However, they disregarded the Commission’s request.
There are currently nine on going article 16 cases involving Austria, Luxembourg, France,
Germany United Kingdom. (See MEMO/02/160, Brussels, 15 October 2002, ‘Questions and
Answers on the Regulation of GMOs in the EU’, of 15 October 2002, http://europa.eu.int/
comm/food/fs/gmo/gmo_index_en.html.) In consideration of the wide consensus against the
marketing of GMOs, the Commission has not taken legal action against the Member States,
although they were not complying with the EC GMOs legislation.
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commercial purposes during the approval procedure of a specific variety of
genetically modified maize.5 The European national governments decided to
suspend the approval procedure for the marketing of GMOs pending the approval
of new legislation giving adequate guarantees against the risks presented by GMOs.
This European position was criticised by the US and other countries, which pointed
out the potential conflict between the moratorium (suspension of the authorisation),
essentially inhibiting trade in GMOs, and the WTO agreements.6 In 1999, the
Commission set out to tackle the crisis by undertaking a number of reforms,
sketched out in the White Paper on Food Safety,7 with the aim of re-defining and
clarifying the European strategy in food safety matters. The overhaul of the food
safety policy has been a challenging task for the Commission since, as one author
points out:
The EC procedures must deal with the paradox of the denationalisation of risk
issues, set against the growing importance of national interests and national
perceptions on risk, while at the same time having to take the decisions which
are defensible in international fora, such as the WTO.8
The reform envisaged by the Commission, and as yet unfinished, is based on
different pillars. Firstly, the Commission has defined some interpretative guidelines
of the precautionary principlewhich plays a fundamental role in the European
decision-making dealing with health-related and environmental issuesin a ‘soft
law’ act.9 Secondly, a new horizontal framework Directive on GMOs10 (which
replaced the original framework Directive of 1990)11 has been adopted; the
institutional setting of bodies dealing with food safety has been radically changed
through the setting up of a European Food Safety Authority (hereafter ‘EFSA’ or
                                                           
5 See the GM maize crisis described above No. 4. For a full account of this crisis see,
Hervey T.K. (2001) ‘Regulation of Genetically Modified Products in a Multi-Level System
of Governance: Science or Citizens?’, in Review of European Community and International
Environmental Law, 10 (3), p. 321.
6 For a detailed analysis of the conflict between the EU ban on GMOs and the SPS agreement
see Charles W. Smitherman III (2002) ‘World Trade Organization Adjudication of the
European UnionUnited States Dispute Over the Moratorium on the Introduction of New
Genetically Modified Foods to the European Common Market: A Hypothetical Opinion of
the Dispute Panel’, in Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law, 30, p. 475, in
particular p. 497.
7 COM (1999) 7S19 final.
8 Tromans S. (2001) ‘Symposium: sustainable development, agriculture and the challenge of
genetically modified organisms: promise, peril, precaution: the environmental Regulation of
genetically modified organisms’, in Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 9. p. 202.
9 COM (2000) 1.
10 Directive 2001/18, OJ (2001) L 106/1.
11 Directive 90/220, repealed by Directive 2001/18.
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‘Food Authority’).12 Finally, the Commission has put forward a package of
measures of sector-related legislation on GMOs designed to solve this impasse,
which has blocked the approval procedure to trade genetically modified organisms.
This paper focuses on this strand of the reform. More precisely, two Commission
proposals for a Regulation, as amended by the Council and the Parliament in its
first reading, will be the primary object of this paper. The first concerns GM food
and feed13 and the second on the traceability and labelling of GMOs and the
traceability of food and feed products produced from GMOs.14 These proposals,
together with the new framework Directive, represent the most significant
legislative changes to the EU regulatory framework on GMOs since the outbreak of
the genetically modified maize crisis.15 The text of the two proposals is far from
final. Given the highly contentious nature of the subject matter, the Parliament
might propose substantial amendments16 to the proposals in its second reading. It
is, however, already possible to identify the spirit, challenges and dilemmas of the
emerging EC measures.
The analysis of the proposed legislation, of which only the most salient
provisions will be presented, has three aims. Firstly, the paper will pinpoint the
impact of the two proposals on the EU regulatory process leading to the marketing
of GMOs by assessing whether the legislative changes proposed by the
Commission are mere cosmetic makeup or whether they meaningfully strengthen
the EU regulatory framework on GMOs. In order to assess how the new legislation
will affect the old GMOs regime, a description of the proposed legislation will be
provided. Special emphasis will be placed on the scope of the Member States’
powers to adopt unilateral measures, suspending or limiting the circulation of a
given genetically modified food/feed on the grounds of public health or
environmental protection. In analysing this issue, I will also consider whether and
how Art. 95 can be used by Member States to introduce or maintain national
measures, derogating from a Community measure. Secondly, an evaluation will be
made of the likelihood that the draft Regulations, which are felt to ‘hold the key’ to
                                                           
12 See Regulation 178/2002, OJ (2002) L31/1.
13 See the Commission’s proposal in COM (2001) 425. This paper will consider the latest
version of the draft Regulation, that is to say, the common position achieved by the Council
on the 17th March 2003. See Council document No. 5204/3/03.
14 See the Commission’s proposal in COM (2001) 182, as modified by the political agreement
reached at the Environment Council meeting of 9 December 2002. The document may be
found at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/st15/15460en2.pdf.
15 See above No. 4.
16 On the first reading, the European Parliament made 111 amendments to the Commission's
proposal on GM food and feed. The Commission accepted only 16 amendments in their
entirety and 38 in a part or in principle. See the Parliament’s legislative observatory.
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the lifting of the moratorium,17 will secure Member States’ consent to the
marketing of GMOs in the Community market. This is the most important
challenge of the emerging legislative framework. Should Member States decide to
abandon the moratorium, the future commercial presence of GMOs in Europe
would depend entirely on consumers, who might welcome these products or decide
not to buy them. Possible problems, resulting from the shape that the EC
institutions decide to give to the GMOs reform, will also be examined. In
particular, since scholars have extensively commented on the (in)compatibility of
the GMOs marketing regime of the 1990s and the WTO rules,18 it will be explored
whether the proposed measures potentially conflict with the trade rules of the
Geneva organisation. Dilemmas which the WTO bodies might face in applying the
WTO agreements to the proposed GMOs legislation will also be underscored.
2. The Scepticism of the Member States Towards the 1990s EU
Legislation on GMOs
It was the crisis leading to the blocking of authorisation in the genetically modified
maize saga19 that first revealed the Member States’ great fear that the use of GMOs,
in food or for other purposes, could cause unforeseen health and/or environmental
                                                           
17 Francescon S. (2001) ‘The New Directive 2001/18/EC on the Deliberate Release of
Genetically Modified Organisms into the Environment: Changes and Perspectives’, in Review
of European Community and International and Environmental Law, 10 (3), p. 320.
18 Bentley Q.C.P. (2000) ‘The re-assessment of article XX, paragraphs (b) and (g) of GATT
1994 in the light of growing consumer and environmental concern about biotechnology’, in
Fordham International Law Journal Vol. 24, No. 1/2, 107; Buckingham D.E. (2001) ‘Hot
Potato, Hot Potato: Regulating Products of Biotechnology by the International Community’,
in Journal of World Trade Vol. 35, No. 1, p. 1; Fredland J.S. (2000) ‘Unlabel their
Frankenstein foods!: evaluating a U.S. challenge to the European Commission's labelling
requirements for food products containing genetically-modified organisms’, in Vanderbilt
Journal of Transnational Law Vol. 33, No.1, 183; House R., Mavroidis P.C. (2000)
‘Europe’s evolving regulatory strategy for GMOsthe issue of consistency with WTO law:
of kine and brine’, in Fordham I nterna tional . Law Journ al, Vol. 24, No. 1/ 2, p. 317; Kre nzler
H.G., MacGregor A. (2000) ‘GM food: the next major transatlantic trade war?’, in European
Foreign Affairs Review 5 297; MacMillan F., Blakeney M. (2000) ‘Regulating GMOs: is the
WTO agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary measures hormonally challenged? Part 1’, in
Internal Trade Law Review, p. 131; McMillan F., Blakeney M. (2000) ‘Regulating GMOs: is
the WTO agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary measures hormonally challenged? Part 2’,
in Internal Trade Law Review, p. 161; Pardo Quintillán S. (2000) ‘Free trade, public health
protection and consumer information in the European and WTO context: Hormone-treated
beef and genetically modified organisms’, in World Trade Journal Vol. 33, No. 6, p. 147;
Perdikis N.O., William A. Kerr, Jill E. Hobbs (2001) ‘Reforming the WTO to defuse
potential trade conflicts in genetically modified goods’, in World Economy, Vol. 24, No. 3,
March, p. 378; Smithermann III C. W. above No. 6.
19 See above No. 4.
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problems. This crisis also highlighted two more elements. The first was that
Member States distrusted the opinion of the scientific advisory committees of the
Commission.20 It should be noted that these committees not only approved of the
marketing of GM products that the Member States were not willing to accept,21 but
also found that the suspension of the authorisation for the marketing of GMOs was
unjustified.22 The second concerned the conditions under which the use of GMOs
could be acceptable to national authorities. It was made clear that Member States
would consent to GMOs only if there were adequate guarantees that these
organisms did not pose substantial risks when placed in the environment or the
food chain. More precisely, the EU legislative framework, which was enacted in
the 1990s,23 was considered insufficient to cope with the risks associated with GM
material. No traceability rules were contemplated by horizontal or sector-related
legislation. As for labelling, although under Regulation 258/97 (hereafter ‘the
Novel Food’ Regulation),24 it was stated that GM Novel Food should be labelled, in
reality ‘the Commission had not produced guidelines on detailed labelling rules to
accompany the regulation.’25 As a result, only two GM crops,26 which were placed
in the market before the adoption of the Novel Food Regulation, had to be labelled.
In addition, GM feed was not subject to labelling requirements, although more than
eighty percent27 of genetically modified soya apparently went into animal feed.
Finally, no labelling thresholds were established for the adventitious or technically
unavoidable presence of GMOs.28
                                                           
20 The authority of the scientific committees has been contested since the BSE crisis. In the
context of this crisis, ‘The Inquiry Committee of the European Parliament found that the
scientific committees had not been free from external, non-scientific influence.’ See Vos E.
(2001) ‘Differentiation, harmonisation and governance’, in (De Witte B., Hanf D., Vos E.,
eds.) The Many Faces of Differentiation in EU Law, p. 175.
21 See above No. 4.
22 See above No. 4.
23 Directive 90/220 and the Novel Food Regulation No. 258/97.
24 OJ (1997) L 43/1.
25 Franks J.R. (1999) ‘The status and prospects for genetically modified crops in Europe’, in
Food Policy, 24, p. 573.
26 These were the Monsanto soya and the Novartis maize which were subject to labelling
requirements under Regulation 1139/98.
27 This is a percentage which is reported in Francescon S. and Mackenzie R. (1999-2000) ‘The
regulation of genetically modified food in the European Union: an overview’, in New York
University Environmental Law Journal, 8, p. 553.
28 The only exception is Regulation 49/2000 which exempts from labelling requirements
foodstuff from non-GM sources where material derived from GMOs is present in food
ingredients, or in the food as a single ingredient, in a proportion which is no higher than 1% if
the presence of the material is adventitious.
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In order to reassure the Member States, the Commission filled these lacunas by
enacting a new GMOs framework Directive, which introduced labelling29 and
traceability requirements30 and a new authorisation procedure for the release of
GMOs.31 Moreover, some specific pieces of legislation on GMOs were enacted.32
However, some Member States, supported by the European Parliament, took the
position that they would not lift the ban on the authorisation of GMOs until a
separate regime of environmental liability for GMOs was set up and more
comprehensive rules on traceability of GMOs enacted.33 While the proposed
environmental liability Directive does not envisage (as it stands)34 separate rules on
damages resulting from genetically modified organisms, extensive rules on
labelling and traceability were laid down in two proposals for a Regulation.35
Furthermore, the authorisation procedure for the marketing of GM food and feed
was revisited with respect to the Novel Food Regulation.
The reforms undertaken by the Commission to secure an improved legislative
framework against the risks of GMOs encouraged this institution to restart the
procedure for authorising genetically modified crops and foods.36 In March 2003,
the Commission informed the EU Environment Council that nineteen applications
were in the pipeline, including ten for genetically modified crops. The news caused
a divided reaction amongst the Member States.37
                                                           
29 Art. 21 and Annex IV.
30 Art. 4(6).
31 Directive 2001/18. On the deficiencies of Directive 90/220 and the news of the proposed
framework Directive (as of 1999), see Douma W. and Matthee M. (1999) ‘Towards new EC
rules on the Release of Genetically Modified Organisms’, in Review of European Community
and International and Environmental Law, 8, p. 152. For a description of the content of the
framework Directive see Lawrence D., Kennedy J., Hattan E. (2002) ‘New controls on the
deliberate release of GMOs’, in European Environmental Law Review, p. 51.
32 See Regulation 50/2000 concerning labelling of foodstuffs and food ingredients containing
additives and flavourings that have been genetically modified or have been produced from
genetically modified organisms.
33 ‘Moratorium on New GMOs Set to Stay’, in ENDS report February 2001, Issue No. 313.
34 Th e cur ren t tex t ( as of Ju ne 20 02) o f t he pr opo sal o n e nvi ro nme nta l lia bil it y with r ega rd to th e
pr ev ent ion a nd remed yin g o f env iro nment al da mag e c ov ers , i nt er al ia , en vir onmen tal da ma ges 
fo ll owe d b y the de li ber ate r ele ase o f GMOs , in clu din g the pl ac ing on t he mar ke t ( see p oin t 1 4 of
an ne x I of t he Cou nc il doc ument 10 45 8/0 2 o f 28 Jun e 200 2).
35 See above No. 13 and 14. The two proposals are strongly intertwined. In fact, they will enter
into force at the same time.
36 See ‘EU Ministers divided over liability, cool on bathing water reforms’, in ENDS Report
No. 338 of March 2003.
37 The UK led a minority of Member States which was in favour of taking a decision on the
pending applications. Germany and other Member States objected the initiative of the
Commission. See END report No. 338 of March 2003.
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3. Overview of the New Legislative Framework
In accordance with the strategy laid down by the White paper on food safety,38 as
from 2001, the Commission, proposed several pieces of sector-related legislation in
the field of GMOs. Although the Commission was keen on re-starting the
authorisation procedure for the marketing of GMOs, it certainly did not choose the
shortest way. For example, greater use of comitology procedure could have been
made instead of following the legislative procedure.39 However, the Commission
preferred the second approach, hoping that the enactment of the new legislative
instruments would gain the Member States and the Parliament’s support toward the
envisaged reform more easily. The legislative changes that it proposed encompass
three Regulations and three Council/Commission decisions.
T he fir st Re gulation conc erns ge ne tic ally modifie d food and fee d; the se c ond is
r elated to the tra ce ability and la belling of G MO s pr oducts and the tra ce ability of GM
f ood and fee d. The Counc il ha s agr eed on a common position on both proposals, 40
w hich will be sent to the EP for a se cond re ading. Politic al agre eme nt on the 
tra ce ability Re gula tion was vote d in De ce mbe r 2002, although the UK , the 
N ethe rla nds, Luxe mbour g and Denmar k voted a gainst it. 41 The U K and Luxembourg
a lso disagre e d on the compr omise rea c he d at the Counc il me eting of 28 Novembe r
2002 on GM food and fe ed. 42 A third pr oposa l for a Regula tion, aime d at
imple me nting the Car ta ge na Pr otocol within the EC Community fra me w or k, 43
                                                           
38 See above No. 7.
39 In order to introduce traceability and labelling requirements on GMOs, the Commission
evaluated the merits of three solutions: a) the adoption of technical measures, implementing
Directive 90/220, through comitology procedures, b) the introduction of traceability and
labelling requirements in the sector-related legislation; c) a new horizontal instrument on
traceability and labelling. The Commission chose the latter legislative approach, thus
discarding the first option which would have been the less time consuming. See the working
document of the Commission on traceability and labelling of GMOs and products derived
from GMOs, doc. ENV/620/2000, p. 8-13.
40 See above No. 13 and 14.
41 See Council document 15101/02, p. 8, published on: http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/
en/02/st15/15101en2.pdf.
42 See http://www.foodstandards.gov.uk/science/sciencetopics/gmfoods/gmfoodfeedproposals/gm2811.
Austria was the third Member State who voted against the political agreement on GM food
and feed.
43 On February 2002, the Commission proposed to implement the Cartagena Protocol,
concerning both the export and imports procedure of living genetically modified organisms.
The draft Regulation is intended to set up a procedure to export GMOs. As far as imports of
GMOs are concerned, the EU legislation will continue to operate. The implication is that the
EC legislation on the imports of these organisms complies with the provisions of the
Cartagena Protocol and, as such, no additional implementing measures are needed. See the
proposal for a Regulation on the transboundary movement of genetically modified organisms
in COM (2002) 85 final of 18 February 2002. The Commission proposal was amended by the
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was put forward by the Commission. However, it will not be examined since it lies
beyond the scope of this paper.44
In addition to this legislation, three decisions were issued, laying down detailed
guidelines on some technical aspects of the approval procedure leading to the
placing of GMOs on the market. These pieces of technical legislation, adopted
through comitology procedures, complete the legislative framework established by
Directive 2001/18.45 The guidelines in these three instruments were needed to make
the framework Directive fully operational.46
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Parliament in its first reading. For the proposed amendments see COM (2002) 578 of 16
October 2002. The Protocol was approved on 25 June 2002. See Council decision 2002/628,
OJ (2002) L 201/48.
44 See COM (2002) 85, p. 21.
45 Above No. 10.
46 The first Decision lays down detailed guidelines on the objectives, elements, general
principles and the methodology of the ‘environmental risk assessment’ (See Commission
Decision of 24 July 2002 establishing guidance notes supplementing Annex II to Directive
2001/18/EC and repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC, in OJ [2002] L 200/22). This
notion is defined by Art. 2.8 of Directive 2001/18 as ‘The evaluation of risks to human health
and the environment, whether direct or indirect, immediate or delayed, which the deliberate
release or the placing on the market of GMOs may pose.’ A description of the way in which
this assessment should be carried out is crucial for a correct and complete notification process
and, eventually, for the positive outcome of the authorisation procedure.
The second Decision concerns detailed guidelines on how the notifiers should implement
monitoring plans in order to trace and identify any direct or indirect, immediate, delayed or
unforeseen effects on human health or the environment of GMOs as or in products after they
have been placed on the market. (Council Decision of 3 October 2002 establishing guidance
notes supplementing Annex VII to Directive 2001/18/EC and repealing Council Directive
90/220/EEC, in OJ [2002] L 280/27.) The ‘surveillance mechanism’, set up by this Decision,
goes in the direction of preventing possible damages (to human health or to the environment).
Therefore it should be seen as a means to strengthen the safety net surrounding the use of
genetically modified products. This is all the more so if one considers that the 2002
guidelines on the monitoring plans are stricter for the notifier than those of the framework
Directive. Indeed, with respect to the guidelines of the framework Directive (See Annex VII
of Directive 2001/18) the 2002 guidelines expand on the objectives for monitoring, expand
on the general principles for monitoring and provide an outline for a general framework for
the development of appropriate post-market monitoring plans.
The third Decision is aimed at standardising the format of the summary notification that
national authorities are bound to send to the Commission. (Council Decision of
3 October 2002 establishing, pursuant to Directive 2001/18/EC, the summary notification
information format for notifications concerning the deliberate release into the environment of
genetically modified organisms for purposes other than for placing on the market, in OJ
[2002] L 280/62.) A comprehensive, unified and clear summary notification is particularly
important since on the basis of this notificationwhich is first sent to the Commission and
then forwarded to the other Member Statesnational competent authorities decide whether
or not to raise objections against the marketing of the GMO. The fact that the summary
notification is standardised in a detailed manner makes sure that the information related to the
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3.1 The Proposed Genetically Modified Food and Feed Regulation
This Regulation lays down the specific pre-marketing approval and labelling
requirements with which genetically modified food and feed will have to comply in
order to be placed on the Community market.
The objectives of the draft Regulation are very broad, as is also shown by the
triple legal basis (Arts. 37, 95 and 152[4]). The Regulation aims to achieve ‘a high
level of protection of human life and health, environment and consumer’s interest
in relation to genetically modified food and feed.’47 It is noteworthy that the
objectives of the Novel Food Regulationwhich the proposed Regulation intends
to reviseare focused on the protection of the common market48 and of public
health.49 The latter is an ancillary objective with respect to the former, as it reveals
the choice of Art. 95 (100.a) as the legal basis.
The proposed Regulation covers food which falls within one of these three
categories:50 a) genetically modified organisms for food use, (i.e. GM maize); (b)
food containing or consisting of genetically modified organisms, (i.e. GM
tomatoes); (c) food produced from or containing ingredients produced from
genetically modified organisms (i.e. flour produced from genetically modified
maize).51 It may be noted that the scope of the proposed Regulation partially
overlaps with that of the Novel Food Regulation and of the GMOs framework
Directive. Indeed, category a) encompasses living GMOs which are also covered
by Directive 2001/18, while categories b) and c) are included within the scope of
the Novel Food Regulation.52 After the entry into force of the proposed Regulation,
the three groups of GM food will be authorised exclusively on the basis of the
authorisation procedure established by the GM food and feed Regulation.53 Thus,
certain provisions of the Novel Food Regulation54 and of the framework Directive55
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request for authorisation to market the GMO is as complete as possible. This will enable, in
turn, the Member States to take a well informed decision on the basis of uniform data.
47 Art. 1.a.
48 The legal basis is Art. 100.a (Art. 95).
49 See recital No. 2 of the Novel Food Regulation.
50 Art. 3.
51 For the sake of convenience, food consisting of, or containing GMOs, and food produced
from GMOs will be referred to as ‘GM food.’
52 See Art. 1.2.a and b of the Novel Food Regulation.
53 Art. 4(2).
54 According to Art. 38, the following provisions of the Novel Food Regulation are repealed:
Art. 1.2.a and b; Art. 3(2) second paragraph and (3); Art. 8(1) d; Art. 9. The GM food and
feed also repeals Regulations 1039/97, 49/2000, 50/2000.
55 See Art. 5(5) b last indent and 17(5) b.
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will be respectively repealed or considered inapplicable. However, Reg. 258/97
remains good law for non-GM Novel Food.56
One important feature of the proposed Regulation is that it covers GM feed, as
it was not previously included within the scope of any piece of legislation. The new
Regulation will apply to a) genetically modified organisms for feed use (for
example, certain varieties of GM soya); b) feed containing or consisting of
genetically modified organisms; c) feed produced from genetically modified
organisms (feeding stuff produced from GM fodder beet).57
Another group of food which the Parliament wanted to regulate in the proposed
Regulation was food produced with a GMO.58 However, the Parliament did not win
the Commission’s support on this point. In practical terms, this means that food
produced from an animal fed with genetically modified feed59 and food which was
produced with a GM enzyme, leaving no traces of genetically modified material in
the final product, will not be subject to the restrictions of the Regulation. Should
there be any doubts on whether a certain category of GM food/feed falls within the
scope of the Regulation, the Commission is empowered, together with the
comitology committee, to clarify this issue.60 It is striking that the opinion of the
EFSA is not required in a decision of this kind.
Let us now turn to the approval procedure to place GM food/feed on the market.
First of all, an authorisation to this effect will be released only if the applicant gives
‘adequate and sufficient evidence’61 that the GM food and feed62 meet the
following conditions:63
– They do not present an unacceptable risk for human health and
the environment;
– They do not mislead the consumer;64
                                                           
56 Non-GM Novel Food is listed in Art. 1.2.c, d, e, f.
57 Art. 15.
58 See amendment 15 of recital 6, in the Parliament report of 7 June 2002 on the proposal for a
Regulation on genetically modified food and feed (A5-0225/2002).
59 Likewise, food produced from animals, which are treated with genetically modified
medicinal products falls outside the scope of the Regulation.
60 See. Art. 3(2) and 15(2). This flexibility was also provided by the Novel Food Regulation.
See Art. 3(4), last indent.
61 Art. 4(3) and 16(3).
62 See Art. 16(1) d.
63 Art. 3(1) and Art. 16(1).
64 The proposed Regulation provides a slightly different wording of the second and third
c o nd i t i on s t ha t an a p pl i c a ti o n fo r g en e t ic a l l y mo d if i e d f e e d mu s t s a t is f y . Ar t. 16( 1 ) c provides
that GM feed should not, inter alia, mislead the user and harm or mislead the consumer by
impairing the distinctive features of the animal products; Art. 16(1) d states that GM feed
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– They do not differ from the food which it is intended to replace
to such an extent that its normal consumption would be
nutritionally disadvantageous for the consumer.
The wording of the proposed Regulation presents similarities with Art. 3.1 of
the Novel Food Regulation,65 except for the first indent. While the Novel Food
Regulation states that genetically modified food can be authorised if ‘it does not
present a danger for the consumer’, the threshold for releasing authorisation is
lower in the proposed measureGM food is authorised if it does not present an
unacceptable risk for human health and the environment. This change is not merely
editorial, since it affects the chosen level of protection. The implication is that EU
institutions are ready to give the green light to a request of authorisation for the
marketing of a certain GM food/feed, if the risk it creates is acceptable. The shift
from ‘no danger’ to ‘acceptable risk’ should not be underestimated: the new
emphasis on acceptable risk is capable of limiting resort to outright bans, since the
Commission is bound to take measures which are proportional to the chosen level
of protection.66
It is now appropriate to consider the requirements of the authorisation
procedure67 and how the final decision on the application is made. When
submitting an application to national competent authorities, the operator (called the
‘notifier’ in the jargon of the GMOs legislation) is required to gather accompanying
documents and information68 so as to enable the EU authorities to evaluate whether
the request complies with the requirements of the Regulation.69 It is noteworthy
that the number of documents and information that the applicant must present
appears more comprehensive (or burdensome according to the point of view) than
that of the Novel Food Regulation. For example, a source of information which the
notifier should include in the application is a copy of the studies, including, where
available, independent, peer-reviewed studies, which have been carried out and any
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should not differ from feed which it is intended to replace to such an extent t ha t it s n or mal 
c on su mpt io n wou ld b e n ut r it io na l ly d i sa dv an t ag eo u s fo r a ni ma l s or h u ma ns .
65 Th is a r ti c l e s t a te s t ha t : ‘Fo o d s a n d f o o d i n g re d i e nt s f al l i n g wi th i n th e s co p e of t h is Reg u l a ti o n 
mu st n o t: a ) p r e se n t a d a n ge r f or t h e c o ns u me r; b ) mi s l ea d t he c on s u mer ; c ) d i f fe r f ro m fo o d s 
o r f o o d i n g r ed i e nt s whi c h th e y ar e i nt e n de d t o r e p la c e to s u ch a n e x t en t t ha t t he i r no r mal 
c o ns u mp ti o n wo u l d b e nu t r i ti o n a ll y d is a d va n t a ge o u s f o r th e c on s u me r .’ 
66 COM (2000) 1.
67 See Art. 7 and 17. The authorisation procedure contains time limits which are here omitted
due to space constraints.
68 Art. 5(3) and 17(3).
69 The information requested from the notifier also serves the purpose of preparing the ground
for the placing of the GM food/feed on the market. Amongst other, the notifier should specify
labelling and handling conditions beyond, where required, post marketing monitoring for the
use of GM food/feed. (Art. 5.3.h; k and Art. 17.h; k)
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other material which is available to demonstrate that the food complies with the
criteria laid down in article 3(1) and 16(1).70 In addition, the operator should give
information as to whether the food gives rise to ethical or religious71 concerns.72
Finally, it should be noted that further information is required for food/feed
consisting of, or containing, GMOs.73
One of the factors which is assessed by the national competent authority during
the authorisation procedure is whether the GM product, which is the object of the
notification, is ‘substantially equivalent’ to its non-genetically modified
counterpart.74 It should be noted that the principle of ‘substantial equivalence’,
which has operated since the Novel Food Regulation75 and was maintained in the
new piece of legislation,76 applies differently in the GM food and feed Regulation
with respect to the 1997 Regulation. In the latter, it applies to limited cases,77
                                                           
70 See Art. 5.3.e and 17.3.e.
71 The Novel Food Regulation only referred to ethical concerns, which had to be mentioned on
the label of the GM product. See Art. 8.c.
72 Art. 13.2.b and 25.3.d. In case the GM food/feed gives rise to these concerns, this should be
stated on the label.
73 The notifier must provide a risk assessment and a monitoring plan for the environmental
effects. See Art. 6.5.a; b and Art. 17.5.a; b.
74 The criteria to define a GM food or food ingredient as ‘substantially equivalent’ to its
conventional counterpart concern their composition, nutritional value, metabolism, intended
use and the level of undesirable substances contained therein (Art. 3.4). The Commission has
also adopted Recommendation No. 97/618 (OJ [1997] L 253/1) to illustrate scientific aspects
of this concept. The latter has formed the object of detailed analysis in the opinion of the
Advocate General Jacobs (of 13 March 2003) in the Monsanto case, C-236/91, pending. In
this case Italy contested the ‘substantial equivalence’ of some GM products. See for more
details on this case section No. 3.2. It should also be noted that the substantial equivalence
principle of the Novel Food Regulation was seen with scepticism by other Member States.
See Young A. R. ‘Trading up or trading blows? Us politics and transatlantic trade in
genetically modified organisms’, RSC EUI working paper No. 2001/30, p. 13.
75 See Recital No. 2 and Art. 5.
76 It should be noted that in the GM food/feed Regulation reference is not explicitly made to the
principle of substantial equivalence. However, this concept is incorporated in the draft
Regulation. See the combination of Art. 19.3.h and 27.3.c in case of GM feed and the
combination of Art. 6.3.h and 14.2.a in the case of GM food. The characteristics which are
considered to make a GM product different from a non-GM counterpart are the following:
composition, nutritional purposes, intended use, implications for human health or for the
health of certain species or categories of animals.
77 Article 3(4) of the Novel Food Regulation establishes to which categories of Novel Food the
principle of substantial equivalence applies. They are foods and food ingredients produced
from, but not containing, genetically modified organisms (Art. 1.2.b); foods and food
ingredients consisting of or isolated from micro-organisms, fungi or algae (Art. 1.2.d); foods
and food ingredients consisting of or isolated from plants and food ingredients isolated from
animals, except for foods and food ingredients obtained by usual propagating or breeding
practices and having a history of safe food use (Art. 1.2.e).
92
whereas in the former, it does not apply only to products produced from GMOs but
also to all GM food/feed and does not give rise to a different procedure.78
Moreover, in the Novel Food Regulation, when a novel food was produced from
GMOs and was substantially equivalent to its traditional counterpart, it was
approved of according to a simplified procedure.79 By contrast, in the new draft
Regulation, a single authorisation procedure applies both to substantially equivalent
and non-substantially equivalent products. The abolishment of the simplified
procedure is a welcome step80 since, as the Commission has always recognised,
substantially equivalent GMOs products are not safe in themselves; what, therefore,
is the point of submitting them to an approval procedure which is different from
that of non-substantially equivalent GMOs food?
Let us now turn to the decision making, leading to the authorisation or rejection
of the application, which involves the Member States, the Commission and a newly
established actor: the EFSA. The main stages of the authorisation procedure are
sketched below. The procedure is set in motion when the person, seeking the
authorisation to market GMO food/feed, applies to the competent national
authority, providing the information previously described. For the sake of
procedural economy, where a product is likely to be used both as food and feed the
operator will submit a single application and a single decision will be made by the
relevant competent authorities.81 The application and related information is sent to
the EFSA,82 which will make it public,83 and will forward it, in turn, to the
Commission and other Member States.84 The final decision on the application is
                                                           
78 The only difference in the treatment between substantially equivalent GM food/feed and GM
food/feed which is different from the traditional counterpart consists in the labelling
obligations, that is to say, a non-‘substantially equivalent’ GM food can be placed on the
market only if the differences with respect to the conventional counterpartand appropriate
information about the nature and the character of the food concerned (Art. 13.3) are
mentioned on the product’s label. See Art. 13.2 a and 25.3.c. It should be noted that, in this
respect, the GM food and feed regulation is no different from the Novel Food Regulation
which required that non-substantially equivalent food was labelled (Art. 8.1.a).
79 See Recital 2 and the simplified procedure of Art. 5. It should be noted that this procedure
allows operators to place on the market a certain GM food, after they have notified the
Commission of the GM product that they intend to place on the market and have provided
evidence of its substantial equivalence to conventional counterparts.
80 It appears that this procedure does not enjoy Member States’ support. The opinion of the
Advocate general in the Monsanto case reports that several Member States in the comitology
committee which examined the Italian decision to suspend the marketing of the Monsanto
maize asked for clarification on the use of this concept. See par. 30 of the opinion. For more
details on the case see section No. 3.2.
81 Art. 27.
82 Art. 5.2.a.iii and Art. 17.2.a.iii.
83 A s ummary of th e appl icatio n will be ma de ava ilable to th e publ ic. Se e Ar t. 5.2 .b.ii and 17 .2.b.i i.
84 Art. 17.2.b.1 and ii and Art. 5.2.b.1 and ii.
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made by the Commission and Member States, whereas the role of the EFSA is
advisory.85 The EFSA’s most important task is thus the release of an opinion86 on
the request for authorisation by the notifier, which is then communicated to the
Commission and the Member States. The EFSA’s opinion may be favourable or
unfavourable but, in any event, it must be appropriately justified. A positive
opinion of the Food Authority has to contain certain bits of information,87 including
the restrictions or conditions to place the genetically modified food/feed concerned
on the market.88 This opinion will be made accessible to the public, which can send
comments to the Commission.89 An oddity in this respect can be observed: public
reactions and comments will have to be addressed to the Commission and not to the
EFSA itself.
Coming back to the authorisation procedure, the Commission will decide on the
application for authorisation in co-operation with the Standing Committee on the
Food Chain and Animal Health (a comitology committee). Factors which can be
taken into account in the authorization process are the opinion of the EFSA, any
relevant provisions of Community law, and other legitimate factors relevant to the
matter under consideration.90 It goes without saying that the opinion of the EFSA is
not binding for the Commission; the latter has only a duty to explain why it took a
different position from that recommended by the EFSA. It is interesting that the
final decision on the authorization can be affected by ‘other legitimate factors.’
This is an expression which was used for the first time by the most important food
standard setting organization, the Codex Alimentarius Commission, in 1995.91
General Principles for Risk Analysis recognised at the international level, in the
framework of the activity of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, ‘allow[s] risk
managers to take into account not only the results of a science-based risk
                                                           
85 The Food Authority also have other minor duties. It replaces the Commission in performing
certain tasks for which the Commission was responsible in the old GMOs regime. For
example the EFSA receives and forward the notification to the Member States, it asks the
applicant for additional information, it may ask the competent national authority to carry out
safety assessment o environmental risk assessment. A further power consists in the possibility
to propose, modify, suspend or revoke the authorisation. This power is shared with the
Commission and the Member States. See Art. 10. The EFSA finally advises the Commission
in laying down implementing rules for the renewal of the authorisation. See for example
Art. 11.5.
86 Art. 6. The Authority has six months to release its opinion.
87 Art. 6(5) and 18(5).
88 For example, the EFSA may decide that post marketing monitoring requirements are needed.
See Art. 6.5.e and Art. 18.5.e.
89 Art. 6.7 and 18.7.
90 Art. 7.1 and 19.1.
91 Juke D. (2000) ‘The role of science in international food standards’, in Food Control, 11,
p. 181.
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assessment but also other legitimate factors relevant for the matter under
consideration.’92 Thus, the phrase refers to the fact that science provides the key
factor in establishing Codex standards but, that other legitimate factors (OLFs) can
be used.93 The following interests were discussed within the Codexwithout
consensus being reached as possible ‘other legitimate factors’: consumer
preferences, environmental concerns, animal welfare.94
A lt hough it is le gitim a te to con side r fa c tor s othe r tha n soun d sc ie nc e in ta king 
r is k ma n a ge me nt de c isi ons, the se fa c t or s shoul d be na me d and ma de cle a r in the 
de f initi ons of th e Re g ula ti on. T his notio n, if le f t unsp e c if i e d, give s the impr e ssion 
of be ing a c a t c h- a l l cla use to ju stif y poli tic a l de c ision s ra t he r tha n r isk
ma n a ge me nt me a sur e s. 95
Before making a decision, the Commission may also consult the European
Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, which delivers an opinion on
ethical issues.96 Eventually, the decision taken by the Commission will be
published in the Official Journal. The approved GM food or feed will be entered in
a register97 which is accessible to the public. It is noteworthy that where an
authorisation is given, this is time-limited: valid for ten years,98 it is renewable
according to special procedure.99
Pr o duc ts whic h fa ll wi thin the sc ope of the GM food and fe e d Re gu la tio n and 
w hi c h ha ve be e n la w f ul ly pl a c e d on th e ma r ke t be f ore th e ent r y in to f or c e of th e 
pr o pose d Re gu la ti on ca n cir c ula t e in the ma r ke t, 100 but the y wil l be subj e c t to a
‘ do uble che c k ’ pr oc e du r e by the Commu nity re f e r e nc e la bo r a tor y, 101 wh ic h w ill
                                                           
92 McFarlane R. (2001) ‘Integrating the consumer interest in food safety: the role science and
other factors’, in Food Policy, p. 11.
93 See Juke above No. 91, p. 186.
94 Ibid., p. 190-191.
95 See section 5 for more comments on ‘other legitimate factors.’
96 Art. 33.
97 Art. 28.
98 Art. 7(5) and 19(5).
99 Art. 11 and 23.
100 Art. 8 and 20.
101 Art. 32. The Commission has also launched a European Network of Genetically Modified
Organisms Laboratories (ENGL). The network is composed of 45 national laboratories whose
personnel is appointed by national authorities. The main duties of ENGL are to look at the
different GMOs put on the market, and to ensure that the control laboratories can trace
GMOs throughout the food chain. The ENGL will primarily have to develop and validate
methods for detecting and quantifying GMOs in food and feed. Once a method has been
optimised, ENGL will set up internal inter-laboratory tests to check if the methods are
suitable for control purposes and if so, labs will use them in their control work. See for
95
te s t and va li da te the me tho d of de te c tion and va lid a tion pr op ose d by the ap plic a nt. 
Sho uld the op e r a t or s r e spon sible for the pla c i ng on the ma r ke t of suc h pr od uc ts
f a i l to give the ne c e s sa r y inf or ma tio n to the Commi ssion , or whe r e thi s
inf or ma t ion is in c or r e c t, the y w ill be sa nc tio ne d w ith the wi thdr a w a l of th e 
pr o duc ts fr om the ma r k e t. 102
The proposed Regulation also contains extensive labelling provisions, which are
coordinated with those of the traceability and labelling Regulation. While the
labelling provisions of the former apply to foods/feeds containing, consisting of, or
produce d f rom G MO s, the la belling pr ovisions of the latte r c onc er n G MO s which a r e
not use d in food or fe ed. By pr e sc ribing the use of positive la be lsi.e . ‘this pr oduc t
may contain G MO s’ tha t is to sa y, labels that indica te the pr e se nc e of ge netic a lly
modif ie d mate rial, the EU r uled out two labe lling options:103 the use of volunta r y and
negative labe lsi.e . ‘this pr oduc t is GM- fr ee ’. 104 It is not clea r whe ther the la tte r
kind of la be ls will be pr ohibite d, 105 so a s not to misle a d the c onsumer .
N ot all GM food/f ee d nee ds to be labe lled. The pr oposed GM food and fe ed
Regulation impose s detailed labe lling requir ements on those genetic a lly modif ie d
f oods and fe e ds whic h conta in G MO s in a pr oportion higher tha n a ce rtain
thr eshold. 106 The introduc tion of minimum thr esholds for la be lling ra ised
c onside r able c ontr ove rsy which wa s se ttled in ‘la st minute agr ee me nts’. On the ba sis
of this compr omise, if the le ve l of minute tra ce s of adventitious GM mate rial107
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further information the Commission press release IP/02/1795 and MEMO/02/279 of
4 December 2002.
102 This decision will be made by the Commission in the framework of the comitology
procedure. See Art. 8(6).
103 The Commission explains the reasons why it discarded those options in COM (2001) 182,
p. 13-17.
104 In the preparatory work of the GM food and feed Regulation, the Commission considered
whether it would have been preferable to adopt negative labels. However, that option was
turned down as the Commission argued that consumers preferred to know what was in
products, and that, in any case, GM-free products were already supplied by the organic
production scheme.
105 By contrast, in the Novel Food Regulation, it was not clear whether a negative labelling was
prohibited. Recital 10 seemed to leave that labelling option open. Recital 10 reads as follow:
‘Whereas nothing shall prevent a supplier from informing the consumer on the labelling of a
food or food ingredient that the product in question is not a Novel Food within the meaning
of this Regulation or that the techniques used to obtain Novel Foods indicated in Article 1(2)
were not used in the production of that food or food ingredient.’
106 Art. 12(2) and 24(2).
107 The operator wishing to market the GM food/feed will have to supply evidence that he had
taken appropriate measures to avoid the presence of GMOs.
96
does not exceed 0,9%,108 labelling is not applicable. Lower thresholds may be set
through the comitology procedure, in particular with respect to foods containing or
consisting of genetically modified organisms or ‘in order to take account advances
in science and technology.’109
Adventitious traces of GMOs are also tolerated in food/feed containing,
consisting of, or produced from unauthorised GMOs, provided that they have
(nevertheless) been assessed as being risk-free. For this category of GMOs, the
threshold below which labelling is not required is 0.5%.110
A basic principle of the proposed Regulation is to give as wide as possible
access to information. The public will be able to read the application for
authorisation, supplementary information from applicants, opinions from the
competent authorities designated in accordance with Article 4 of Directive
2001/18/EC, monitoring reports and information from the authorisation holder,
excluding confidential information on the website of the EFSA.111 The content of
this information is identified by the notifier who cannot, however, avail himself of
confidentiality as a justification to conceal information identifying the GM product
or its effects.
3.2 The Scope of Member States’ Powers to Introduce Emergency Measures
A particularly important aspect of the draft Regulation concerns the Member
States’ powers of enacting unilateral measures, suspending or limiting the
circulation of a given genetically modified food/feedwhich was lawfully placed
into the Community marketon the grounds of public health or environmental
protection.112 This powers is regulated by the so-called ‘safeguard clauses’. The
scope of this power may be regarded as a decisive factor in convincing Member
States to give up the moratorium.
Before looking at the provision of the draft Regulation dealing with this issue,
three remarks need to be made. The first is that devising the possibility for Member
States to act unilaterally to suspend the trade of genetically modified food/feed is a
politically delicate task for Community institutions. Indeed, the marketing of
genetically modified products is closely connected, on the one hand, to the
                                                           
108 The text of the Commission proposal (2002)559 provides for a threshold of 1%. A political
compromise was reached at the Council meeting of 28 November 2002 for a threshold
of 0,9%.
109 Article 12(4) and 24(4).
110 See the minutes of the Environment Council meeting of 9 December 2002. See document
15101/02 published on http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/envir/73567.pdf.
111 Art. 29(1).
112 See on this issue Scott J. (2003) ‘European Regulation of GMOs and the WTO’, in Columbia
Journal of European Law, 9, p. 213.
97
functioning of the internal market, an exclusive competence of the EC, and, on the
other, to the protection of public health, which falls within the realm of shared
competences. Thus, Community institutions must ensure the functioning of the
internal market, a task the Commission is entrusted with, and, at the same time,
accommodate the right of the Member States to evaluate risks in a manner which is
different from that of the Community institutions. A further noteworthy issue is that
the Commission has a difficult task in assessing Member States’ unilateral
measures because of the high degree of scientific uncertainty that surrounds the use
of GMOs. Indeed, it is tricky for the Commission to distinguish between
scientifically sound national measures, restricting the marketing of
GMOsbecause of the serious risks that they pose to consumer’s healthand
measures which are instead founded on (political) grounds which have nothing to
do with consumer welfare. The third point concerns the reason why Member States
are keen on maintaining the power to enact unilateral measures. This is because this
power allows them to opt for a different position from that achieved at Community
level. Since there are remarkable differences in the attitudes of the Member States
toward the use of GMOs, national competent authorities wish to maintain the
possibility to opt out of a Community measure which may have been adopted
against their will. To put it bluntly, safeguard measures are included in the GMOs
legislation because a feeling of mutual distrust pervades the relationship amongst
Member States. This statement is confirmed in a recent preliminary ruling currently
before the ECJ (the Monsanto case)113 in which the Italian Ministry of Health
raised objections against the evaluation of the English Advisory Committee on
Novel Foods and Processes that a certain type of GM maize114 was substantially
equivalent to its traditional counterpart. The risk assessment made by the English
authority had important consequences; it legitimised recourse to a simplified
procedure to market novel food in the EU. The use of this procedure is politically
sensitive since it allows a novel food to be placed onto the market bypassing the
control of fourteen national competent authorities. It is a significant fact that this
procedure has never been used. The only time it was resorted to by a Member State
(the UK), another Member State (Italy) invoked the safeguard clause of Art. 12 to
object against the scientific opinion which activated the simplified procedure.
It is now appropriate to take a closer look at the safeguard clauses. These allow
Member States to derogate from a Community measure, authorising the marketing
of a given GMO, by enacting unilateral measures to limit the circulation of GMOs.
                                                           
113 C-2 36 /0 1 , Mon sa nt o Agr i co lt ur a I ta l ia S pA an d Oth er s c . Pr e si de nz a d el Co ns ig l io d e i mi ni s tr i
a nd Others, no year. See the opinion of the Advocate General Jacobs of 13 March 2003, no
year.
114 This is genetically modified maize, Bt 11, MON 810 e MON 809.
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They are included in all major pieces of GMOs legislation.115 Safeguard clauses
were used (and even abused) by the Member States on several occasions.116 They
are an important part of the GMOs legislation since they have been the triggering
factor of the political117 or legal disputes118 which arose in connection to the trade
of GMOs in the European Community.119
The 1997 Regulation contained a safeguard clause in Art. 12. The common
position on genetically modified food and feed does not include a safeguard clause
worded along the lines of Art. 12 of the Novel Food Regulation. Art. 53 of the draft
Regulation on GM food/feed regulates the adoption of the so-called ‘emergency
measures’, that is to say, measures which are to be enacted when a given
genetically modified food or feed is likely to represent a serious risk to human
health, animal health or the environment. Art. 35 reads as follows:
Where it is evident that products authorised by or in accordance with this
Regulation are likely to constitute a serious risk to human health, animal health
or the environment, or where, in the light of an opinion of the Authority issued
under Article 10 or Article 22, the need to suspend or modify urgently an
authorisation arises, measures shall be taken under the procedures provided for
in Articles 53 and 54 of Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002.
                                                           
115 Safeguard clauses are provided in the first (90/220), the second framework directives
(2001/18) and in the Novel Food Regulation. Art. 12 of the latter states: ‘1. Where a Member
State, as a result of new information or a reassessment of existing information, has detailed
grounds for considering that the use of a food or a food ingredient complying with this
Regulation endangers human health or the environment, that Member State may either
temporarily restrict or suspend the trade in and use of the food or food i n gr e d i en t i n q u es t i o n
i n i t s te r r i to r y . I t sh a l l i mme di a t e ly i nf o r m t h e ot h e r Me mb er Sta t e s a n d th e Commi s sio n 
t h er e o f , g i v in g th e g ro u n d s f o r i t s de c i si o n . 2 . The Co mmi s s io n sh a l l e x a min e t he g r ou n d s
r e fe r r e d t o in p ara g r ap h 1 a s s oo n a s p o ss i b l e wi t hi n t he St an d i ng Co mmi t t ee f o r Fo o ds t u ff s ; it 
s h al l t ak e t he a pp r o p ri a t e me a s ur e s in a cc o r d an c e wi t h th e p ro c e du r e la i d do wn in Ar ti c l e 1 3 .
Th e Me mbe r Stat e whi c h to o k t h e de c i s io n r ef e r r ed t o i n pa r a g ra p h 1 ma y ma i nt a i n i t u nt i l th e 
me as u r e s h a v e e n te r e d i n t o f o r c e.’ 
116 It may be recalled that the moratorium on the marketing of GMOs was legally possible
because Directive 90/220 provided a safeguard clause, Art. 16, which enabled the Member
States to temporarily prohibit the marketing of a certain type of genetically modified maize.
Some Member States abused of these clauses, since they did not use them as a basis for
temporary measures, but as a tool to maintain a five year-moratorium. It should also be noted
that Art. 12 of the Novel Food Regulation is the legal basis which founded the Italian
decision to restrict the circulation of a certain type of genetically modified maize and which
has formed the object of the above-mentioned Monsanto case, see above No. 113.
117 See for example the invoking of Art. 16 of Directive 90/220 in the Ciba-Geigy request of
authorisation to market a certain kind of genetically modified maize.
118 See for example the Italian recourse to Art. 12 of the Novel Food Regulation in the Monsanto
case, see above No. 113.
119 The only exception is the Greenpeace case, Case C-6/99 Greenpeace France and others ECR
(2000), p. I-1651.
99
In order to know how emergency measures may be enacted, it is necessary to
read first Art. 53 and then 54 of the EFSA Regulation. Art. 53 regulated the
situation in which an emergency breaks out in a Member State. In these
circumstances, the Commission, in co-operation with a Comitology committee,120
is empowered to approve of protective measures with respect both to food/feed
imported from third countries and food/feed of Community origin. These measures
may be enacted by the Commission on its own initiative or at the request of the
Member State affected by the emergency. In both cases, the Commission follows
the Comitology proc e dur e . I t must be added tha t possible pr ote c tive me asur e s which
w e re adopte d by the Me mbe r Sta te c onc e r ned be fore inf or ming the Commission of 
the eme rge nc y ta king pla c e within its te rr itory, can be ma inta ined until Community
me asur e s ha ve be en adopte d. This mea ns tha t should the Commission for ma lly
de cide tha t the na tiona l prote c tive me a sur e s ar e no longe r nec e ssa r y, the Me mbe r
State conc e r ne d by the eme rge nc y is re quir e d to withdr a w the m. 
Art. 54 rules on ‘other protective measures’. The first paragraph of Art. 54
states: ‘Where a Member State officially informs the Commission of the need to
take emergency measures, and where the Commission has not acted in accordance
with Article 53, Member States may adopt interim protective measures.’ Art. 54.3
states that these measures will be confirmed, amended or abolished by the
Commission in the framework of a Comitology procedure.
Art. 54 is akin to the safeguard clause established by Art. 12 of the Novel Food
Regulation and by the text of other pieces of GMOs legislation. Indeed, under
Art. 54, the initiative to take protective measures is in the hands of the Member
State and not of the Commission (as established by Art. 53). However, Art. 54
differs from the safeguard clause (in Art. 12) of the Novel Food Regulation since
the latter allowed Member States of their motion to either temporarily restrict or
suspend the trade in and use of a given GMOs or genetically modified food on their
territories. The Commission (in the framework of the Comitology procedure)
intervened to review these national measures only after the Member State in
question had enacted them. By contrast, in my opinion the main feature of Art. 54
is that Member States’ unilateral action is possible only after the Commission’s
failure121 to take protective measures, under Art. 53. It is not clear what happens in
                                                           
120 This is a regulatory committee: the food chain and animal health EFSA standing committee.
See Art. 58.1 of Regulation 178/2002.
121 Joanne Scott rightly argues that it is ambiguous what is the triggering factor allowing
Member States to act under Art. 54. It could be the Commission’s failure to take measures
under Art. 53 or the Commission’s refusal to authorise protective measures. She concludes
that it is more appropriate ‘for Member States to be able to introduce interim unilateral
emergency measures merely when the Commission has not acted, subject to the substantive
and procedural requirements laid down.’ See Scott J., above No. 112, p. 16, ft. 39. A
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case that the Commission explicitly refuses122 to take protective measures. This is
not clarified by the text of the Regulation.
The procedure of Art. 53 and 54 deserves a few comments. Firstly, the
relationship between the protective measures of Art. 53 and the ‘other protective
measures’ of Art. 54 is quite ambiguous. In what way do these measures differ? It
may be thought that whereas Art. 53 gives the Commission the possibility to take
emergency measures, Art. 54 grants Member States the power to adopt independent
measures to overcome the lack of action by the Commission. This reading is
supported by the fact that the triggering factor for the Member States’ unilateral
measures is the Commission’s failure to adopt protective measures under Art. 53.123
However, unilateral measures adopted under Art. 54 are not lawful in themselves;
in order for the Member State to lawfully maintain these measures, it is necessary
to submit them to the scrutiny of the Commission and the Comitology committee,
set up by the EFSA Regulation. This procedural requirement makes them identical
to measures under Art. 53, which are enacted by the Commission with the
involvement of a Comitology committee (Art. 53.1). Therefore, it looks as if
Art. 53 and 54 provided for largely overlapping measures from the procedural point
of view; indeed, in both cases the enactment of protective measures require the
support of the Commissionin co-operation with the Comitology committeeand
of the Member State (where the emergency took place).124
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comparison between the English and the French/Italian/Spanish version of Art. 54 also
strengthens this interpretation.
122 A possible scenario in which the Commission refuses to adopt protective measure is when a
Member State requests the Commission to take protective measures under Art. 53. The
Commission submits a request for the adoption of these measures to the comitology
committee, set up by Art. 58.2 of the EFSA Regulation, but neither the Comitology
committee nor the Council of the European Unionwhich may be involved in the decision
making process, according the regulatory committee procedure do not achieve the
necessary quorum to approve of protective measures. In these circumstances, the final
decision is left to the Commission which may decide against the adoption of protective
measures.
123 A possible scenario in which the Commission fails to adopt protective measure is when a
Member State requests the Commission to take protective measures under Art. 53, but this
institution denies the authorisation since the Comitology committee (and eventually the
Council of the European Union) do not achieve the necessary quorum to approve of
protective measures.
124 In the first case, measures are enacted by the Commission (and a Comitology committee),
even if Member States may request the Commission to do so; in the second case measures are
enacted by the Member States, should the Commission decide that there is no need for
protective measures. In this second case, Member States’ measures will be scrutinised by the
Commission and a Comitology committee with the view of confirming/amending or
abolishing them.
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What are the effects of the emergency measures on the substance, that is to say,
on Member States’ powers to derogate from Community decisions, authorising the
marketing of genetically modified products? Are these powers enhanced or
diminished with respect to the previous novel food regime? It should be noted that,
similarly to Art. 54, the safeguard clause of Art. 12 entrusted the Commission,
within the Comitology procedure, with the power to scrutinise unilateral measures.
Therefore, it may be concluded that, despite minor procedural differences, the
emergency measures of the draft Regulation and the safeguard clauses of Art. 12
are similar in terms of Member States’ power to introduce unilateral measures.
More precisely, the old safeguard clause and the new emergency measures clause
set up the same type of Community control procedure over national unilateral
measures. This implies that the draft Regulation leaves Member States the same
degree of autonomy offered by the Novel Food Regulation.
A further issue concerns how Member States will use the power to enact
emergency measures. Any statement on this issue rests on shaky grounds, since it is
always difficult to make predictions. However, it is always possible to speculate. In
my opinion, Art. 54 will be used by Member States not only when the Commission
fails to take protective measures, but also to enact and maintain measures
suspending the marketing of genetically modified food/feed, should they not like a
decision taken at Community level refusing to adopt protective measures. In theory,
the Commission can always review the national unilateral measures of Art. 54 and,
where necessary, oblige Member States to abolish them. However, it is uncertain
whether the Commission would take this step, especially if there is a serious
disagreement between the Member State (where the emergency took place) and the
Community institutions over the risk posed by a given genetically modified
food/feed. After all, a conflictual relationship between the Commission and several
Member States was at the origin of the moratorium! In view of this precedent, it
would not be politically wise for the Commission to ‘forcefully’ deny protective
measures when Member States want to enact them. A similar decision touches
upon the sphere of public health, an area in which Member States are very jealous
of their powers. It is likely that the Commission, reminiscent of all troubles it had
with the Ciba-Geigy application in 1996—this application led to the enactment of
the moratorium—would attempt to avoid a direct clash with Member States in this
area of regulation. The danger (or the benefit?) created by this situation is that the
Commission may end up being constrained by the level of risk to human health that
Member States deem acceptable for their citizens. This last remark leads me to a
very final conclusion on this issue: Art. 35 of the draft Regulation lends itself to the
same abusive use of the emergency measures which was made of the safeguard
clauses in the framework of Directive 90/220.
It should not be forgotten that the precautionary principle, by which the
Commission is bound, can be invoked by Member States to defend their right to
differentiate their risk evaluations from that made at Community level. Although
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the ECJ has recently warned against a purely hypothetical approach to risks in the
Alpharma case125 (par. 156), it has also legitimised competent public authorities to
take preventive measures ‘when such measures appear essential given the level of
risk to human health which the authority has deemed unacceptable for society’
(par. 173).
Having said this, it should not be forgotten that Art. 95 offers a second legal
instrument to Member States to depart from the draft Regulation,126 which is
aimed, amongst others, as the legal basis tells us, at ensuring the functioning of the
internal market.
The significance of this article to justify national measures aimed at ensuring a
higher level of protection of public health than that afforded by a Community
harmonising measure is illustrated by a recent case: C-3/00 Denmark v.
Commission.
127 However, Art. 95 may raise false hopes for Member States.
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Art. 95 allow Member States to respectively maintain and
introduce national measures after the adoption of a harmonising measure.
Maintaining national measures is easier than introducing new derogating measures
since the grounds and conditions for introducing new national measures are
respectively more limited (only for environmental reasons; public health is
excluded) and more stringent (scientific evidence need be given). Furthermore,
national derogating measures should comply with the proportionality principle.
These limits should be taken carefully into consideration by Member States in
applying for a derogation from a Community measure authorising the marketing of
a certain genetically modified food/feed. The Commission has been quite strict in
                                                           
125 T-70/99 Alpharma v. Council, no year.
126 On t h e po s s i bi l i ty f o r t h e Me mb er St at e s t o r es o r t t o Art . 9 5 o f t he EC Tr e at y or t o th e 
s a fe g u a rd c l au s e t o d er o g a te f r om Di re c t iv e 2 00 1 / 1 8, s e e Da br o ws ka P. ( 2 0 02 ) ‘ Th e di v i s io n 
o f p o we rs b e twe e n t h e EU a nd t h e Me mbe r St a t e s wi t h r e g ar d t o d e li b e r at e r el e a s e of GMOs 
( t he n e w Di r ec t i ve 2 0 01 / 1 8 )’ , i n Ge rma n La w J ou r n al , Vol . 3 , No . 5 , 1 Ma y .
127 Reference to this case is crucial for Member States wishing to maintain national measures on
grounds of public health. The important paragraphs of this ruling are No. 63 and 64. The ECJ
affirms that a Member State may justify maintaining derogating national provisions, invoking
the argument that ‘its assessment of the risk to public health is different from that made by
the Community legislature in the harmonisation measure.’ Furthermore, the Court makes
clear that: ‘In the light of the uncertainty inherent in assessing the public health risks posed
by, amongst others, the use of food additives, divergent assessments of those risks can
legitimately be made, without necessarily being based on new or different scientific
evidence’ (par. 63).
The ECJ also emphasises the conditions to trigger Art. 95.4. In par. 64, it is stated that
Member States need to prove that the national derogating provisions ensure a level of health
protection which is higher than the Community harmonisation measure and that they do not
go beyond what is necessary to attain that objective.
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admitting national derogating measures and the ECJ has in most cases128 upheld the
Commission’s refusal to authorise the Member States’ application for derogation.
Even more fundamentally, it should be borne in mind that Member States are
precluded from using Art. 95 where the draft Regulation fully harmonises the
marketing of genetically modified food/feed. Reliance on Art. 95 is only possible
should the draft Regulation in question partially harmonise this area of regulation.
It is therefore necessary to carry out a preliminary analysis on the nature of the
draft Regulation.
Can the draft Regulation be considered an example of total or minimum
harmonisation?129 The answer is not straightforward and a full examination of this
point is not possible due to space constraints. However, in my opinion, there is
more evidence in favour of total harmonisation. First of all, the act in question is a
Regulation designed to leave Member States as a narrow as possible a margin of
manoeuvre both in the achievement of the aims of the act in question and in the
instruments needed to attain this goal. Secondly, the draft Regulation is set out so
as to reduce the opportunity for the Member States to deviate from the Community
legislation insofar as Art. 4.5 states that: ‘An authorisation [to market genetically
modified food] […] shall not be granted, refused, renewed, modified, suspended or
revoked except on the grounds and under the procedures set out in this Regulation.’
This provision, which was not included in the Novel Food Regulation, is set out to
accentuate the centralised character130 of the procedures involving the trade of
genetically modified food and feed. Thirdly, contrary to the 1997 Regulation,
which rested upon Art. 100.a (Art. 95), the draft Regulation is based on Art. 95,
Art. 152.4.b) (public health) and Art. 37 (agriculture). The Commission, whose
interest was to centralise the authorisation procedure to place genetically modified
food/feed into the Community market as much as possible, was the first to propose
that draft Regulation be based on all three legal bases. The fact that Art. 152.4.b
and 37 were used together with Art. 95 as the legal basis for the draft Regulation is
one of the factors indicating that the draft Regulation harmonises the marketing of
genetically modified food/feed exhaustively. It may be strange to argue in favour of
total harmonisation when one of the legal bases concerned relates to public health.
                                                           
128 See for exceptions the mentioned case C-3/00 Denmark v. Commission of 20 March 2003, no
year and C–473/98, Kemikalieinspektionen v. Toolex Alpha AB (2000) ECR I–5681.
129 On the meaning and occurrence of minimum harmonisation within the Community legal
order, see the insightful analysis of Dougan M. (2000) ‘Minimum harmonisation and the
internal market’, in Common Market Law Review, 37, p. 853.
130 It should be noted that Member States have not so far contested the accentuated centralisation
of the procedure, during the discussion leading to the drafting of the Council’s position on the
two proposed Regulations. The Parliament highlights that ‘a large majority of delegations
expressed their wish to keep a centralised [authorisation] procedure as proposed by the
Commission.’ See the Parliament’s legislative observatory.
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However, had the Treaty authors wanted Art. 152.4.b) to allow for the adoption of
more stringent protective measures, they would have explicitly provided for it, as is
the case for Art. 152.4.a) or as is laid down by other Treaty provisions concerning
the environmental131 and consumer protection.132 However, this is not a compelling
argument. Should the ECJ be asked in the framework of a preliminary ruling
whether the draft Regulation pre-empts Member States’ independent action, the
answer may be difficult to predict. Certainly the Court would not consider the lack
of an explicit minimum harmonisation clause in Art. 152.4.b) sufficient to prove
total harmonisation. Indeed, as Dougan points out, ‘minimum harmonisation need
not be provided for explicitly. The Court of Justice has on several occasions held
Community measures to constitute non-exhaustive standards by process of
implication.’133 Therefore, even if Art. 152.4.b) does not contain a ‘minimum
harmonisation’ proviso such as that of Art. 152.4.a), this does not mean that it
should be regarded as a provision founding a ‘total harmonisation’ measure.
However, another piece of the puzzle of the ECJ caselaw on minimum
harmonisation should be added to the picture. This is the Compassion World
Farming ruling in which the Court maintained that a minimum harmonisation
clause of a Directive (Art. 11.2 of Directive 91/629) did not preclude the Directive
from exhaustively harmonising the powers of the Member States in the area of
regulation (the protection of calves) concerned.134
It may be concluded that the ECJ caselaw is unsettled on minimum
harmonisation. In this confused state of affairs, perhaps a further point may be
raised to tilt the balance in favour of total harmonisation. Comparing the legal basis
of the Novel Food Regulation and the new draft Regulation, one can argue that the
Commission based the draft Regulation on a greater number of legal bases than the
original Novel Food Regulation to remove any lingering doubts over the degree of
harmonisation pursued by the new genetically modified food/feed Regulation, a
degree of harmonisation which could have been considered ‘minimum’ when the
Novel Food Regulation had a single legal basis (Art. 100.a),135 but which was
intended to be ‘exhaustive’ if the legal basis were extended to three.
The last point, concluding my speculations on the legal basis of the draft
Regulation, is the following. It is odd that the draft Regulation is founded on
                                                           
131 See Art. 176 of the EC Treaty.
132 See Art. 153.5 of the EC Treaty.
133 See Dougan M. above No. 129, p. 856.
134 See the case Compassion in World Farming, C-1/96 (1998) ECR-I-1251.
135 As it was emphasised in ft No. 3, during the Environment Council meeting of June 1999
some Member States alluded to the possibility of invoking Art. 95 to adopt national unilateral
measures derogating from the framework Directive. Maybe the Commission decided to
expand the legal basis the of the draft Regulation so as to avoid the danger that Member
States appealed to Art. 95 to derogate from the Novel Food Regulation.
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Art. 152.4.b) and Art. 37 since it appears from the letter of Art. 152.4.b) that when
measures in the veterinary and phytosanitary fields have as their direct objective
the protection of public health they are based upon 152.4.b). This makes Art. 37
redundant. Therefore, the Regulation concerned should have been based only upon
Art. 95 and 152.4.b). The possibility of a legal action introduced by a Member
State against the future Regulation for inappropriateness of its legal basis should
not be excluded, since annulment actions of this kind are quite often used by
Member States to invalidate a Community measure that they do not like.
3.3 The Traceability and Labelling of GMOs and the Traceability of Food and
Feed Produced from GMOs
The objective of the draft Regulation is to facilitate ‘accurate labelling, monitoring
of the effects on the environment and, where appropriate, on health, and the
implementation of the appropriate risk management measures including, if
necessary, withdrawal of products.’136
As the title implies, this measure137 rules on two aspects: 1) how to identify
traces of GMOs (traceability)138 in genetically modified food/feed139 or products
containing them,140 and 2) when and how products containing or consisting of
GMOs (i.e GM cotton) should be labelled (labelling).141 Neither traceability nor
labelling are related to the safety of GMOs, which is an issue considered by the
framework Directive and by the GM proposed food and feed Regulation.
According to the Commission, this is the reason why no mention is made of the
precautionary principle142 which concerns the safety assessments of GMOs. The
traceability and labelling Regulation may be defined as a ‘flank measure’ with
respect to the two above-mentioned acts since it eases the implementation of risk
management measures.
                                                           
136 Art. 1.
137 COM (2001) 182 as modified by the political agreement reached on the 9 December 2002.
See document above No. 14.
138 The proposed rules supplement the traceability provisions of existing legislation (Art. 4(6) of
Directive 2001/18, which already contained traceability rules for GMOs) and lay down new
obligations for food/feed containing or consisting of GMOs and for products produced from
GMOs.
139 Art. 5.
140 Art. 4(1).
141 Art. 4(6). Labelling provisions of food/feed containing or consisting of GMOs are provided
in the GM food and feed Regulation.
142 It is noticeable that the Commission rejected the Parliament’s suggestion to make explicit
reference to the precautionary principle in the draft Regulation. See point 3.3. of the amended
proposal for Regulation concerning traceability and labelling of genetically modified
organisms and traceability of food and feed products produced from genetically modified
organisms and amending Directive 2001/18/EC, in COM (2002) 559, of 23 September 2002.
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Let us now look at the content of the proposed Regulation. The traceability
provisions address problems which may arise after the placing on the market of
products containing or consisting of GMOs and food/feed produced from GMOs.
Indeed, it might happen that authorised GMOs turn out to have adverse effects on
human health, animal health or the environment, as was shown by the problems of
the StarLink in the US.143 Hence, they need to be withdrawn from the market.
Another possibility is that operators label authorised GMOs incorrectly, thus
misleading users on the actual content of the labelled product. In order to facilitate
the implementation of controls on the labels and withdrawal of products, where this
is necessary, GMOs need to be identifiable. The proposed Regulation makes GMOs
traceable in products by obliging the latter to be assigned a code (called ‘unique
identifier’).144 Operators are required to inform the person who receives the product
containing GMOs of what its unique identifier is. This information should also be
passed on in writing to other operators involved in the subsequent stages of its
placing on the market.145 Special and more burdensome traceability provisions are
also laid down for food and feed produced from GMOs, although the UK opposed
their inclusion within the scope of the proposed Regulation.146
The second element of the proposed measure is labelling. Products consisting
of, or containing, GMOs should be labelled as indicated by the Regulation.147 An
exception applies if traces of GMOs in products used as GM food or feed do not
exceed a proportion of 0.9%, provided that the presence is adventitious or
technically unavoidable.148 Different labelling thresholds apply to products
consisting of, or containing GMOs which are not intended for food use.149
Inspections and control measures on the implementation of the Regulation are
delegated to Member States. The latter must test products using the harmonised and
                                                           
143 On the problems of the Starlink, see Nelson A.P. (2002) ‘Starlink see Legal Liability in the
Wake of Starlink TM: Who Pays in the End?’, in Drake Journal of Agricltural Law 7, p. 241.
144 A system of unique identifer will be defined by the Commission in the framework of
Comitology procedure. Development in international fora will be taken into account in
defining the identifiers. See Art. 8.
145 Operators will have to keep track of the information concerning the transaction (the operator
from which the GMOs material was received, data related to the GMO material and the
addressee of the transaction) for a period of five years.
146 The UK was the only Member State to support the exclusion of food and feed produced from
GMOs. See Council document 14076/02, p. 2.
147 Art. 4(6).
148 Art. 4(7).
149 These products are labelled according to Art. 21(2) and 21(3) of Dir. 2001/18, as modified by
Art. 7 of the proposed Regulation on traceability and labelling. See Art. 4(8).
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validated methods decided at Community level by the Commission and comitology
committees and by the Community Reference Laboratory.150
A final issue which deserves attention is the financial impact of this Regulation
on economic operators. The Commission admits that it is difficult to estimate the
costs of introducing traceability specifically for GMOs and products produced from
GMOs.151 However, it draws the conclusion that since the transmission and
retention of information can be largely incorporated into existing (documentary)
systems of transaction, they should not imply significant extra costs for operators
and consumers.152 As we will see in section 7, however, the financial implications
of the proposal are a matter of controversy.
4. Beyond the Technicalities of the Proposed Legislation: Elements of
Reassurance for the Member States
It is now useful to give an evaluation of the proposed regime of authorisation,
labelling and traceability of GM food and feed.
It may be said that the draft of the GM food and feed Regulation softens some
of the excessively strict aspects of the old GM food regime which made it
unworkable.153 For example, although the GM food/feed Regulation is inspired by
the precautionary principle,154 there has been a shift in the level of protection
chosen against the risks of GM food and feed. As mentioned earlier, in the Novel
Food Regulation it is stated that the GM food must not present a danger […]. This
threshold evinces ‘a zero risk’ approach155 in the use of GMOs which cannot be
                                                           
150 Art. 9(2).
151 COM (2001) 182, p. 8.
152 COM (2001) 182, p. 9.
153 It must be pointed out that no food or food ingredient was authorised under the standard
authorisation procedure of the Novel Food Regulation. For eleven kinds of GM food the
authorisation procedure is pending. Several products produced from GMOs were notified to
the Commission under the simplified procedure. See the Commission press release,
‘Questions and answers on the Regulation of GMOs in the EU’, above No. 4.
154 The European Parliament suggested to include reference to this principle both to make clear
that the Regulation was drafted in the light of the precautionary principle and to require that
this principle is taken into account when implementing the Regulation. Reference to the
precautionary principle is incorporated in the draft Regulation of COM (2002) 559 which
includes the amendments of the Parliament which were accepted by the Commission.
155 United States and Canada criticised the draft Regulation on GM food and feed for its initial
emphasis on standards of zero risk approach. The text of the proposed Regulation was
changed taking into account the comments of the transatlantic States. See the document
G/SPS/GEN/337 and G/TBT/W/179 of 26 July 2002 entitled ‘Responses from the European
Commission to comments submitted by WTO members under either or both G/TBT/N/EEC/6
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achieved. Under the new Regulation, GM food and feed can be authorised if they
do not present an unacceptable risk for human health, animal health and the
environment. Secondly, the principle of ‘substantial equivalence’ is applicable not
only to food produced from GMOs but to all GM food/feed. Moreover, where GM
food/feed is not ‘substantially equivalent’ to its conventional counterpart, it can still
be traded provided that it is appropriately labelled to inform consumers. Thirdly,
traces of unauthorised GMOs are acceptable if certain conditions are met, whereas
in the Novel Food Regulation they were not allowed to circulate in the market
under any condition.
While it is true that the draft Regulation relaxes, in certain limited respects, the
previous regime, the impression should not be given that the new legislation will
open the European borders to transatlantic GM food and feedthis is only made
possible, but it is far from simple. The prevailing feeling amongst the European
institutions156 towards GMOs is still that of scepticism, although not intolerance.
Therefore those Member States which were particularly concerned about the effects
of the principle ‘one key-one door’157 for the purposes of marketing GMOs should
not be alarmed. The complex and sophisticated reform, carried out by the
Commission through the proposals for Regulations examined above, seem in fact to
strengthen the regulatory framework provided for by the 1990’s GMOs regime,
from both a procedural and substantive point of view. The labelling and traceability
obligations for food/feed and products produced from GMOs actually ensure that
Member States are now well equipped to authorise, in collaboration with the
Commission, the safe use of GMOs in food/feed and products. Although other third
countries regulated the use of GMOs,158 the EU Regulation is probably the tightest
of all possible regimes,159 leaving aside an outright ban on the use of GMOs. As a
result, Member States should feel encouraged to unblock the authorisation of
GMOs or food/feed products containing them or produced from GM material. A
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AND G/SPS/N/EEC/149’. This document is published on http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/
fs/gmo/gmo_ongoinit_en.html.
156 The Commission is in favour of resuming the authorisation procedure of GMOs whereas the
Parliament and the Council seem convinced that applications of biotechnology, although
offering potential opportunities, should be treated ‘with caution.’
157 This principle allows a GMOs (or its derivatives) to circulate in the territory of all Member
States if the commercial release of this GMOs has been authorised by a national competent
authority and neither the Commission, nor the other Member State have raised objections
against the placing of the GMO concerned on the market.
158 For example Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand, Japan laid down mandatory labelling
requirements.
159 For an overview of GMOs legislation in third countries see Zarrilli S. ‘International trade in
genetically modified organisms and multilateral negotiations—a new dilemma for developing
countries’, United Nation Conference on trade and development, 5 July 2000, published on
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poditctncdd1.en.pdf.
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further postponement of the lift on the moratorium would not be justifiable by
arguing that the legislative framework does not offer adequate guarantees to protect
human/consumer health and/or the environment. Therefore, once the current
proposed rules become final, it will be legally difficult to keep the moratorium.
From a political point of view, however, the situation may be different. Member
States have no interest in opening their markets to food to which their consumers
are hostile. Therefore, it is not clear whether the internal pressure of the
Commission, which sees biotechnology as an opportunity which Member States
hesitate to seize,160 and the external pressure of transatlantic trade partners will be
enough to persuade Member States to resume the GMOs authorisation procedure.
However, it should be reiterated that Member States’ concerns are no longer
justified in the light of the GMOs reform. Evidence that the GMOs regulatory
framework was re-invigorated by the proposed Regulations is provided by the
following elements. The scope of the GM food/feed Regulation is more extended
than that of the Novel Food Regulation. Even if such scope is not as comprehensive
as the Parliament would have liked,161 this does not raise any worries since food
produced with a GMOs does not contain any genetically modified material.
Moreover, it should be noted that further sector-related legislation,162 expanding the
scope of the EC legislation is in the pipeline.
I t is note w orthy tha t GM food/f ee d is subje c t to a single author isa tion pr oc e dure . 
T he simplif ied notif ica tion pr oc e dure , set out by the Nove l Food Re gula tion for
‘ substa ntia lly equiva le nt’ food pr oduc e d fr om G MOs ha s be e n abandoned. This
se cur e s ga ins in te r ms of pr oc e dur a l ec onomy. 163 Cer ta inly, this pr oc edur e ha d the 
a dva nta ge of wa r ra nting spee diness in the approva l of substa ntia lly equiva le nt
ge ne tic ally modifie d nove l f ood. How eve r , Me mbe r Sta te s, rightly or wrongly, ha ve 
ha rdly use d it; the only oc ca sion on whic h one Me mber State , the UK , made 
r e cour se to it, another Me mbe r Sta te , Italy, cla imed that it should not ha ve be en
used. 164 The r e f or e , the dumping of this pr oc edur e pr e se nts the fur ther bene f it of 
a c cr uing Me mbe r Sta te s’ suppor t f or the food and fee d dra f t Re gula tion. 
A further substantive element which should contribute towards reassuring
Member States is the mandatory labelling of safe GMOs and derivatives. In the
                                                           
160 See COM (2002) 27 ‘Life sciences and biotechnology—a strategy for Europe’, p. 8-9.
161 The Parliament supported the view that the Regulation should extend to food and feed
produced with GMOs.
162 The Commission has announced the Parliament that it will put forward new legislation on
GM enzymes.
163 Two different authorisation procedures are replaced by one.
164 See the Monsanto case see above No. 113.
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Novel Food Regulation, labelling requirements were more limited165 and no
labelling threshold was provided for adventitious or a technically unavoidable
presence of GMOs. With the new Regulation, the clear identification of GMOs in
products or GM food and feed will enhance the consumer’s freedom to decide
which products to buy. In addition, although minimum traces of adventitious or
technically unavoidable GMOs are tolerated, the thresholds below which they will
not be labelled is very low. In all likelihood, the EU is the area with the lowest
tolerated presence of GMOs.166 Hopefully, it will be possible to enforce these
labelling provisions.
Finally, the importance of the inclusion of traceability obligations for operators
dealing with GM food/feed and products at all stages of the marketing chain should
not be underestimated. These measures will enable the Member States to take ex-
post marketing action, in the case of any unforeseen adverse effects of GMOs on
public health and/or the environment.
The new proposed rules have also made the regulatory framework on GMOs
procedurally tighter. For example, the applicant is asked to supply a number of
documents and information supporting his applications (in particular, the lodging of
reference material and methods for detection and identification). This ensures that
the final decision on the dossier is made on the basis of comprehensive
information. More importantly, the procedure to carry out the scientific risk
assessment on GM food/feed is more streamlined,167 reliable and transparent with
respect to the previous regime. The procedure is also rationalised from an
institutional point of view, since the EFSA will replace a panoplia of
committees,168 which were previously involved in the approval procedure.
Moreover, the involvement of the EFSA in the authorisation procedure makes it
more trustworthy, since the Food Authority guarantees independent scientific
expertise.169 This is particularly important for the Member States, given that the
lack of trust in the evaluation of the Commission’s advisory scientific committees
was one of the reasons underlying the Member State’s scepticism towards the
Community authorisation procedure.170 The new procedure also gains in
                                                           
165 Labelling requirements did not extend to feed containing, consisting of, GMOs, or produced
from GMOs.
166 For example Australia, Japan, New Zealand have higher thresholds.
167 Beyond the Comitology committees, several scientific committees were involved: the
Scientific Committee on plants, the Scientific Steering committee and the Scientific
Committee of food. See http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/gmo/gmo_scientadvice_en.html.
168 Above No. 167.
169 See Art. 37 of Regulation 178/2002.
170 During the crisis which was triggered by the request of authorisation for the marketing of GM
maize, the Commission advisory committees took the position that the GM maize did not
pose risks for human health. However, the Member States decided to halt the authorisation
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transparency, since the Authority will have to make several documentsincluding
the opinion of the EFSA on the authorisation of a certain GM food/
feedaccessible to the public.
Amongst the most qualifying points of the proposed Regulations is one which is
particularly important for the Member States: the role of national authorities in the
release, suspension and withdrawal of the authorisation to market GM food/feed. It
may be noted that the competent national authorities have kept the power to block
the authorisation procedure.171 However, the exercise of this power is subject to the
constraints of Art. 4.5.172 Member States also maintain the power to adopt
unilateral measures on the grounds of public health or environmental protection and
having the effect of halting the trade of an authorised genetically modified
food/feed, in the case of an emergency within their territory. This power is
regulated according to the same ‘check and balances’ of the Novel Food
Regulation. Member States cannot, legally speaking, maintain unilateral measures
unless they are backed by the Commission and the Comitology committee set up by
the EFSA Regulation. However, it was also argued that Member States are likely,
politically speaking, to take independent action, even if the Commission and the
Comitology committee do not approve of this.
5. The Proposed Regulations: Criticism and Ambiguities
If, on the one hand, the draft Regulations are praiseworthy since they address a
number of Member States’ concerns, on the other, they also contain certain
shortcomings and ambiguities.
The first critical remark that can be made concerns the legislative style. The
proposed Regulations turn the legislation on GM food and feed into a fragmented
patchwork which is not easy to read. For example, the GM food and feed
Regulation does not replace the Novel Food Regulation as a whole. Therefore,
rules on GM food may be found in two different legal instruments. Furthermore,
the Commission chose to adopt a horizontal instrument on treaceability and
labelling instead of inserting traceability and labelling provisions into the sector-
related legislation (such as in the GM food and feed Regulation). In sum, it is
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procedure. See above No. 4. It should be noted that the EFSA will rely on the activity of
some scientific committees which will in part be composed of the same persons who sat in
the former advisory committees of the Commission.
171 Indeed, they may object the marketing of GM food/feed, after EFSA has released an opinion
on the application. In such a circumstance, the Commission will take the ultimate decision on
the application, in cooperation with the Comitology committee. See Art. 8(1) a.
172 ‘An authorisation (to market genetically modified food) […] shall not be granted, refused,
renewed, modified, suspended or revoked except on the grounds and under the procedures set
out in this Regulation.’
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regrettable that rules applicable to a single type of GM material (be it a
living genetically modified organism, or food/feed containing or consisting of
GMOs, or products containing or consisting of GMOs) are not contained in a single
legal instrument.
Turning to the substance, the Regulation can also be criticised for its
‘vulnerability to fraud and the wider question of enforcement’173 as far as the
labelling requirements are concerned. The Commission seems to underestimate
these problems.
A further shortcoming of the proposed Regulation is the limited role that it
reserves to the EFSA. The institutional architecture of risk decision-making is
based, on the one hand, on the Food Authority, which will be responsible for risk
assessments and, on the other, on the Commission and the Member States, which
take risk management decisions. It is felt that this institutional distinction, which is
criticised by some authors,174 is a legitimate choice, since ‘judging what is an
acceptable level of risk for society is an eminent political responsibility.’175
However, this does not mean that the involvement of the EFSA in the authorisation
procedure on GM food/feed should be kept at a minimum. Indeed, the setting up of
the European Food Safety Authority is a good occasion to boost the credibility of
the European food safety policy, which, in the opinion of the US, ‘is hostage to
politic a l conce rns with complete disr egar d for sc ie nc e and sound re gulatory dec ision- 
making. ’ 176 It is regre tta ble tha t the Author ity is not consulte d syste matic ally on all
issue s per ta ining to the sa fe ty of GM food/f ee d and produc ts. 177 In some case s, 
dec isions ar e taken by the Commission, in the fr a me work of the c omitology
c ommitte es, without consulting it at all. 178 Furthermore, it is regrettable that the
Member States and the Commission can decide on an application to market GM
food and feed, and take into account only the EFSA opinion. This means that it is
possible for the Member States and the Commission to disregard a positive
(scientific) opinion given by the EFSAprovided that they state the reasons for
                                                           
173 See the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on genetically modified food and
feed, CES 694/2002, of 30 May 2002, p. 7.
174 Majone G. ‘Foundations of Risk Regulation: Science, Decision-Making, Policy Learning and
Institutional Reform’, chapter 1 in this volume.
175 COM (2000)1.
176 See G/SPS/GEN/337 and G/TBT/W/179 of 26 July 2002, above No. 155.
177 For example the opinion of the EFSA is not required for the adoption of emergency measures
or for the enlargement of the scope of the GM food and feed Regulation.
178 Co mi t o l og y c ommi tt e e s d e c i de i n c a s e o n e o r mor e n at i o n al a u th o r it i e s o b j e ct t h e g r a nt i n g o f 
a u th o r i sa t i o n, o r o n th e wit h d r awa l fr o m t h e ma r k e t o f th e GM f o od / f e ed , o r o n th e
o p po r t u ni t y to i nt r o d uc e l ab e l l in g t hr e s ho l d s wh i c h a r e l o we r t h an t h e e x i st in g o n e s .
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departing from the latter.179 There should, however, be a heavier burden on these in
order for them to reject the Authority’s opinion. Otherwise, suspicions could arise
that the Commission and the Member States can simply ignore EFSA opinion, even
in the absence of valid reasons.
The broad discretion of the EC institutions in taking risk management
measures180 seems to distinguish the European approach to food safety from the
American one. However, it is important that this discretion be exercised with
scientific evidence in mind. This does not, for instance, mean that ‘other legitimate
concerns’, such as consumer resistance to GMOs, should not come into play. ‘If the
decisions are to have any legitimacy among the public […] there is a need for the
risk assessment process to incorporate them as equal partners.’181 However, there
should be a way to define, as well as to gauge, these legitimate concerns. If this is
not done, it becomes difficult to reject the US’s allegation that the ambiguity of this
notion can be used by the EC to ‘arbitrarily delay or block (GMOs) approvals.’182 It
should be noted that the European Community has requested a discussion of the
definition of ‘other legitimate concerns’ at the Codex Ad Hoc Intergovernmental
Task Force on Foods derived from Biotechnology, set up in 1999. However, the US
has been reluctant to define standards on this aspect. In order to gauge public
opinion, the Commission seems to rely on Eurobarometer surveys,183 which are the
only available means to sound this out.
In the draft Regulation on GM food and feed, two ambiguities should also be
signalled. The first concerns the administrative review of the EFSA’s action.184
Private parties can submit a complaint185 to the Commission against an EFSA
                                                           
179 It must be specified that the duty to state reasons for departing from the EFSA’s opinion also
applies in the event the Member States or the Commission are favourable to grant
authorisation whereas the EFSA opposes it.
180 Recently, the wide scope of the EC institution’s discretion was confirmed by the CFI in the
Alpharma-Pfizer rulings (see T-70/99 Alpharma v. Council delivered on the 11 September
2002 and T-13/99 Pfizer v Council delivered on the 11 September 2002, not yet reported.). In
these cases, the ECJ recognised that in risk management decisions, the Commission may
reach different conclusions than those of the scientific committees, provided that, the
scientific material the EC institutions rely on, is founded on the principle of excellence,
independence and transparency. See for a comment Segnana O. (2002) ‘Case note on
Alpharma-Pfizer’, in German Law Journal.
181 See McFarlane R. above No. 92, p. 11.
182 See G/SPS/GEN/337 and G/TBT/W/179 of 26 July 2002, above No. 155.
183 See for example Eurobarometer 55.2 ‘Europeans, Science and Technology’, December 2001,
European Commission, DG Research, which also contains some data on GMOs. The results
of the survey are published on: http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/press/2001/pr0612en.html.
184 Art. 36.
185 It should be noted that Member States and the Commission of its own motion can also submit
a complaint against an action or failure to act of the Authority.
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decision or a failure to act, if they are directly and individually concerned by such a
decision or failure. The Commission will decide on the matter within two months,
requiring the EFSA, if appropriate, to withdraw its decision or to remedy its failure.
It is clear that the Commission will have to make clear a number of details of this
provision.186 For the moment, suffice it to attract attention to one of the most
important issues: it is unclear which private parties will be able to rely on this
provision. Possible interested parties in reviewing the EFSA’s action are those
applicants whose request for authorisation has not passed the screening process of
the Food Authority, as well as competitors of the applicant. Public interest groups
also have an interest in submitting complaints, although it seems that, from the
letter of Art. 36.a, referring to ‘private parties’, they will be excluded. Moreover, it
is unclear whether they would pass the ‘individual and direct concern’ test.187 It
would be desirable if the Commission interpreted this provision in the direction of
accepting the complaints of public interest groups, since this would increase the
legitimacy of the EFSA’s decisions.
The second ambiguity touches upon an issue which is connected to the problem
of the legitimacy identified above, that is to say, it concerns the accountability of
the EFSA’s action and, in reality, is not specifically related to the draft Regulations
but pertains to the overall institutional structure of the European food safety policy.
The problem is that it is unclear which body is politically accountable to the public
for decisions concerning the realm of food safety. Should there be a food scandal
involving the use of GMOs, who will be held responsible? Will it be the Executive
Director of the EFSA? Or the SANCO Commissioner or the collège of
Commissioners? It is regrettable that this is not mentioned in the draft Regulations
or elsewhere. In principle, since it is the Commission that takes risk management
decisions, the political responsibility should lie with it. At all events, clarifications
on accountability are important to make the GMOs’ new regime and any other
decision on food safety fully acceptable to the public. It is crucial that the
Commission take up this issue.
6. The Potential Application of the WTO Law to Measures Restricting
the Use/Marketing of GMOs: An Overview of the Legal Problems
When the Member States halted the authorisation procedure for the marketing of
GMOs, many authors speculated on the legality of such decision in WTO terms
                                                           
186 For example, the Commission should lay down the procedural requirements of its power of
administrative review and the grounds of review.
187 According to well established case-law, the interpretation of ‘direct and individual’ concern
of the ECJ, under Art. 230 of the EC Treaty, is very narrow and tend to exclude public
interest groups.
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and, more generally, on the compatibility between the restrictive EU legislation on
genetically modified organisms and the WTO obligations. The most important legal
issues raised by commentators are summarised below.
It was argued that an EU measure treating all GMOs (regardless of their
national origin) differently from ‘like products’ (i.e. conventional products) could
breach Article XI of the GATT and/or the non-discrimination principle of
Article III of the GATT.188 The assumption was that products containing,
consisting of, or produced from GMOs were ‘like products’ with respect to
products which were manufactured without the use of biotechnology. However,
this was far from clear. There were two legal dilemmas surrounding the violation of
these WTO articles:
– Are GMOs products ‘like’ conventional products?
– Can consumers’ preferences be taken into consideration when
carrying out the test of likeness?
– Moreover, should GMOs be considered as ‘like products’ with
respect to traditional products, could the EU justify its restrictive
use of GMOs as a necessary measure under Art. XX b),
protecting, amongst other things, human health?
The second WTO agreement, which was considered important for establishing
the legality of a GMOs measure, was the SPS agreement.189 The latter places a
strong emphasis on the fact that measures which are designed to protect human,
animal or plant life or health from food-borne risks or protecting plants from pests
and diseases’ should be based on sound science.190 In particular, measures which
aim at a level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection which is higher than that
achieved by measures based on international standards may be adopted191 but must
comply with strict requirements.192 It was found that where the EC rejected an
application to market GMOs submitted by an American firm, the US could claim
that the scientific factors used by the EC in making this decision were inaccurate.193
The SPS agreement would therefore be invoked. It is felt that trade restrictive
measures on GMOs to protect human or animal life may fall ‘within the spirit, if
not the letter, of the SPS Agreement. There is, however, no consensus on this
                                                           
188 Howse R. and Mavrodis P. above No. 18.
189 Howse R. and Mavrodis P. above No. 18.
190 See Art. 2.2 SPS.
191 Art. 3.3 SPS.
192 See Art. 5 paragraph 1 to 8 of SPS.
193 See Krenzler above No. 18, p. 310.
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assumption.’194 Should the European Community wish to maintain these kinds of
measures in relation to GMOs, the following related questions would arise:
– Can the EC take restrictive measures with respect to the
marketing of GMOs on the basis that they endanger human
health even if a risk assessment evinced no such threat? To what
extent can the precautionary principle justify these measures?195
– Are these measures justifiable on the basis of the consumer’s
preferences (i.e. the European consumer’s reluctance to buy
GMOs products?)
– In any event, is article XXb) and g) applicable to measures
which violate the SPS agreement?196 If so, what interest,
amongst those mentioned by Art. XX b and g, does a trade
restrictive measure of GMOs seek to protect?
The possibility of introducing mandatory labelling schemes raised the following
doubts: do they fall within the SPS or the TBT agreement?197 Is compulsory
labelling the least trade restrictive measure? These questions have been left
unanswered so far since to date no WTO members have triggered the WTO dispute
settlement procedure.198 However, the EU GMOs legislation, in particular the draft
Regulations analysed in this paper, have been the object of a number of critical
comments by several WTO members.199
                                                           
194 Zarrilli S. above No. 159, p. 24.
195 See on this issue MacMillan F., Blakeney M. (second part of the article) above No. 18,
p. 161-164.
196 For a positive answer, see Bentley above 18.
197 See MacMillan F., Blakeney M. (first part of the article) above No. 18, p. 133-134. Zedalis
considers that labelling practises on GMOs could also be reached by Art. IX GATT. See
Zedalis Rex J. ‘Labeling of genetically modifed food—the limits of GATT rules’, p. 308.
198 It should be noted that the EU regulatory framework on GMOs has been repeatedly the
subject of controversy in the TBT committee. See Howse R. and Tuerk E. (2001) ‘The WTO
impact on internal regulations-a case study of the Canada. EC asbestos dispute’, p. 284 in De
Búrca G. and Scott J. (ed.) The EU and the WTO Legal and Constitutional Issues Hart
publishing.
199 Australia, Argentina, Brazil and the US also made comments on Regulation 1139/98. See
G/TBT/W/184, 4 October 2002.
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7. The Comments of Third Countries with Commercial Interests in
GMOs to the Proposals on GM Food/Feed and Labelling/Traceability
of GM Products
The Commission notified the proposal for a Regulation on GM food and feed200
under both the SPS and the TBT agreement in consideration of the fact that the
provisions contained therein were capable of falling within the scope of both
agreements. The same was done for the proposal on traceability and labelling.201
A number of issues were raised by some third countries, Australia, Canada, US,
Brazil, Argentina and Switzerland202 many of which have important interests in
marketing agricultural biotech products.203 This group of States made comments on
virtually every single provision of the proposed Regulation on GM food and feed,
requesting clarifications both on the meaning of the terminology204 used in the
proposal and on procedural and institutional aspects of the GMOs regime.205 The
                                                           
200 The Commission notified the proposal as set out in COM (2001) 425. Therefore the
comments that were made by WTO members do not take into account the political
compromise reached in November 2002 by the Council. See ‘Responses from the European
Commission to comments submitted by WTO members under either or both G/TBT/N/EEC/6
AND G/SPS/N/EEC/149’, above No. 155.
201 The Commission notified the proposal as set out in COM (2001) 182. See the notification
G/TBT/N/EEC/7 and G/SPS//N/EEC/150. See also ‘Responses from the European
Commission to comments submitted by WTO members on the proposal for a Regulation of
the European Parliament and of the Council on traceability and labelling of genetically
modified organisms and traceability of genetically modified food and feed—COM (2001)
182 final’ published on http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/gmo/gmo_ongoinit_en.html. The
comments that were made by WTO members do not take into account the political
compromise reached in December 2002 by the Council.
202 It was not the first time that EU GMOs legislation attracted the criticism of third countries.
See G/TBT/W/184, of 4 October 2002 in which Argentina, Brazil, Canada, New Zealand and
United States criticised Regulation 1139/98 on the foods and food ingredients produced from
genetically modified soya and genetically modified maize.
203 It must be emphasised that the position of Switzerland differ from that of the other countries
since this country does not have a prominent interest in GMOs.
204 Clarifications were requested in relation to items which were included and excluded in and
from the scope of the Regulation. Queries were made on the application of the ‘substantial
equivalence’ principle in the new rules, and on the meaning of ‘other legitimate factors’ and
of ‘public’. The labelling statements ‘misleading the consumer,’ and ‘it gives rise to religious
concern’ also raised doubts. Explanations were asked on the threshold applicable to
unauthorised GM material.
205 Elucidation was asked for on the involvement of the European Group on Ethics in Science
and New Technologies in the authorisation procedure and on the role of competent national
authorities and of the Community reference laboratory. Further raised issues were the degree
of autonomy of the Member States to take decisions related to authorisation to market GM
food and the time frame of the Commission for the release of an authorisation. Critical
remarks were also made on the operation of the register of authorised GM food.
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idea which is canvassed in the criticism of both the first and the second EU
proposa l is tha t the EU regulators tr ea t G MO s as inhe r ently unsaf e produc ts, while 
the re is no scientif ic evidence that this is the ca se . Acc or ding to the countrie s
mentione d above , in pa rticula r for Ca na da and the US, the EU food and fe e d re gime
is unwor ka ble 206 and une nf or c ea ble, 207 the role of the EFSA is limite d,208 it contains
many ambiguitie s209 and, chie fly, the prominence of non- sc ie ntific fac tors in the
a uthorisation proce dur e is still signif ic ant.210 Simila r critic al re ma rks wer e reser ved
to the tra ce ability and la belling dr af t Regula tion: the ra tiona le for this me asure has
bee n conte ste d;211 the re gime set out by the Re gulation is discr imina tory212 and also
too costly to imple ment;213 in addition, the re sult of its applica tion would be the 
e rosion of consumer conf ide nc e. A common re mar k, ma de in rela tion to both
proposa ls, wa s that they ar e cha ra cte rise d by a lac k of suff icient detail or additional
guida nc e on tec hnic a l aspec ts of the pr opose d Re gulations. 
It should be noted that the UK, which voted against the political compromise
reached within the Council on the two draft Regulations,214 expressed (in part)
concerns along the same line. The UK emphasised the need for ‘a policy based on
sound science and which was practicable and enforceable. The compromise text
failed to meet these objectives.’215
                                                           
206 One of the reasons which make the labelling system unworkable is that the labelling
threshold of 1% is too low. The detection method for a very low presence of GMOs may not
be technically available. This can also pave the way to fraud.
207 For example the US is concerned that Member States will not be able to enforce the
legislation in the absence of a standardised testing methodology.
208 EFTA is not included in decision-making leading to the adoption of emergency measures;
moreover, its opinion in the authorisation is not binding either for the Commission or the
Member States.
209 It is unclear what are the criteria, which will guide the Commission in imposing post market
monitoring plans upon applicants.
210 Beyond the fact that the role of the EFSA is too limited in the authorisation procedure, it is
emphasised that the importance of ‘other legitimate concerns’ in the risk management
decision is unclear.
211 The need for rules on traceability and labelling is doubted given that GM products/food and
feed have already undergone a risk assessment and have been approved. It is argued that this
measure is unnecessary.
212 This is due to the fact that conventional products are not subject to the same traceability and
labelling requirements.
213 According to Canada, comprehensive traceability would have enormous costs. Switzerland
and the US respectively suggest that the proposal would be burdensome for the
administration and for operators. Finally, in case of non-compliance, the exposure of
operators to liability costs would increase.
214 See above No. 13 and 14.
215 Two further reasons which induced the UK to vote against the political compromise were that
it could not support threshold values less than 1% nor the revised authorisation procedure
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A second set of comments submitted by the WTO members focused on the
compliance of the new authorisation, labelling and traceability rules with WTO
law. It was emphasised that GM food and feed products and their non-GM
counterparts are ‘like products’ for the purpose of the WTO Agreements. The EU
proposed legislation should thus treat them in the same way. Instead, the EU draft
measures infringe the WTO obligation not to discriminate by distinguishing
products in relation to ‘production methods’the use of biotechnologyrather
than ‘product characteristics’ the presence/absence of genetically modified
material. Canada added that ‘even within this processed based system, the EC
appears to be inconsistent in its application, i.e. by including foods produced “from
GMOs” while excluding foods produced “with GMOs”’ A further criticism, which
is related to the previous one, concerns the labelling regime. The EC’s choice to
label, inter alia, food/feed produced from a GMOs but which contains no traces of
GM DNA and/or protein in the final product is questioned. How can the EC argue
that this material is ‘unlike’ a conventional product? Finally, it is argued that the
proposed labelling scheme would not be the less trade restrictive option.216 More
precisely, the proposals would be more trade-constraining than is necessary to fulfil
a legitimate objective of the TBT agreement.217
8. The EC Clarifications and the Problematic Compatibility Between
the New Rules on GM Food and Feed and the WTO Principles
The Commission offered clarification on several points raised by the commenting
countries, making extensive reference to the activity of the Codexalimentarius
commission.
218 In most cases, it defended its proposed measures, while accepting
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without the Article 308 as a legal base. See for this information the website of the English
food safety authority.
216 A voluntary labelling scheme was less trade restrictive than the proposed one.
217 This is a comment made by Australia.
218 The Commission draws the attention on some agreed principles of the Codex Alimentarius
Commission, in particular the Statements of Principle Relating to the Role of Food Safety
Risk Assessment, to justify the functional separation of risk assessment and risk management
activities. The Commission relies on the Codex standard for food labelling to emphasise that
traceability is a recognised process in adopted Codex texts and to rebut the Canadian
argument that traceability obligations are unworkable and too costly. The Commission
stresses the importance of the Codex’s activity in sampling and detection methods of genetic
modifications in food. It emphasises that the EC’s choice to subject food produced from
GMOs is consistent with the work in progress of the Codex Alimentarius Task Force on food
derived from Biotechnology. The Commission quotes the proposed draft principles for the
risk analysis of food derived from Modern Biotechnology to justify post-marketing
monitoring requirements for the use of GM food. The Commission refers to general
principles for risks analysis to prove that reliance on factors different from science in risk
management decisions is legitimate.
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the criticism of its trading partners on one issue.219 The most interesting part of the
Commission’s answers lies in the Commission’s rebut of the alleged non-
compliance of the EU draft legislation with WTO obligations.
The EC challenged the statement that GM food and feed products are ‘like’
their non-GM counterpart. Firstly, the examination of ‘likeness’ of products should
be made on a case-by-case basis; secondly, a wide range of factors should be
considered when carrying out this assessment. Beyond physical characteristics and
other features which are likely to influence the competitive relationship in
the market place, the Commission mentions consumers’ preferences, tastes and
habits, provided that they are proved by empirical evidence. In Europe,
Eurobarometers surveys show that consumers do not consider GM products as
substitutes of conventional products. Consumers’ preferences are also invoked by
the Commission to justify the labelling obligations for food/feed which was
produced from GMOs but which does not have any traces of GM material. The
Commission claims that even if this kind of food/feed does not contain GM
material, ‘there is solid evidence’220 that European consumers do not perceive it as
its traditional counterpart.
It appears that the Commission’s defence is centred around the need to meet
consumer preferences. It should be noted that this defence creates two difficulties,
regardless of the applicable WTO agreements.221 The first is that it is not clear
                                                           
219 Article 4.1 of the GM food and feed proposed Regulation required all biotech food not to
present ‘a risk for human health or the environment.’ The comment was made that this
provision imposed a ‘no risk standard’, which is scientifically impossible to achieve. The
Commission accepted to bring the issue to the attention of the Parliament and the Council,
which agreed to change the words of the provision in question. Indeed, as noted elsewhere in
this paper, Art. 4.1 now reads biotech food ‘must not present an unacceptable risk.’
220 ‘Responses from the European Commission to comments submitted by WTO members under
either or both G/TBT/N/EEC/6 AND G/SPS/N/EEC/149,’ above No. 155.
221 As the Commission acknowledged, both the SPS and the TBT agreements are capable of
reaching the EC draft Regulations. As for GATT, it is submitted that because of the broad
definition of ‘technical regulation’ in the TBT, most claims on non commercial purposes will
not be decided under Art. III GATT.
It should be decided on a case-by-case basis which of the two agreements is applicable. The
position of the Commission on this matter is thoroughly justified. Given the heterogeneous
nature of the interests protected by the draft measures (human life, environment, consumer’s
interest), these measures could fall within the scope of both WTO agreements. For instance
the traceabilty provisions of the traceability and labelling Regulation are likely to fall within
the TBT since those provisions are aimed, inter alia, to prevent deceptive practises. At the
same time, the labelling provisions prescribed by the draft Regulation concerns consumer’s
health and as such they could also fall within the SPS agreement. Let us take the GM food
and feed Regulation. A refusal to authorise the marketing of GM food on the ground that it
might be dangerous for human health would concern the SPS agreement. Viceversa, the
imposition of certain labelling requirements on a notifer from a third country could be
challenged under the TBT agreement.
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whether consumer preferences would be accepted as one of the factors which make
two products ‘unlike’. Secondly, it is unclear whether the proposal on GM food and
feed is dictated by the need to protect consumer preferences or consumer health.
The difference is important for WTO purposes. Whereas consumer health could be
considered a legitimate objective222 under the TBT to justify a discriminatory
labelling scheme (assuming that the labelling scheme is a technical measure),223
consumer preferences224 may not. The EC could argue that the GM food and feed
Regulation intends to protect consumer health as it can be deduced from the legal
basis. In this case, the EU labelling scheme could be justified under the TBT
agreement, provided that it is shown that it is the less trade restrictive measure.
However, two weaknesses can be found even in this argument. First of all, it is
contentious that the EU labelling scheme is the least trade restrictive measure.225
Secondly, it remains difficult for the EU to justify, in the name of consumer
protection, the labelling obligations for GM food and feed which does not contain
GM material. Indeed, production processes may be important to show that two
products are unlike, but only subject to the condition that such production processes
are detectable in the final product. This is not the case for food/feed produced from
GMOs. Reliance on consumer preferences to justify this aspect of the Regulation is
not possible since we have seen that it is not contemplated by the TBT. A way out
for the EC could be the adoption of an international labelling standard by the Codex
Alimentarius Commission, allowing the inclusion of ‘other legitimate factor s’226i.e .
consumers’ pref erence samongst the reasons justifying the introduction of a trade
                                                           
222 Under Art. 2.2, one of the legitimate objectives for a TBT measure is the protection of human
health of which the protection of consumer’s health could be considered an aspect.
223 See on this issue the opinion of Pardo Quintilian who argues that a labelling requirement
intended to inform consumers and not directly related to food safety would fall under the
scope of the TBT. See above No. 18, p. 190.
224 Some authors argue that consumer’s concerns should be explicitly recognised as a legitimate
reason for countries to apply trade measures. See Perdikis N.O., William A. Kerr, Jill E.
Hobbs (2001) ‘Reforming the WTO to defuse potential trade conflicts in genetically modified
goods’, in World Economy, Vol. 24, No. 3, March, p. 397.
225 This is an argument which was raised by several third countries. The Commission justified
the labelling option it chose on the basis of the following points: a) voluntary ‘GMO-free’
schemes are beset by a number of technical, commercial and other difficulties; b) Consumers
clearly prefer to be informed of what is in products and not of what is not in products. c)
‘GMO-free’ products are already supplied by the Organic Production scheme, which
excludes the use of GMOs in the whole production chain on a very strict basis. A second
‘GMO-free’ production scheme is therefore also considered to be confusing for consumers
and potentially misleading. See above No. 155.
226 This issue is under exam at the Codex Committee on General Principles (CCGP). The issue
was also discussed by the Task force on Biotechnology. See the Report of the first session of
the codex ad hoc intergovernmental task force on foods derived from biotechnology, Chiba,
Japan 14-17 March 2000.
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restrictive measure. Thus, the EC could rely on this standard to enact a labelling
scheme which meets consumer preferences, without incurring the violation of the
TBT. However, in the light of recent discussion in the codex committees, it seems
unlikely that some countries, such as the US, New Zealand and Canada would
legitimise reliance on factors other than science.227
I t should also be borne in mind that the SPS agr e ement could be invoke d aga inst
the GM food and fee d author isation pr oc edur e and against the la be lling sc he me 
provide d her e with. How eve r, the possibility of the EC justif ying, unde r the SPS
a gr ee ment, the re fusal to author ise the mar keting of a cer ta in GM food/f e ed is eve n
mor e limited than in the ca se of the TBT agr ee me nt. Inde ed, the SPS pr ovisions
pla ce much gr ea te r empha sis tha n the TBT on the ‘sc ie ntific basis’ of SPS mea sur es.
I t is ther ef ore dif f ic ult to ac c ommodate consume r conce r ns within the SPS
a gr ee me nt. I t follow s tha t it would be unlikely for the above -mentione d SPS mea sur e
to pa ss the scr ee ning of the WT O bodies in the event tha t suc h a me a sure wa s ba sed
on fa ctors othe r tha n sc ience , i.e c onsumer pr ef er e nc es. 
In the previous sections, potential clashes were identified between the proposed
EC legislation and the spirit of the SPS and TBT agreement. There are reasons to
doubt that the new rules on GM food/feed are compatible with the letter of the
WTO law. However, it is noteworthy that a strictly trade-oriented interpretation of
these agreements undermines one of the fundamental principles of WTO law: each
Member State can choose the level of protection that it deems appropriate to protect
human, animal or plant life or health (and environment in the case of TBT) within
its territory, provided that its policy is not arbitrary and does not verge toward
disguised protectionism.
Should WTO bodies be asked to adjudicate on a conflict between i.e. the US
and the European Community, they would feel unease about dealing with issues
such as what the risks acceptable for a given society are. Nor would it be legitimate
for them to interfere with choices belonging to regulators.
9. Conclusions
The GM food and feed draft Regulation and the traceability and labelling draft
Regulation are two complex measures which strengthens the GMOs regulatory
framework enacted by the European institutions in the 1990s. Therefore, Member
States, which made the lift of the moratorium conditional upon the undertaking of
major reforms in the field of food safety, have no legal reasons to keep the ban.
Amongst the strengths of the draft Regulation, there is a more streamlined and
                                                           
227 See on this issue the works of the Codex Committee on general Principles. See also the
Report of the first session of the codex ad hoc intergovernmental task force on foods derived
from biotechnology, Chiba, Japan 14-17 March 2000.
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centralised authorisation procedure, enhanced transparency, and extensive labelling
provisions. Furthermore, although the draft Regulation on genetically modified
food and feed is likely to exhaustively harmonise the marketing of these GM
products, Member States maintain the power to introduce unilateral emergency
measures. Yet again, it is clear that the EU legislative framework incorporates the
risk approach whereby it is better to err on the side of caution, although it is more
realistic than the first generation of GMOs legislation in pursuing targets of
consumer/environmental protection.
The second part of the paper focused on the shortcomings and ambiguities of
the two draft Regulations. It was found that they are difficult to read, assign little
influence to the EFSA, and do not clarify which body is held accountable for food
safety decisions. Moreover, a further point which is not clear is whether public
interest groups would be able to review the EFSA’s action. Hopefully, the
Commission will cast some light on these issues in the near future. As to the draft
Regulation on the traceability of GM products, it was noted that the Commission
might have underestimated problems of enforceability of the draft Regulation.
Critical remarks on the two proposals were also made by some WTO members
which found that the authorisation procedure privileges political factors to the
detriment of scientific evaluations. It was also noted that the traceability and
labelling rules are disproportionate to the risks posed by GMOs, being both costly
and unenforceable. The new EU measures were, finally, accused of clashing with
some principles of WTO law. The most important alleged breach is the violation of
the non-discrimination principle between GM products and their ‘like’ traditional
counterpart products. The Commission’s defence is centred around the need to take
consumer preferences into consideration; however, this defence would probably not
be accepted in a possible legal dispute before the WTO. This is regrettable in the
light of another principle of the WTO, on the basis of which each country should be
able to choose the level of protection which it deems appropriate.
The final conclusion of this paper is that it is in the best interest of countries
wishing to export GMOs to Europe not to challenge the new GMOs rules before
the WTO. This is because, although they are complex, burdensome and difficult to
implement, they may be the only rules which the Member States are willing to
accept. It should be remembered that the Commission made substantial efforts to
review the legislative framework so as to convince the Member States to resume
the GMOs authorisation procedure. It would be a ‘trade success’ if the Member
States accepted the invitation of the Commission to allow the authorisation of the
GM food/feed under the new rules. Should the new regime be challenged before
the WTO bodies, the marketing of GM food/feed in Europe will probably be
further delayed. Therefore, a trade war on GMOs would be politically opportune
for those countries which are major exporters of GMOs. Recent events show that
the latter have opted for a different strategy. In May 2003 the United States,
Canada, Argentina requested consultation with the European Community, pursuant
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to Art. 4.4 of the DSU, against the moratorium on the approval of biotech
products.228 We shall see if this move will help the parties of the dispute to reach a
compromise or whether it will reinforce their positions as happened with the
hormone-in-beef controversy.
                                                           
228 See WT/DS291/1 of 20 May 2003, WT/DS/203/1 of 21 May 2003, WT/DS292/1 of
20 May 2003.
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Chapter 5
Setting Out International Food Standards:
Euro-American Conflicts within the
Codex Alimentarius Commission
Sara Poli
1. Purpose of this Chapter
The Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission (hereafter the ‘Codex
Commission’ or ‘CAC’) is an inter-governmental body set up in 1962, whose role
is to promote international trade in food through the adoption of standards, aimed at
ensuring fair trade practises and the protection of consumer’s health.
The Codex Commission has played an increasingly important role1 in
international food trade since 1995, the year in which the World Trade
Organization (WTO) was founded. Indeed, under the WTO agreements, national
measures which are based upon food standards, adopted by this organisation
(amongst others), are presumed to comply with WTO principles.2
                                                           
1 See generally on the Codex Alimentarius Commission, Boutrif E. (2003) ‘The new role of
Codex Alimentarius in the context of WTO/SPS agreement’, in Food Control, 14, p. 81-88.
2 Art. 3.2 of the SPS agreement states that: ‘Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform
to international standards, guidelines or recommendations (of the Codex Alimentarius
Commission, amongst others) shall be deemed to be necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health, and presumed to be consistent with the relevant provisions of this
Agreement and of GATT 1994.’ Art. 2.4 of the TBT agreement affirms: ‘Where technical
regulations are required and relevant international standards (adopted by the Codex
Alimentarius Commission, amongst others) exist or their completion is imminent, Members
shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for their technical regulations except
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It is the primary purpose of this paper to assess whether the Codex Commission
has the ‘structural capability’3 to fulfil its new role.4 In order to do so, we will look
at whether and how the main areas or issues of conflict between the members of the
European Community and the US were settled within this organisation.
Firstly, this chapter will highlight the importance of Codex standards within the
WTO legal system. Special emphasis will be placed on the WTO ‘sardine case’.
Then, the role of Codex standards in European Community law will be briefly
considered. Reference will also be made to the European Commission’s efforts to
change the Codex Commission’s internal rules so as to allow the full membership
of Regional Economic Integration Organisations, such as the European
Community. Secondly, consideration will be given to Euro-American conflicts on
the general principles underlying Codex decision-making, these being at the heart
of more specific instances of conflict. Thirdly, the most recent example of Euro-
American conflict will be illustrated: this is the adoption of standards related to
food derived from biotechnology. The description of these conflicts within the
Codex Commission, will be followed by conclusive remarks highlighting the
‘lessons to learn’ from these conflicts and the usefulness of holding a discussion, in
an attempt to solve these conflicts, within the Codex Commission.
2. The Sardine Case: An Illustration of the New Role of the Codex
Alimentarius Commission as a Benchmark for Food Standards in the
WTO Legal Order
The new role of the Codex Commission, as a satellite organisation of the WTO
legal system, has two consequences. Firstly, it has become increasingly difficult to
agree on the content of food standards.5 Secondly, Codex standards were invoked
by WTO members in disputes before the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to prove
that certain SPS or TBT measures, not complying with Codex standards, also
conflicted with the TBT and the SPS agreements. For example, Codex standards
                                                           (contd.)
when such international standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate
means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because of
fundamental climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological problems.’
3 Terence P. Stewart and David S. Johanson (1998) ‘The SPS Agreement of the World Trade
Organisation and International Organisations: the roles of the codex alimentarius
Commission,  the international plant protection convention, and the international office o f
e pi zo ot i cs ’, in S yr ac us e J ou r na l of In te r na ti on a l La w & Comp ar at i ve , Vo l. 2 6 , 27 , 2 9.
4 On this issue, see R. Romi (2001) ‘Codex Alimentarius: de l’ambivalence à l’ambiguité’, in
Revue juridique de l’environnement 1. See also OECD (2000) Food Safety and Quality: trade
considerations.
5 David G. Victor (2000) ‘The sanitary and phytosanitary of the World Trade Organisation: an
assessment after five years’, in New York University Journal of International Law & Policy,
32, 865.
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were crucial in the ‘hormones in beef’ case, which concerned an SPS measurea
Regulation of the European Community banning the use of hormoneswhich was
‘not based’ on the maximum level of residues of hormone in meat, established by a
Codex standard of 1995. More recently, compliance with Codex standards turned
out to be important in the context of the TBT agreement. The compatibility of a
TBT measure, (i.e. a European Regulation) with WTO principles was evaluated
taking as reference a Codex standard of 1978. The dispute, generally referred to as
the Sardine case, revolved around an EC Regulation, reserving the name ‘sardine’
to certain fish species (sardine pilchardus, amongst others, available in the
Mediterranean sea) to the exclusion of others (the Peruvian Sardinops sagax), thus
precluding Peru to market its sardine species under the name of sardines within the
territory of the EC. The Panel’s finding that the EC legislation breaches Art. 2.4 of
the TBT agreement is interesting because in assessing whether the concerned
measure is compatible with Art. 2.4 of the TBT, the Panel considers a Codex
standard on sardines, adopted in 1978, as a ‘relevant international standard’. This
standard laid down common marketing standards for preserved sardines and
covered twenty sardine species, including the species of pilchardus and Sardinops
sagax. The most interesting part of the standard was that it allowed the name
‘sardine’ to be used not only for the Pilchardus species but also for other sardine-
type species, thus making possible for the Peruvian sardines to be placed on the EC
market with the name of ‘sardines’. The Panel who adjudicated the dispute, found
that the EC had not used the Codex standard ‘as a basis’ for the EC Regulation on
sardine,6 since the EC had not considered the standard concerned as ‘the principal
constituent or the fundamental principle’7 of the technical regulation. The EC
appealed, amongst others, against this point of law. It argued that ‘using a standard
as a basis for a technical regulation’ means that a technical regulation is informed
in its overall scope by the international standard. In other words, the EC argued that
there must be a ‘rational relationship’ between the technical legislation and the
standard on the substantive aspects of the standard.8 This was the case for the EC
regulation since it used part of the standard as a basis for the Regulation. The
Appellate body did not accept the EC’s argument; stating that ‘something cannot be
considered a “basis” for something else if the two are contradictory.’9 The technical
regulation under consideration contradicted the Codex standards concerned,
because it prohibited to use the label ‘sardine’ for fish species other than Sardina
pilchardus. By contrast, the Codex Standard allowed Sardinops sagax to be
marketed under the appellation ‘sardines’. Thus, it could not be maintained that the
European Regulation took Codex standards as a basis.
                                                           
6 WT/DS231/R of 29 May 2002.
7 This is definition of ‘conform to international standard’ given in the hormone case.
8 Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS231/AB/R, of 26 September 2002, par. 241.
9 Par. 248.
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T h e sa r d in e c a se pr o vi d e s an e x a mp l e of ho w im p o r t a n t th e de f i ni t i o n of th e 
c o nt e n t of f o o d st a n da r d s wi t h i n th e Cod e x Com m i s s io n is ; it a ls o he lp s 
u n de r s t a nd i n g wh y th e a d o p ti o n of f o o d st a n d a r d s w it h i n th i s or g a n i s a t i o n ca n 
b e c o n t r ov e r s i a l a n d gi v e ri s e to c o n f li c t s am o n g s t de l e ga t i o n s w h i c h la s t fo r 
m a ny ye a r s . 
3. The Role of Codex Standards Within the European Community
Legal System
Although Codex standards are voluntary, they were taken into account in the
adoption of the European foodstuff legislation. There are many instances of EC
legislation which are based on Codex standards or incorporate its guidelines.10
The standards of the CAC were even invoked in cases before the European
Court of Justice. For example, the Court has used the provisional works of the
Codex Commission to clarify the meaning of the words ‘hazard’ and ‘scientific risk
a sse ssment’ . 11 In anothe r ca se , the Cour t re f er r e d to Code x sta nda r ds to dete r mine 
the cha ra c te ristic fe atur e s of yoghurt in a case on the la be lling of foodstuf f s12 and in
de ciding whe the r a food additive pr e se nted a risk to public he a lth or me t a re a l ne e d, 
e spe c ia lly a te c hnologic a l one . 13 In a thir d ca se ,14 Advoc a te Ge ne r a l L e ge r ref e r r ed
to Code x sta nda r ds on the limits for le a d and c a dmium in ce r ta in f oodstuf f s. 
Probably the most interesting reference to Codex standards is that of Advocate
General Fennelly, who ventured to consider Codex standards as a source of
information (for the Community judicature) as far as the ‘objective characteristics
and properties’15 of foodstuff or the maximum tolerated presence of undesirable
substances in food are concerned.
                                                           
10 Reference will be made only to some recent examples: Regulation 1181/2003 OJ (2003)
L165/17 laying down common marketing standards for preserved sardines. This Regulation
amends the EC legislation taking into account the outcome of the WTO sardine dispute. See
also Commission Directive 2002/82 laying down specific purity criteria on food additives
other than colours and sweeteners OJ (2002) L292/1; Commission Directive 2002/63
establishing Community methods of sampling for the official control of pesticide residues in
and on products of plant and animal origin OJ (2002) L187/43; Commission Directive
2001/50/EC laying down specific purity criteria concerning colours for use in foodstuffs OJ
(2001) L190/14.
11 See T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council of the European Union, (2002) ECR II-
3305, par. 147 and 156.
12 Case C-298/87 Smanor (1988) ECR 4489, par. 22.
13 Joined Cases C-13/91 and C-113/91 Debus (1992) ECR I-3617, par. 16 and 17.
14 See the opinion of Advocate General Leger of 20 January 2000, in case C-465/98 Unwesen in
Handel und Gewerbe KölneV v. Adolf Darbo AG.
15 See the opinion of Advocate General Fennelly of 8 June 2000 in Case C-42/99 Fábrica de
Queijo ERU Por tugues a Ld v. Tri bunal Téc nico Adu aneiro de Seg unda Ins tância , p ar. 33 .
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The most recent reference to a Codex Commission-related activity may be found
in the opinion of Advocate General Alber in the Monsanto case.16 Mr. Alber
considered the conclusions of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation on
Biotechnology and Food Safety as a relevant source to give interpretative
guidelines on the meaning of the principle of ‘substantial equivalence’17 between
genetically modified products and non-GM products, a principle which was
incorporated in the European legislation on GMOs.
4. Towards the Accession of the European Community to the Codex
Alimentarius Commission
Whereas single European countries are full Codex members,18 the European
Community, being a Regional Economic Integration Organisation, has observer
status19 within the CAC. However, Art. II of the Codex Commission’s rules of
procedure allows members of FAO to become Codex members. Since the European
Community acceded to FAO in 1991, it would be legally possible for the European
Community to become a member of CAC, subject to an amendment of the Codex
rules of procedure, explicitly allowing the membership of Regional Economic
Integration Organisations.
At the time of the EC accession to FAO, an explicit reference was made to the
possibility of the European Community becoming member of the Codex
Commission.20 The Council had authorised the Commission to negotiate the
conditions and the modalities of such accession in 1993.21 However, the European
Commission has not taken action for many years. In 2001, the European
Commission sought full membership of the European Community to the Codex
Commission and put forward a proposal to this effect.22 The European executive
justified the EC’s full membership in the following way:
Accession of the European Community as a full member of the Codex
[…] Commission, alongside its Member States, is essential in order to
ensure that the primary health and other interests of the European
Community and its Member States are taken into consideration during
                                                           
16 Case C-236/01, Monsanto Agricoltura Italia SpA e a. v. Presidenza del Consiglio dei
Ministri.
17 Conclusions of Advocate General Alber of 13 March 2003.
18 Rule VII of the Procedural Manual.
19 Art. 3 of the Procedural Manual.
20 Report of the 16th meeting of the CCGP, 2001, par. 134.
21 See proposal Council decision on the accession of the European Community to the Codex
Alimentarius Commission, COM (2001) 287.
22 See proposal Council decision on the accession of the European Community to the Codex
Alimentarius Commission, COM (2001) 287.
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the preparation, negotiation and adoption of such standards, guidelines
or recommendations and other provisions by this organisation.23
Moreover:
The accession of the European Community as a full member to the
Codex Commission should help reinforce coherence between the
standards, guidelines or recommendations and other provisions adopted
by the Codex Commission and other relevant international obligations of
the European Community.24
It is clear that the EC’s accession to the Codex Commission was made
necessary by the acquired importance of Codex’s role in the WTO system.25 Codex
standards had been crucial in the two disputes in which the EC had lost: the
hormone-in-beef and sardine cases. Maybe the standards at stake in these cases
could have a different content, had the European members of Codex spoken with a
single voice.
In 2001, with these considerations in mind, the observer of the European
Community asked ‘to establish clear Rules of Procedure for the membership of
regional economic integration organizations in the work of Codex, including the
membership of the European Community.’26
The European Commission pushed hard within the Codex Committee of
General Principles27 (hereafter the ‘CCGP’) to have the issue of membership for
Regional Economic Integration Organisations settled as soon as possible. In the
meeting of the CCGP of 2003, the observer of the European Community urged
Codex members to deal with the EC accession, stating that: ‘New legislation had
entered into force in the European Union that required the European Community to
take into account the international food standards of Codex when introducing new
or harmonizing existing food legislation.’28 Moreover, the WTO, of which the EC
is a member, encouraged the participation of Members of the WTO in the
international standards-setting bodies.
The idea of having members of the European Community speaking with one
single voice did not raise the enthusiasm of any Codex delegation. The strongest
views against the idea were those of the delegation of the United States. They
                                                           
23 Recital 3 of COM (2001) 287.
24 Recital 4 of COM (2001) 287.
25 See TBT and SPS agreement.
26 Report of the 16th meeting of the CCGP, 2001, par. 127.
27 This is a subsidiary body of the Codex Commission which deals with ‘procedural and general
matters referred to it by the Codex Alimentarius Commission. These include the
establishment of the General Principles that define the purpose and scope of the Codex
Alimentarius, the nature of Codex standards and guidelines for Codex Committees.’ See
BRIDGES, Vol. 3, No. 7, 17 April 2003, available online.
28 Report of the 18th meeting of the CCGP, 2003, par. 75.
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emphasised that the membership of regional economic integration organizations in
any United Nations body should not infringe the principle of ‘one nation, one vote,’
and that the admission of regional economic integration organizations into FAO
should not be seen as a precedent for other UN bodies. They noted that full Codex
membership for the European Community would allow this organisation to enjoy
privileges not available to other Members and it would eliminate a strength of
Codex decision-making: the possibility of all Member countries to express
diversity of views.29 Other delegations, such as Canada, Australia, Malaysia and
Singapore, supported the American position.
At the current stage of the negotiation within the CCGP, it seems that the EC
will succeed in changing the rules of procedure and acceding to the Codex
Commission. However, clarifications are needed on some technical issues. The first
is how the vote will be organised, within the Codex Commission, in case of mixed
competence between the regional economic integration organization and its
Member States.30 The US delegation has made the point that it would be
burdensome for the Chairpersons of Codex meetings to assess the consensus where
the adoption of a Codex standard concerned matters which fall within the mixed
competence of the EC and Member States.31
The second controversial point is whether the Regional Economic Integration
Organization can exercise the voting right of a Member, that may have submitted
credentials or have registered as a participant, but that was not present at the
time of the vote.32 Some delegations expressed the opinion that ‘if the voting right
of a registered, but absent, participant could be exercised this practice would
dilute the rights of other Members, especially those smaller countries with single
person delegations.’ 33
In the last meeting of the CCGP (2003), the provisional conditions governing
the accession of Regional Economic Integration Organisations were clarified:34 no
additional rights or privileges would accrue to members of Regional Economic
Integration Organizations as a result of the changes to the rules of procedure;
voting rights of Regional Economic Integration Organisation are limited to the
                                                           
29 Report of the 16th meeting of the CCGP, 2001, par. 129.
30 Report of the 18th meeting of the CCGP, 2003, par. 80.
31 Report of the 18th meeting of the CCGP, 2003, par. 81. The American delegation also put
forward a   proposal of amendment to the rules of procedure dealing with the issue of mixed
competence, which has not been accepted by the EC since it does not ease the task of the
chairperson and ‘it would limit the debate and the diversity of opinion necessary to reach a
consensus.’ See ALINORM 03/26/ 5: add.1 in the Report of the 26th meeting of the CAC, 30
June-7 July 2003.
32 Report of the 17th meeting of CCGP, 2002, par. 108.
33 Report of the 17th meeting of CCGP, 2002, par. 108.
34 See Report of the 18th meeting of CCGP, 2003, par. 78.
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number of members of these organisations present at the time a vote was taken. A
solution in case of mixed competence has not yet been achieved.
The efforts made by the European Commission to convince Codex members to
allow the accession of the European Community imply that the European
institutions attach great importance to the Codex Commission. Which advantages
would accrue to the European Community in case this organisation became
member of the Codex Commission? The benefit of being a full Codex member
would not come from having a greater number of votes, since the principle ‘one
State-one vote’ would remain. However, the EC would gain strength in negotiating
Codex standards; the opposition of the EC to the adoption of a standard would
prevent consensus from being reached and, conversely, draft standards supported
by the EC would stand greater chances of adoption. So far the negotiating positions
of European delegations were very similar but it was quite difficult for these States
to impede the adoption of standards unless they were supported by other
delegations. In sum, the bargaining power of the ‘European block,’ comprising 15
members (and in the near future, even more than 15) would be perceived as
stronger than that of the sum of its 15 single members.35
5. Areas of Conflict Between the European Community and
Transatlantic Partners
There have been at least three cases36 in which the adoption of specific standards
proved to be problematic due to conflicting views of the members of the European
Community on the one hand, and the US on the other. In all these cases consensus
could not be achieved, and eventually the corresponding standards were adopted by
majority vote, a procedure which is rarely used within Codex.37 One of these
conflicts, concerning the MLRs (‘Maximum Levels of Residues’) of hormones in
beef, did not remain confined in the CAC;38 in 1998 it became a trade dispute
                                                           
35 Consumer International pointed out to a disadvantage linked to the accession of the European
Community to the Codex Commission. It would be difficult for civil society (i.e NGOs
protecting consumer interests) to channel their concerns or interests to Brussels; the accession
would result in the diminished ability of consumers' organizations to interact with these
organisations. Single national delegations are certainly more accessible for NGOs with short
of economic resources. See Report of the 16th meeting of the CCGP, April 2001, par. 132.
36 These cases concerned the adoption of MLRs for growth promoting hormones for beef cattle,
the bovine somatotropin (BST) and natural mineral waters. For a brief description of the three
controversial Codex decisions, see Terence P. Stewart and David S. Johanson, above No. 3,
p. 41-45.
37 Terence P. Steward and David S. Johanson (2003) ‘A Nexus of Trade and the Environment:
The Relationship Between the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the SPS Agreement of
the World Trade Organization’, in Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law &
Policy, 14, 48.
38 The laying down of the MLRs of BST has not been settled, yet.
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which was adjudicated by the Dispute settlement body of the WTO. We can say
that this trade dispute was anticipated by the heated discussion which has being
held within various Codex Committees since 1988.
The US and the Codex members, belonging to the European Community, have
fundamentally different views on the Codex Commission’s areas of competence
and the principles underlying its decision-making. In the next sections, these
fundamental differences will be highlighted in relation to two issues: the place of
the precautionary principle within the Codex system and the role of factors other
than science in the approval of Codex food standards.39
Subsequently, an account will be given of the most recent case of Euro-
American conflict: the adoption of Codex standards/guidelines on labelling and
traceability of food derived from biotechnology. This is another area, in which the
Euro-American divergence of views became clear at the level of the Codex
Commission, but they are not likely to be reconciled in the Codex framework,40 as
it happened in the hormone case.
5.1 Contrasting Views on the Role of Precautionary Principle Within the Codex
Commission
Given the attention that has been paid to the precautionary principle in the last
decade (see chapter 2), it is not surprising that Codex committees had an intense
discussion on this topic before including a very loose version of the principle in the
Codex Procedural Manual.41
The opportunity for a debate on the precautionary principle was offered by the
adoption of Codex working principles for risk analysis, which were to be addressed
to Codex Committees and Member Governments. The CCGP was charged with the
development of these principles by the Codex Commission in 199742 and in 2003
the Committee completed its works.43
T he discussion on the de f inition of pr inciple s for risk ma na ge me nt le d ine vita bly
to conside r the issue of how to addr ess unc e r ta inty in sc ie ntif ic eva lua tions. 44 Thus, 
                                                           
39 The activity of the CCGP will be the privileged, though not exclusive, source to develop this
part of the article.
40 In May 2003, the US and other delegations asked the DSB to have consultations with
the European Community on the subject of the European moratorium of the marketing of
GMOs.
41 Report of the 26th session of the Codex Commission of 30 June-7 July 2003.
42 The guidelines had to be ready by 2003.
43 The CCGP asked the CAC to adopt the Draft Working Principles for Risk Analysis for
Application in the Framework of the Codex Alimentarius at Step 8 of the Codex Procedure,
for inclusion in the Procedural Manual. See ALINORM 03/26/06 in the Report of the 26th
CAC meeting of 2003.
44 Report of the 14th meeting of the CCGP, 1999, par. 27.
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the pr e ca utiona r y pr inc iple wa s imme dia tely calle d into pla y. The ma in pr oble ma tic 
issue s we r e the following: should Code x la y dow n guide line s on this princ iple or
should it le ave this ta sk to na tiona l author itie s? A further related question was: how
to respond to potential consumers’ health situations where complete scientific data
were not available? In other words: what kind of action should the CAC take when
scientific data are insufficient? Should it adopt standards or should it refrain from
doing so until it has sufficient scientific information? Consensus on the solutions to
these questions proved to be very difficult.
The US and the EC had (and still have) diverging views on all issues
highlighted above. This was evident since the first meeting of the CCGP in which
the debate started (1999).
The European countries advocated the inclusion of the precautionary principles
within the principles underlying risk management and supported the elaboration of
guidelines on the use of the principle45 since ‘this was also essential to build the
confidence of consumers in the risk analysis process and reflect that the protection
of public health was the primary objective of Codex.’46 The representative of the
EC and other Codex members considered that uncertainty should not prevent
necessary measures to protect public health. Sweden proposed the following draft
principle clarifying the role of the precautionary principle within Codex:
Lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason to delay
measures intended to prevent adverse effects on human health from
hazards present in food. When a preliminary risk assessment indicates a
threat of adverse effects on human health from a hazard present in food,
it is justifiable to take measures to prevent such effects without awaiting
additional scientific data and a full risk assessment. Such measures
should be proportionate to the potential health risk and should be kept
under review.47
The delegation of the United States opposed the inclusion of the precautionary
principle within the Codex working principles for two reasons: no internationally
recognised definition was available and secondly ‘a precautionary approach was
already built in risk assessment; this concept should not be used by risk managers
to overrule risk assessment.’48 The American delegation recalled that Article 5.7 of
the SPS Agreement already addressed the issue of insufficient scientific evidence.
At the 2000 meeting of the CCGP, held in Paris, the French representative,
opening the meeting, emphasised that the precautionary principle should be
regarded as an appropriate tool of risk management, provided that it was not used
                                                           
45 Report of the 14th meeting of the CCGP, 1999, par. 29.
46 Ibid. See also Report of the 16th meeting of CCGP, 2001, par. 66.
47 Report of the 14th meeting of the CCGP, 1999, par. 28.
48 Report of the 14th meeting of the CCGP, 1999, par. 30.
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as an excuse to establish unwarranted and arbitrary trade barriers.49 The basis of the
discussion was not the Swedish proposal but a text prepared by the delegation of
the United States, the member countries of the European Community and several
other delegations. The text described the use of precaution in taking risk
management measures;50 moreover, a footnote in the text indicated that this was
referred to as the ‘Precautionary Principle’ in certain member countries.
Notwithstanding the extensive discussion51 on the new draft, consensus was not
achieved. Additional work was required on the text. A working group was
convened on purpose.52
During the CCGP meeting of 2001 many delegations (Argentina, Bolivia,
Paraguay and Uruguay) supported the deletion of any reference to the
precautionary principle in the risk management principles claiming that it was not a
principle of international law53 and should not be mentioned as such in the
framework of Codex; other delegations were against the precautionary principle
because ‘all necessary measures to protect consumers' health when scientific
evidence was insufficient were covered by the SPS Agreement and that any
additional reference could foster the use of precaution for the purpose of trade
protection.’54 Yet, detractors of the precautionary principle were counterbalanced
by its traditional supporters. Meanwhile different proposals concerning precaution
in risk analysis were put forward.55
Given the highly contentious nature of the debate, the Codex Commission was
invited by the CCGP to clarify certain aspects of its mandate. Was it appropriate for
the Codex to elaborate standards when scientific evidence was not sufficient? The
Codex emphasised that ‘precaution was and should remain an essential element of
risk analysis in the formulation of national and international standards.’56 It was felt
                                                           
49 Report of the 15th meeting of the CCGP, 2000, par. 3.
50 The text was drafted as follows: When relevant scientific evidence is insufficient to
objectively and fully assess risk from a hazard in food, and where there is reasonable
evidence to suggest that adverse effects on human health may occur, but it is difficult to
evaluate their nature and extent, it may be appropriate for risk managers to apply precaution
through interim measures to protect the health of consumers without awaiting additional
scientific data and a full risk assessment. However, additional information for a more
objective risk assessment should be sought and the measures taken reviewed accordingly
(within a reasonable time frame/until a more complete risk assessment is performed).
51 See par. 43-61.
52 Report of the 16th meeting of the CCGP, 2001, par. 52.
53 These were Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay. See 16th CCGP meeting, par. 58.
54 Report of the 16th meeting of CCGP, 2001, par. 61.
55 See ALINORM 01/33A, Appendix IV of the report of the 16th meeting of the CCGP.
56 Report of the 24th meeting of the CAC, 2001, par. 77.
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that the ‘Codex Alimentarius Commission was the most appropriate forum to
discuss this issue.’57
However, the views on the precautionary principle remained sharply divided
during the 2001 CAC meeting. On the one hand, it was felt that the Commission
should not elaborate ‘standards and related texts’ when data were insufficient, as
Codex recommendations represented a reference at the international level and
should be based on adequate scientific evidence. The situation was different at the
national level, as governments had the possibility to take provisional measures to
protect their population, as recognized under the SPS Agreement.58 On the other
hand, it was claimed that precaution had already been applied in Codex work, and
that the Commission had adopted codes of practice and other recommendations
when scientific data did not allow the establishment of a standard. Thus, Codex was
required to make every effort to develop recommendations to protect consumers'
health even when scientific evidence was insufficient.59
At the end of the 2001 meeting, the following compromise text was adopted,
although consensus on it was dubious:
When there is evidence that a risk to human health exists but scientific
data are insufficient or incomplete, the Commission should not proceed
to elaborate a standard but should consider elaborating a related text,
such as a code of practice, provided that such a text would be supported
by the available scientific evidence.60
In the 2002 meeting of the CCGP, attempts were made to open the discussion
on the agreed compromise.61 Noting however that considerable effort had been
made in achieving a consensus on this issue, the Committee agreed to retain the
text as drafted.62
Finally in 2003, the CCGP submitted the Draft Working Principles for Risk
Analysis for Application in the Framework of the Codex Alimentarius to the Codex
Commission, which endorse d them in July 2003. For our purpose s, atte ntion is
demande d by par agra phs 10 a nd 11 of the sec tion on ‘r isk a na lysis-ge ne ra l a spec t:’ 63
                                                           
57 Ibid.
58 Report of the 24th meeting of the CAC, 2001, par. 80.
59 Report of the 24th meeting of the CAC, 2001, par. 81.
60 Many delegations supported this text as a compromise reflecting the need for a scientific
basis while allowing for flexibility in the elaboration of ‘related texts’. (Par. 82.) However,
most of the members of the EC expressed reservations and the UK complained about the way
in which the decision was made.
61 It was suggested to amend the paragraph dealing with precaution, in particular to delete the
introductory sentence (Argentina) and to provide more detailed clarification on the nature of
the risk and its potential public health consequences (USA). See report of the 17th meeting of
2002, par. 28.
62 Report of the 17th meeting of CCGP, 2002, par. 28.
63 See appendix I, ALINORM 26/06/ adopted at the 26th session of the CAC.
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10. When there is evidence that a risk to human health exists but
scientific data are insufficient or incomplete, the Codex Alimentarius
Commission should not proceed to elaborate a standard but should
consider elaborating a related text, such as a code of practice, provided
that such a text would be supported by the available scientific evidence.
11. Precaution is an inherent element of risk analysis. Many sources of
uncertainty exist in the process of risk assessment and risk management
of food related hazards to human health. The degree of uncertainty and
variability in the available scientific information should be explicitly
considered in the risk analysis. Where there is sufficient scientific
evidence to allow Codex to proceed to elaborate a standard or related
text, the assumptions used for the risk assessment and the risk
management options selected should reflect the degree of uncertainty
and the characteristics of the hazard.
What are the implications of these paragraphs for the Codex Commission’s
activity? Paragraph 10 serves to discourage the Codex Commission from adopting
standards in situations of scientific uncertainty. At most, a code of practise may be
adopted in these circumstances. This drafting reflects the view of the US and those
other countries which are favourable to stick to the scientific evidence in taking risk
management decisions.
Paragraph 11, first paragraph states the obvious: precaution is important in risk
analysis. The second paragraph is convoluted and it has hardly any meaning; in any
case, it does not offer valuable guidelines in situations of scientific uncertainty
since it envisages a situation in which sufficient scientific evidence is available.
This second paragraph appears to stress the need to reflect the degree of uncertainty
in taking risk management options even when sufficient scientific evidence is
available. Thus, it seems that the precautionary principle is here evoked with the
same meaning as the proportionality principle. The precautionary principle, in the
sense given to it by the members of the European Community, was lost somewhere,
amongst the different texts which circulated within Codex Committees.
5.2 The Role of Factors Other than Science in Codex Decision-Making:
Hidden Protectionism or Legitimate Concerns?
The Codex Commission is bound to adopt food standards on the basis of ‘the
principle of sound scientific analysis and evidence, involving a thorough review
of all relevant information.’64 Sound scientific analysis is the tenet of Codex
decision-making. However, the Codex Procedural Manual also provides that:
When elaborating and deciding upon food standards, the Codex
Alimentarius will have regard, where appropriate, to other legitimate
                                                           
64 See the first statement of principles inspiring Codex decision making, were adopted by the
Commission in 1995 (21st meeting of the Commission) and were included in the Appendix of
the Manual of Procedure.
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factors (emphasis added) relevant for the health protection of consumers
and for the promotion of fair practices in food trade.65
This statement is quite ambiguous since it is unclear what are ‘the other
legitimate factors relevant for the health protection of consumers and for the
promotion of fair practices in food trade.’ The definition of these factors is
important because they are capable of affecting the content of a standardor even
potentially impeding its adoption. Therefore, guidance was needed for the
identification, management, application and interpretation of these factors.
In 1998 the CCGP started to discuss about the definition of these factors,66
following the decision of the CAC to suspend ‘consideration of the adoption of the
MRLs for Bovine Somatotropin pending […] examination of the application of
“other legitimate factors” in relation with BST by the CCGP.’67 The BST is an
hormone, increasing milk production, whose maximum level tolerable in milk was
at the centre of discussions within the Codex Committee for the Residues of
Veterinary Drugs in food. During this discussion, the need to consider other
legitimate factors than science was invoked for the first time by the Codex
members of the European Community.
A paper of the Secretariat68 revealed that broad categories of ‘other legitimate
concerns’ were potentially considered eligible to be considered in se tting food
sta ndards. These were : economic sustainability, the lack of appropria te methods of
ana lysis, technologic al nee d, tec hnical feasibility, saf ety fa ctors. Other specific fa ctors, 
i.e . environmental risks, consume r conc erns,69 animal health and we lfare, 
ethical/r eligious/ cultural factors70 we re mentioned by de legations on other occasions.
These factors were seen by certain delegations, in particular, those of the
members of the European Community, as being essential in ensuring a wide
acceptance of Codex standards. Other Codex members, in particular the US
delegation, took the position that ‘giving consideration to […] these factors could
open a Pandora’s box.’71 Thus, the delegation of the United States, supported by
                                                           
65 Second statement of principles included in Appendix of the Manual of Procedure, see
footnote 64.
66 Report of the 13th meeting of the CCGP, 1998, par. 59-70.
67 See the 22nd Report of the CAC, 1997, par. 67-68.
68 This is CX/GP/99/9. Reference to this paper is reported in D. Juke (2000) ‘The Role of
Science in International Food Standards’, in Food Control, 11, 189.
69 See for example the opening of the 15th meeting of CCGP of 2000 in which the French
representative emphasized that legitimate factors other than strictly scientific data could not
be ignored by governments and that the development of world trade could not take place
without having regard to the legitimate rights of consumers.
70 This category of OLFs was considered relevant by some delegations in adopting standards on
food derived from biotechnology. See report of the first meeting of the ad hoc IGTF on food
derived from biotechnology, of 14-17 March 2000, par. 15.
71 OECD (2000) Food Safety and Quality: Trade Considerations, p. 34.
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other delegations, took a very restrictive view of these factors. The protection of
interests which were not relevant to the protection of consumers’ health and the
promotion of fair practices in food trade was not within the mandate of Codex72
and were likely to create barriers to trade.
As previously mentioned, the discussion on OLF started in the framework of the
BST case. The US was in favour of adopting the MLRs of the BST whereas
members of the European Community opposed it. The position of the EC was that
consideration of other legitimate factors, such as the technological justification of
using the hormone concerned, animal welfare73 and consumer concerns74 had to be
considered when adopting the BST standard. Other delegations stressed that
science-based risk assessment should be the determining factor when addressing a
food safety issue such as the setting of MRLs for veterinary drugs.
No consensus on the application of OLFs in the case of BST was achieved.
However, the EC asked and obtained75 to suspend consideration of the adoption of
the MRLs for Bovine Somatotropin pending re-evaluation of scientific data by
JECFA76 and the CCRVDF77 and examination of the application of ‘other
legitimate factors’.78
In 1999, a general discussion on the role of OLFs in Codex decision-making
was held at the 14th meeting of the CCGP with the view of setting out interpretative
criteria of the Statements of Principle on the Role of Science and the Extent to
which Other Factors are Taken into Account.
In this meeting, the conflict between the European countries and the delegation
of the United States became apparent. The US expressed the view that the scientific
basis of risk assessment was essential in the decision process and that the
introduction of ‘other factors’ that are more appropriately considered at the national
level was, by contrast, not appropriate within Codex. According to this delegation,
environmental aspects did not fall within the Codex mandate. The delegation also
pointed out that the precautionary principle should not be considered as one of
these factors as it related to uncertainty, which was already addressed in the
                                                           
72 Report of the 15th meeting of CCGP, 2000.
73 Reference was made to a potential reduction of animal immune defences and the risk
of increased antibiotics use as a consequence. See 13th session ALINORM 99/33,
September 1998.
74 Some consumers opposed the use of BST.
75 13th session ALINORM 99/33, September 1998.
76 Expert Committee on food additives and contaminants.
77 Codex Committee for the Residues of Veterinary Drug in Food.
78 The EC had enacted a moratorium on the use of BST in the European Union until the end of
1999.
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framework of risk assessment. This position was supported by several countries
and by the Observers.79
Amendments to the Manual of Procedure, laying down the conditions under
which OLFs may be invoked, were discussed in 2000, during the 15th meeting of
the CCGP and endorsed during the 16th session of 2001. Finally, the Codex
Commission adopted the amendments at its 24th session. They were included in an
appendix to the Procedural Manual entitled ‘General Decisions of the
Commission’80 and listed as follows:
a) When health and safety matters are concerned, the Statements of
Principle Concerning the Role of Science and the Statements of
Principle Relating to the Role of Food Safety Risk Assessment should be
followed;
b) Other legitimate factors relevant for health protection and fair trade
practices may be identified in the risk management process, and risk
managers should indicate how these factors affect the selection of risk
management options and the development of standards, guidelines and
related texts;
c) Consideration of other factors should not affect the scientific basis of
risk analysis; in this process, the separation between risk assessment and
risk management should be respected, in order to ensure the scientific
integrity of the risk assessment;
d) It should be recognized that some legitimate concerns of governments
when establishing their national legislation are not generally applicable
or relevant world-wide;
e) only those other factors which can be accepted on a world-wide basis,
or on a regional basis in the case of regional standards and related texts,
should be taken into account in the framework of Codex;
f) The consideration of specific other factors in the development of risk
management recommendations of the Codex Alimentarius Commission
and its subsidiary bodies should be clearly documented, including the
rationale for their integration, on a case-by-case basis;
g) The feasibility of risk management options due to the nature and
particular constraints of the production or processing methods, transport
and storage, especially in developing countries, may be considered;
concerns related to economic interests and trade issues in general should
be substantiated by quantifiable data;
h) The integration of other legitimate factors in risk management should
not create unjustified barriers to trade; particular attention should be
given to the impact on developing countries of the inclusion of such
other factors.
                                                           
79 Report of the 14th session of CCGP, 1999, ALINORM 99/33A.
80 Report of the 12th meeting of CCGP, November 1996.
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The 2001 amendments to the Manual of Procedure make possible to invoke on a
case-by case basis OLFs than science in risk management decisions. The very same
fact that OLF than science can be invoked in risk management processes is a
victory for the supporters of these factors and a loss for the US, which had
unsuccessfully proposed that risk management was ‘grounded on science-based
risk assessment’.81 Certainly, the use of OLFs in Codex decision-making is
constrained in many respects. Firstly, ‘Consideration of other factors should not
affect the scientific basis of risk analysis.’ This means that in case the inclusion of
OLFs conflicts with scientific evidence, they are not to be taken into consideration
in Codex standards. Otherwise, these factors could be used for protectionist
purposes. Secondly, these factors should not excessively restrict trade and should
be accepted on a world-wide basis. Thirdly, factors which are only recognised at
national level cannot be invoked in the adoption of Codex standards. Finally,
reliance on OLFs should not have an impact on developing countries.
It is quite disappointing that no consensus was reached on the exemplification
of factors (relevant for health protection and fair trade practices). The CCGP
proposed to include certain factors if they were included in recommendations of
relevant multilateral intergovernmental organizations.82 Along this line, Sweden
suggested that ‘concerns relating to the environment, animal and plant health and
animal welfare’ were taken into account ‘if international requirements or
recommendations of the competent international fora’ existed.83 However, this
proposal was rejected.
So far, these OLFs have never been taken into consideration explicitly in the
adoption of a Codex standard. However, the acknowledgement that OLFs can be
invoked when adopting food standards has now encouraged some Codex Members
to ask that these factors be taken into consideration in specific cases. For example,
the need to identify OLFs related to modern biotechnology was identified at the end
of the work of the ad hoc Task Force on food derived from biotechnology.84 This
means that the debate on this notion is not ended and delegations will come back on
its meaning in the future.
5.3 Recent Conflicting Views on Food Derived from Biotechnology
Divergent views on the conditions allowing the marketing of food derived from
biotechnology surfaced in various Codex committees (CCFICS, CCFL) and within
an Inter-governmental ad hoc Task Force on food derived from biotechnology
                                                           
81 Ibid par. 33.
82 Report of the 16th meeting of CCGP, 2001, par. 95.
83 Report of the 16th meeting of CCGP, 2001.
84 Fourth report of the ad hoc Task Force on food derived from biotechnology, 2003, par. 82.
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(hereafter ‘Task Force’ or ‘IGTF’), set up by the CAC in 1999 to discuss about
food standards in this sector.
a) Labelling Food Derived from Biotechnology: A Trade Barrier or a Means to
Inform Consumers?
In 1991 the CAC agreed that work on the safety, labelling and nutrition aspects of
biotechnology, being undertaken by relevant Committees.85 The CCFL was
entrusted with the task of developing the labelling aspects of biotechnology. This
Committee has discussed about the definition of key-terms (i.e. what are food or
food ingredients obtained through certain techniques of genetic
modifications/genetic engineering), the objective and the scope of labelling
requirements of food derived from biotechnology since 1996. Attention is drawn
here on the debate considering the need to label biotech products.
It is still early to evaluate the choices made by the CCFL on labelling since, this
committee has only agreed ‘draft guidelines for the labelling of food and food
ingredients obtained through certain techniques of genetic modifications/genetic
engineering’ in the last meeting of 2002. 86 However, it is certainly possible to
emphasise the most important points in the debate.
So far no consensus on labelling options has been reached because the US
delegation and European Codex members have different positions. The former
considers that the Codex Commission should limit itself to lay down voluntary
labelling indications, embracing food derived from biotechnology to the extent that
it ‘differs substantially’ from conventional food. Food derived from biotechnology
which is not substantially different from its conventional counterpart should not be
labelled.87 The US did not want to consent to labelling based on the method of
production.88
By contrast, the latter prefer comprehensive labelling obligations, which apply
systematically to all categories of food derived from biotechnology,89 including
food produced from GMOs when it is not ‘substantially equivalent’ to conventional
food. It should be noted that the EC internal legislation goes further than the
position taken by the Codex members of the European Community within the
relevant Codex Committees. The Council has recently approved a piece of
                                                           
85 Report of the 25th meeting of the CCFL, APPENDIX VI - Proposed Draft Recommendations
for the Labelling of Food Obtained through Biotechnology, par. 1.
86 ALINORM 03/22, Appendix IV, Report of the 30th meeting of the CCFL, 2002. During the
last meeting of the CCFL in 2003, this committee agreed to postpone the discussion on this
point to the next session of the committee. See point 74 of Report of the 31st meeting of the
CCFL, 2003.
87 Report of the 27th meeting of CCFL, 1999, par. 41.
88 Report of 30th meeting of the CCFL, 2002, par. 52.
89 Report of the 27th meeting of CCFL, 1999, par. 43.
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legislation90 which extends labelling to all food containing or consisting of GMOs
and produced from GMOs, irrespective of the equivalence or differences of this
GM food with respect to existing ones.
The European Codex members argue that the objective of labelling food
obtained through techniques of genetic modification is to inform consumers of the
origin and nature of the foods which they purchase. Indeed, adequate labelling is
crucial to gain consumer’s confidence.91 In particular, European consumers want to
know whether the food that they buy derives from GMO or not; thus, labelling need
to be as much comprehensive as possible. According to the US delegation, it is not
necessary to inform consumers when food derived from biotechnology is
equivalent to existing food, otherwise the impression can be given that the products
concerned are unsafe and ultimately consumers are misled. This debate clearly
echoes the discussion on the role of OLFs, ie consumer preferences, in the adoption
of Codex standards.
b) Product Tracing of Food Derived from Biotechnology: An Unnecessary and
Costly Burden or an Essential Risk Management Tool to Gain Consumer’s
Confidence?
The most recent bone of contention between the US and EC is the definition of
traceability, which has been discussed within the Task Force since its first meeting
in 2000.92 The concept of traceability was known to the Codex Commission,93
although ‘it had not been treated in a systematic manner.’94 However, the Codex
Commission had never embarked on a discussion on this issue in the context of
foods derived from biotechnology. Thus, the development of guidelines on the
monitoring and traceability of food derived from biotechnology became a priority
in the works of the Task Force.95
                                                           
90 This is the Regulation on genetically modified food and feed, which was finalised end of
July 2003.
91 Report of the 30th meeting of CCFL, 2002, par. 42.
92 Initially, the Task Force agreed to have a better understanding of the meaning and
implications of this concept, which was considered as a horizontal issue potentially
interesting all Codex activities, by involving in the discussion other Committees. These are
the CCGP, CCFL and CCFICS. The US wanted traceability to be considered within CCFICS,
whereas the Codex members of the European Community favoured consideration of this
matter within the CCGP.
93 France reports in its paper on traceability that an ISO standard defined traceability as ‘the
ability for the retrieval of the history and use or location of an article or an activity through a
registered identification’. See point 8 of the discussion paper, in CX/FBT 01/6, Report of the
2nd meeting of the ad hoc Task Force on food derived from biotecnhlogy.
94 Report of the 49th meeting of the executive committee, 2001, par. 29.
95 Report of the first meeting of the ad hoc Task Force on foods derived from biotechnology,
Chiba, 2000, par. 18.
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The Codex Members of the European Community exercised pressure to
introduce this concept within the principles on risk analysis of foods derived from
biotechnology and eventually they obtained a partial success, as we will see infra.96
What is a traceability system? It is a ‘mechanism providing a continuous flow
of information, allowing the retrieval of the history and of the origin of a product at
any point in the food chain;’97 it consists in placing unique identifiers on products
and in setting up a system of registration of products.
In its broadest definition, traceability is a risk management tool, serving two
purposes. The first is to make easy the recall of products from the market, in case
they are found to be hazardous for human health, following their placing on the
market. Using WTO jargon, a measure imposing traceability requirements, for the
purpose described above, is an SPS measure because it has a food safety objective.
The second function of a traceability system is related to consumer information;
indeed, by making products identifiable, a traceability system allows to verify the
authenticity of labelling claims, thus guaranteeing consumers that the information
stated on the label is correct.98 A measure promoting this second objective of a
traceability system, i.e. consumers information, would be considered a TBT
measure, fulfilling a legitimate objective.
The definition of traceability just described reflects the European position,
which was illustrated in a circular letter presented by France to the Task force in
2002.99 This position is consistent with recent initiatives of reform of the European
GM food legislation, which placed great emphasis on the functioning of a
traceability system.100
The US and other delegations strenuously opposed the European approach to
traceability. The US claimed that the issue of traceability was not unique to foods
derived from biotechnology.101 Hence, there was no need to include this concept
within the principles of risk analysis of foods derived from biotechnology.
However, when they realised that there was consensus102 on the inclusion of
                                                           
96 Report of the 26th meeting of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 30 June-7 July 2003,
forthcoming.
97 Report of the second meeting of the intergovernmental ad hoc Task Force on food derived
from biotechnology, 2001, par. 34.
98 This is why traceability was also discussed within the CCFL. See for example report of the
25th meeting of the CCFL of 2002, par. 4-9.
99 See CX/FBT 01/6 Discussion Paper on Traceability above No. 93.
100 In 2001, the Commission put forward a proposal centred on the treaceability of GMOs. See
COM (2001) 182.
101 Report of the third meeting of the Task Force on biotechnology-derived foods, March 2002,
par. 24.
102 In addition, the Executive Committee, which was asked guidelines on the scope of
traceability, agreed to retain both aspects of traceability, even if first consideration had to be
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traceability within these principles, they attempted to circumscribe the scope of this
notion as much as possible. While supporting the use of ‘product tracing’103 for the
purpose of public health, the US did not agree on the application of this concept to
the labelling of food derived from biotechnology.104
T he tra c ing of pr oducts was inc luded as a possible risk ma na gement option
dur ing the se cond me eting of the Task For ce (2001). 105 The sc ope of tra ce ability wa s
f inally se ttled thr ough a ‘ Solomon-like solution,’ a chie ve d at the thir d me e ting of the 
T ask For ce (2002) . It wa s agr ee d to inc lude tra cing of pr oduc ts a mongst the ‘tools
f ac ilita ting the imple me nta tion and enf or ce ment of risk ma na gement mea sur es,
w ithout pr ejudice to its use for othe r purpose s (that is to say to for la be lling
pur pose s). ’106 This w a s a par tial succ e ss f or the Eur opea n Code x de le gations. 
The most thorny issue remained the provision of a definition of traceability/
product tracing which was acceptable to all Codex members. An open discussion
on traceability was required for this purpose and it was held during the fourth
meeting of the Task Force (2003).
In the course of the debate the US fully displayed arguments against traceability
requirements for foods derived from biotechnology, as proposed by France in
2002.107 The US objected to the definition of traceability provided by France.
Mandatory product tracing requirements are necessary when public health is at risk.
‘The need for traceback for other than public reasons should be driven by market
forces.’108 The US support the use of product tracing to the extent that this implies
tracing products ‘one step back and one step forward’109 in the food chainas
opposed to ensure product tracing at all stages of the food chainin compliance
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given to traceability as a risk management option in the working principles for risk analysis.
See Report of the 49th meeting of the executive committee, September 2001, par. 31. See
also Report of the 50th meeting of the executive committee, 2002, par. 48.
103 The US considered the meaning of ‘product tracing’ more restricted than that of traceability
and in the discussion preferred to use the former term. However, the terms were used
interchangeably since 2001.
104 Report of the 4th meeting of the IGTF, 2003, par. 68.
105 See par. 21 in Appendix II, Report of the second meeting of the Task Force in 2001.
Paragraph 21 (retained in the final version of the principles) states: ‘Specific tools may be
needed to facilitate the implementation and enforcement of risk management measures. These
may include appropriate analytical methods; reference materials; and, the tracing of products
for the purpose of facilitating withdrawal from the market when a risk to human health has
been identified or to support post-market monitoring in circumstances as indicated in
paragraph 20.’
106 See Report of the 3rd meeting of the IGTF, 2002, par. 27. Tracing of products is mentioned
in paragraph 21 of the principles of risk analysis of foods derived from biotechnology.
107 See the comprehensive paper presented by the US, CX/FBT, CRD 9.
108 See the document CX/FBT, CRB 9, p. 6, presented at the 4th meeting of the IGTF, 2003.
109 This means to allow the identification of the immediate previous sources and the immediate
subsequent recipients of food. See the document CX/FBT, CRB 9, p. 2.
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with the choice made by the Food and Drug Administration for the proposed
domestic legislation on food.110
The US put forward several reasons against the inclusion of traceabilty within
the principles inspiring foods derived from biotechnology. ‘Safe bio-engineered
food’111 is not inherently unsafe since it has been reviewed for safety before
marketing; thus the use of traceability to inform consumers is a costly requirement,
which is not justified unless there is a clear public health justification. Moreover,
traceability requirements are certainly very burdensome for developing
countries.112 The US disagreed with the European position that the cost
implications of product tracing were not significant.113 The use of product tracing
as an instrument to monitor the unintended effects of foods derived from
biotechnology should be determined on a case by case basis and employed in
exceptional cases related to human health concerns;114 as to the use of traceability
to preserve the identity of products, the US argued that this issue concerns private
commercial relationships rather than the Codex.115
It should be noted that it has hitherto been impossible to agree on a Codex
definition of traceability. However, a consensus was reached as to the need of
developing such a definition.116 This is left to future work of the CCGP.
6. Possible Conclusions
What lessons may be drawn from the conflicts between the US and the Codex
members of the European Community? Is there an added value in discussing and
attempting to settle these conflicts within the Codex Alimentarius Commission?
Three points may be noted:
– After lengthy discussions, these conflicts led to poor
compromises, which do not have practical impact on the activity
of the Codex Commission. This is the case of the conflict on the
precautionary principle.
– Discussion of controversial issues within the CAC does not seem
to have any positive effect in preventing WTO litigation. The
setting out of MLRs of hormones in beef was debated for many
                                                           
110 Report of the 4th meeting of the IGTF, 2003, par. 68.
111 See the document CX/FBT, CRB 9, p. 5.
112 See the document CX/FBT, CRB 9, p. 5. Developing countries indeed oppose the use of
traceability.
113 See the document CX/FBT, CRB 9, p. 8.
114 See the document CX/FBT, CRB 9, p. 6.
115 See the document CX/FBT, CRB 9, p. 6.
116 Report of the 18th meeting of the CCGP, April 2003, par. 97.
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years within several Codex Committees but eventually the
impossibility to reconcile the positions of the European
Community and the US led the latter to trigger the DSB
procedure. Very recently, the US has asked for consultations
with the European Community in order to unblock the
authorisation process for the marketing of GMOs. Therefore,
notwithstanding the attempts to harmonise Euro-American
positions on labelling and traceability of foods derived from
biotechnology, the US will challenge the European GMOs
legislation before the DSB.
– Sometimes the Euro-American conflicts brought about
clarifications, as it happened when the conditions, upon which
OLFs may be invoked in the adoption of standards, were
endorsed. However, so far these clarifications were not relied
upon in any specific case.
Two alternative conclusions may be drawn from the Euro-American conflicts
described in previous sections. The first is that the Codex Commission is not a
suitable arena to settle politically sensitive issues or find compromises on them.
Discussing about these issues within Codex is just a vain attempt to ‘reconcile
the irreconcilable’ and sooner or later the intervention of a judicial body will
become necessary. The hormone-in-beef case and the likely WTO dispute on the
European moratorium on GMOs support this conclusion. The Codex’s poor
capacity to settle very controversial issues questions the very need of having a
Codex Alimentarius Commission.
The second and opposite conclusion does not place emphasis on the Codex
Commission’s (in)ability to solve politically sensitive issuesthis is not the Codex
Commission’s rolebut rather on the fact that the Codex Commission provides a
useful and world-wide forum to debate about issues upon which the positions of
delegations are very far apart. This opportunity is highly appreciated by Codex
members, as is shown by the interest manifested by the European Commission in
acceding to the CAC.
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Chapter 6
Enlarging the EU Food Safety Regime:
Selected Problems in Adjusting the Polish Food
Safety Regime to EU Food Safety Requirements
Aleksander Surdej
What they are short of is imagination
Officialdom can never cope
with something really catastrophic.
(Albert Camus, The Plague)
1. Introduction: The Growing Internationalization of Food Safety
Regulations
Public regulations regarding the production, transportation and sale of food are by
no means an invention of contemporary governments receptive to the pressure of
wealthy citizens susceptible to food scares. Rather, they go at least as far back as to
ancient Athens, where beer and wines were inspected for purity and soundness,
while the Romans had a well-organized state food control system to protect
consumers from fraud or bad produce. In medieval Europe individual countries
passed laws concerning the quality and safety of eggs, sausages, cheese, beer, wine
and bread. Some of these ancient statutes still exist today.1
                                                           
1 This paragraph has been drawn from the information contained in the text ‘Origins of the
Codex Alimentarius’ from http://www.fao.org/docrep/W9114E/W91114e03.htm.
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Initially food quality and safety legislations were a purely local matter. By the
late nineteenth century, however, leading countries had adopted general food laws
and established law enforcement inspections; food safety regulations had thus
become national in scope. The multi-ethnic (if not multi-national) nature of some of
the large imperial states made them precursors of modern attempts at
internationalization of food safety regulations as their food safety legislation had to
take into consideration different production techniques and different consumer
tastes. Thus, for instance, between 1897 and 1911 the Austro-Hungarian Empire
developed a series of standards and product descriptions for a wide variety of
foods, known as the Codex Alimentarius Austriacus, which, although lacking legal
force, was used as a reference by the Empire’s courts to determine standards of
identity for specific foods. The present day FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius draws
its name from this Austro-Hungarian code.
For a long time food safety regulations seemed to be first and foremost a policy
response to domestic public health problems, but with the intensification of
international trade in foods the threats to public health also increased. International
trade in foods predates modern times, but until the end of 1800s such trade was
limited in quantity and variety. Large-scale imports of products from exotic
countries started in the mid-1800s when bananas were first shipped to Europe from
the tropics. In the late 1800s long-distance food transportation started with the first
shipments of frozen meat from Australia and New Zealand to the United Kingdom.
Today international trade in foods amounts to 10 percent of the world food
production. In 2000 in the group of most developed countries (the OECD area)
import penetration of food reached 20 percent showing a steep rise from 7 percent
in 1992. The 1990s was a period of rapid growth of international trade in food, but
it was, to a large extent, an increase of food trade within the OECD area. In the
future, however, a fast growth of share of less developed countries in the
international food trade is forecast as the index of their food auto-sufficiency
decreased from 97 percent in the 1960s, to 91 percent in the late 1990s and is
expected to fall further to approximately 89 percent by 2010. International food
trade is likely to grow since there will be an increasing mismatch between areas of
food abundance and areas of food shortages.2
Food safety regulations are really risk regulations in that they are rules issued
by the public authority to reduce the threat to people’s health stemming from
consumption or from contact with contaminated foods. Unlike selected
environmental regulations which can produce international negative externalities,
domestic food regulations cannot directly affect other countries unless food is
internationally traded and physically transported. It might seem thus that food
safety is a domain of easy international regulatory co-operation, in which food
                                                           
2 International trade in food grows also in response to the need for food variety.
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safety standards are mutually recognized, found equivalent in outcomes or even
internationally harmonized.
Protecting one’s own citizens against risks stemming from the consumption of
imported unsafe food is possible unilaterally, but at high costs of intensive border
controls and possibly diminished food variety. A better solution would be to create
bilateral or multilateral arrangements assuring a minimal level of convergence in
food safety regulations and their implementation within a food trading area.
The latter would reduce international trade conflicts when spontaneously (in
response to emergency situations) or strategically (that is out of intent to exploit
regulations to gain advantage over other countries) countries create domestic
regulations which can be considered as technical barriers (invisible tariffs)3 to trade
in foods.
Even if universalism of science seems to guarantee the common definition of
health threats stemming from food consumption, an international regulatory
harmony in the domain of food safety is undermined by three main factors: the
intrinsic uncertainty of scientific knowledge about the long term-effects of the
consumption of certain foods; public perception of existing threats; and the costs of
effectively protecting citizens against food safety risks.
The international dimension of food safety was recognized a long time ago. The
first international regulatory initiatives in the area started at the beginning of the
twentieth century. Today international sanitary and phytosanitary standards are
being developed by three international organizations: the Codex Alimentarius
Commission; the International Office of Epizootics; and the International Plant
Protection Convention. The conformity of national standards with the standards set
by these organizations protects from legal challenges under the World Trade
Organization (WTO) rules, making it beneficial for countries to maintain these
standards, unless they consider them too low or want to use food safety regulations
for strategic trade purposes even at the cost of being challenged in the WTO.
International regulatory bodies take the lead in elaborating basic (minimum)
food safety standards. Other, be they regional or national, standards can exceed
these standards only if a country or a regional grouping can show scientific
evidence in support of such stricter rules. But even if food safety rules are widely
accepted as appropriate, they might not be evenly applied, thus creating a food
sa fe ty risk. It se e ms tha t as an ope n challe nge to inte rna tiona l food sa f e ty standa r ds
is be c oming inc r ea singly dif f ic ult, inte rna tiona l dispute s ove r food sa f e ty risks ar e
te nding to move to the ar e a of the prope r imple me nta tion of inte rna tiona l sta ndar ds. 4
                                                           
3 The term invisible tariffs was first used by Percy Bidwell (1939) The Invisible Tariff, New
York: Council of Foreign Relations.
4 This line of argument has been tried by the EU in the WTO case regarding beef hormones,
where the EU pointed to the danger of hormone abuse by cattle ranchers, even if the Codex
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T he issue of pr ope r ly enf orc ing the impleme ntation of regula tor y rule s be c ome s
c r uc ia l both in the constr uc tion of the Eur opea n Union food sa f e ty re gime and in
e valua ting the impa c t of the ongoing e nlar ge ment on the E U food sa f e ty regime.
2. Food Safety Regulations: Problems and Methods
It is a widely shared opinion that regulating food out of concern for health and
environment is a difficult task due to the interplay of scientific uncertainties and
risky human comportment.5 In what follows no attempt is made to give a
comprehensive picture of these difficulties: issues have been chosen because of
their relevance to the discussion of the impact of the ongoing enlargement on the
EU food safety regime.
2.1 Basic Concepts Related to Food Safety
What is a safe food? An answer to this seemingly easy question can be stated only
in general terms such as ‘a safe food is one that does not cause harm to the
consumer when it is prepared and/or eaten according to its intended use’6. The
safety of food is thus not an intrinsic feature of food, but a product of food’s
characteristics and the ways food is handled.
At the very general level food-related health problems can be divided into those
resulting from microbiological and chemical hazards.7
At the origin of health problems resulting from microbiological hazards there is
a propagation in food of micro-organisms like Salmonella spp., Campylobacter
jejuni, Listeria monocytogenes or E. coli 0157.8 Sound comparative international
                                                           (contd.)
Alimentarius studies are right that hormones are ‘safe’ when used in accordance with good
veterinary practices (See Alan O. Sykes [2002] ‘Exploring the Need for International
Harmonization: domestic regulation, sovereignty, and scientific evidence requirements: a
pessimistic view’, in Chicago Journal of International Law, Fall.).
5 See, for instance, section 1 of the book edited by Julian Morris and Roger Bate (1999)
Fearing Food: Risk, Health and Environment, Butterworth Heineman.
6 R. B. Tompkin (2001) ‘Interactions between government and industry food safety activities’,
in Food Control, No. 2.
7 The major breakthrough in ensuring food safety arrived with the birth of modern chemistry in
the nineteenth century. Its development created a scientific base for modern food safety
controls, as it allowed the understanding of the chemical parameters of food composition.
Science began to provide tools with which it was possible to disclose dishonest practices in
the sale of food and to distinguish between safe and unsafe edible products.
8 Salmonella is a rod-shaped, motile bacteriumnonmotile exceptions S. gallinarum and S.
pullorum, nonsporeforming and Gram-negative. There is a widespread occurrence in
animals, especially in poultry and swine. Environmental sources of the organism include
water, soil, insects, factory surfaces, kitchen surfaces, animal faeces, raw meats, raw poultry,
and raw seafoods, to name only a few. Campylobacter jejuni is a Gram-negative slender,
curved, and motile rod. It is a microaerophilic organism, which means it has a requirement
153
statistics of the scale of microbiological hazards does not exist as incidence rates of
microbiologically caused foodborne diseases (MCFD) are reported according to
different national definitions and diagnostic systems.9 Despite popular beliefs that
microbiological hazards haunt only civilizationally backward societies, MCFD
never fully disappear in any society and once control measures and public
awareness to the risk are weakened, they can reemerge as local or regional
epidemics, as happened in Latvia and Lithuania between 1985 and 1992 and in the
Czech Republic or Hungary between 1995-97.10
Although it is impossible to achieve zero risk, controlling practices aimed at the
identif ic a tion and elimina tion of MCFD should ta r get as closely as possible the sta te
of no(‘ z e r o’ ) - mic r obiologic a l contamina tion, as in f a vor a ble conditions mic r o-
or ga nisms ra pidly multiply and might thr ea te n huma n he a lth. MCFD re gula tions ar e
thus an e xa mple of situa tions in which regula tion atte mpts to er adic a te the thr ea t. 11
Health problems can also be due to chemical contaminants in foods. Chemical
contaminants in foods include natural toxicants such as mycotoxins, environmental
contaminants such as dioxins, mercury, lead or food additives, pesticide and
veterinary drugs.
The contamination of food by chemical hazards is a major public health concern
in Europe. The use of various chemicals (like food additives, pesticides, veterinary
drugs and other agrochemical substances) is comprehensively regulated and
controlled by state inspections.
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for reduced levels of oxygen. It is relatively fragile, and sensitive to environmental stresses
(e.g., 21 percent oxygen, drying, heating, disinfectants, acidic conditions). Listeria
monocytogenes is a motile by means of flagella. Some studies suggest that 1-10 percent of
humans may be intestinal carriers of L. monocytogenes. It has been found in at least 37
mammalian species, both domestic and feral, as well as at least 17 species of birds and
possibly some species of fish and shellfish. E. coli is a normal inhabitant of the intestines of
all animals, including humans. When aerobic culture methods are used, E. coli is the
dominant species found in faeces. Normally E. coli serves a useful function in the body by
suppressing the growth of harmful bacterial species and by synthesizing appreciable amounts
of vitamins. A minority of E. coli strains are capable of causing human illness (Source: US
FDA).
9 One could thus postulate the harmonization of the format in which the data about foodborne
diseases are collected and reported.
10 Cristina Tirado, WHO (2002) Statistical Information on Food-Borne Disease in Europe:
Microbiological and Chemical Hazards, a paper to the FAO/WHO Pan-European Conference
on Food Safety and Quality, Budapest, February.
11 But, for instance, USDA applies ‘zero-tolerance’ policy to the detection of L. monocytogenes
in ready-to-eat products, whereas countries such as Canada and Denmark have a ‘non-zero
tolerance’ for L. monocytogenes for some classes of foods. (See the website of ‘Health
Canada’ http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/index.html.)
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Chemical hazards to food might result as, for instance, in Western Europe from
the ‘industrialization’ of agriculture production, but they might also results as, for
instance in Central and Eastern Europe, mostly from industrial contamination of
air, soil and water.12
Scientific analytical methods can usually establish the thresholds of non-
ha rming dose s of a groc he mic a ls in f ood. But de spite the existe nc e of compr e he nsive
r e gula tions and pr e c ise standa r ds, it is not possible to exc lude the re - a ppe a r a nc e 
of ca se s like that in Spa in whe n in 1981-1982 ra pe se e d oil de na tur e d with
a niline killed mor e tha n 1,000 pe ople and disable d anothe r 25, 000. 13 In the Spa nish
c a se , the agent re sponsible wa s ne ve r identif ie d despite intensive inve stiga tions. 14
2.2 The Role of Scientific Evidence in Making Food Safety Regulations
The safety effects of food hazards need to be cautiously and credibly assessed. This
depends first and foremost on scientific and technological progress, but also on
procedural and institutional factors. The accent on scientific evidence results from
the search for objective, scientific truth (science is expected to establish certain
knowledge whether and how a given microorganism can harm health) and from an
attempt to discipline regulatory rulemaking by demanding scientific justification
for any regulatory decision.
Scientific proof is supplied by mainstream science based on reasoning from the
experimental evidence.15 The minority scientific views do, of course, matter, but
only when they bring with them convincing evidence. And if they are convincing,
in a normal scientific development, they are expected to become a part of new
mainstream views.16
                                                           
12 The use of fertilizers and pesticides is several times lower in Poland than in the EU countries.
See Rolnictwo i gospodarka zywnosciowa w Polsce w aspekcie integracji z Unia Europejska,
Report of the Polish Ministry of Agriculture, Warsaw, 2002, p. 13.
13 See The Guardian Weekend, 25 August 2001, http://education.guardian.co.uk/higher/
research/story/0,9865,542111,00.html.
14 According to the data from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimate 76
million gastrointestinal illnesses, 325,000 serious illnesses and 5,000 deaths each year from
foodborne illness in the United States. The economic impact resulting from medical costs and
productivity losses for diseases caused by five key foodborne bacterial pathogens totals $8.3
billion annually see Thomas J. Billy (2002) ‘HACCP a work in progress’, in Food
Control, 13, p. 359-362.
15 No serious scientist would subscribe to the radically sociological view on science expressed,
for instance, by Bruno Latour, who, according to Sokal and Bricmont (Alan Sokal, Jean
Bricmont [1998] Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science
Piccador), challenged as anachronistic the report of French scientists who examined the
mummy of Ramses II and declared that the pharaoh had died of tuberculosis, because the
tuberculosis bacillus came into existence only when Robert Koch discovered it in 1882.
16 ‘An interpretation that accepts the minority opinions of consultants as “risk assessment”
effectively converts scientific evidence requirements into minimal procedural hurdles that can
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T he re quir e ment to pr ese nt sc ie ntif ic pr oof s for food saf e ty r e gula tions ser ve s, as
w a s, for insta nc e, expr e ssed in the WT O SPS (Phytosa nita r y Pr otoc ol) , to limit, if
not to exc lude , the insta nce s of the ar bitr a r y use of food saf e ty re gula tions to pr ote c t
dome stic pr oduc e rs fr om fore ign competition. Food sa f e ty re gula tions should not
be come te c hnic a l ba r r ie r s to tr ade , nor be a pa r t of the str a tegic use of re gula tions. 17
Strictly speaking food safety regulations, if applied equally to domestic and
foreign producers, are not a discriminatory measure, but can still be called
protectionist measures since they might increase rivals’ costs as domestic
producers are usually better suited to meet them.18
Uncertainty intrinsic to many scientific results should not serve as an easy
justification for the introduction of tighter food safety regulations. Science-based
regulatory making is contested not because of the knowledge of scientific disputes,
but because the refutation to accept scientific arguments often serves to exploit
ignorance, misunderstandings, people’s desire to return to nature and irrational
fears so common in contemporary societies which want to enjoy the benefits of
technological progress without incurring its risks.
2.3 The Public Quest for Safety: Public Expectations and Regulatory Feasibility
No scientific evidence matters if citizens are frightened enough by influential
books, other publications or the media.19 This case is best illustrated by a ban on
the pesticide DDT introduced in the US in 1972 in the wake of a book by an
influential American media person, Rachel Carson, entitled ‘Silent Spring’. The
ban was introduced despite numerous scientific testimonies which concluded that:
DDT is not a carcinogenic hazard to man... DDT is not a mutagenic or
teratogenic hazard to man… The use of DDT under the regulations
involved here does not have a deleterious effect on freshwater fish,
estuarine organisms, wild birds or other wildlife.20
Governments want to reassure their citizens about food safety risks. But they
f ac e dif ficulties in conveying the simple me ssage tha t food saf ety is alw ays a matte r 
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be met easily by any determined regulators, high-minded and protectionists alike’ introducing
into an international trade system the element of American tort system with its high litigiosity
(Alan O. Sykes [2002] ‘Exploring the Need for International Harmonization: Domestics
Regulation, Sovereignty and Scientific Evidence Requirements: A Pessimistic View’, in
Chicago Journal of International Law, Fall).
17 See David Orden and Donna Roberts (eds.) (1997) Understanding Technical Barriers to
Agriculture Trade The International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.
18 They can, for instance, not apply hormone treatment of animals and the ban on it does not
affect them.
19 See Joanne Cantor (2002) ‘Fright Reactions to Mass Media’, in Jennings Bryant, Dolf
Zillmann (2002) Media Effects: Advances in Theory and Research, LEA Publishers: London.
20 See The DDT Ban By Steven Milloy, Copyright 2000 Junkscience.com, January 1, 2000,
http://www.junkscience.com/jan00/century.htm
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of degree, that risks are lower or higher, but there is no world of zero risk. For this
reason even ‘The FDA does not state that American food is so safe that only 1 in 10
million Americans will be killed by bacteria contamination, but rather it declares
that food is safe and makes unqualified commitments to maintaining this safety’.21
People do react to what might be called an emotive side of food safety issues,
and this reaction is strengthened by the fact that health is central to other personal
values, that the majority of risks to health cannot be organoleptically identified, and
that the causes of these risks are difficult to understand for a layman. What seems
to matter for people’s attitudes to food-related health risk is not so much the nature
of risk as the dimensions that characterize the risks.22
The outcomes of psychological research indicate that attitudes towards risk
(these attitudes can be placed on the axis from risk-proness to risk-averseness)
depend on the following risk descriptors:
– Whether risk is taken voluntarily or involuntarily;
– Whe ther the eff ects of exposure to risk are felt immediately or with
a delay ( this delay c an sometimes be an inter genera tional one);23
– Whether the risk is concentrated in space or diffused;
– Whether the risk is catastrophic or it is a recurrent risk;24
– W he ther the risk is one of morta lity or one of illness (morbidity). 25
The high scare factor of foodborne risks makes food safety regulations
dependent on today’s public opinion pressures, which might make them ill-targeted
and thus ineffective and inefficient. ‘Smart risk regulation’ cannot be passed or
implemented in the havoc of media-induced food panic. Risk regulation should be
based, as is argued by Cass R. Sunstein, on science and procedures requiring a
comprehensive analysis of its costs and benefits.26
2.4 Approaches to Risk Regulation
Approaches to risk regulation can crudely be divided into a technological and
economic approach. In principle the two could go together, but there is often a
strong tension between them.
                                                           
21 Richard J. Zeckhauser, W. Kip Viscusi (1996) ‘The Risk Management Dilemma’, in The
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, May.
22 That it might derive from the consumption of food.
23 As J.M. Keynes used to say ‘Long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run
we are all dead’, in ‘A Tract on Monetary Reform’, chapter 3, London 1924.
24 That is, it happens once.
25 Adapted from Paul Slovic (2000) The Perception of Risk, Earthscan, p. 173.
26 Cass R. Sunstein (2002) Risk and reason: safety, law and the environment, New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press.
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The technological approach to risk regulation seeks, as its name suggests, to
find a technical solution to all health and safety risks. It applies technical devices to
risk-bearing equipment and technical controls to risk situations. This approach
usually does not take into account either the changes in the behavior of individual
risk-takers, or the cost tradeoffs. It tends to be preferred by governments of rich and
risk-averse societies.
The economic approach to risk regulation starts from an assumption that the
proper role of the government is not to eliminate the risk, but to attenuate market
failures which cause an inefficient balance between risk reduction and its costs.
When drafting a regulation, public authorities should identify cases in which
regulation can generate more benefits to society than the costs incurred due to the
regulatory intervention and to regulate only when a draft regulation passes this test.
The technological approach to risk regulation favors specification standards,
which specify the technology that a firm must use, whereas the economic approach
tends to favor performance standards which impose the requirements that a firm
must achieve a specified level of product quality (safety) without specifying the
technology that must be used to achieve the standard.27 Generally, policy analysts
argue that, whenever possible, it is better to rely on performance standards than on
specification standards as the former give firms a chance to find the most efficient
way to conform to the standard.28
2.5 Regulatory Trade-Offs: Safety Effects of Regulation Induced Wealth
Changes
Regulations impose costs on food producers and distributors. These costs are called
compliance costs and they are measured as the change (an increase) in the costs of
production induced by compliance with the performance (or specification) standard
imposed by the regulator.29
Usually regulatory costs are justified by a reference to expected benefits from
regulation in the form of a decreased rate of mortality or a decreased rate of
morbidity. But, as Joseph M. Antle noted, the balancing of regulatory costs and
                                                           
27 The typology of standards has been developed by Anthony Ogus in his (1994) Regulation:
legal form and economic theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
28 See the discussion in: Paulette L. Stenzel (2000) ‘Can the ISO 14000 Series Environmental
Management Standards Provide a Viable Alternative to Government Regulation?’, in
American Business Law Journal, Winter.
29 Other costs resulting from food safety regulations include: court imposed fines; the cost of
civil damages awarded to downstream users, including final consumers; reduced revenues
due to the loss of reputation and ‘goodwill’ arising from adverse publicity; the costs of
product recalls; the costs of investigating possible negligence by a supplier and the costs of
legal services (legal fees).
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benefits is not an easy task, as the calculation of benefits is based on several
uncertain assumptions:
The goal of statutory food safety regulation is to mandate that firms
produce higher quality, i.e. safer, products for consumers. The key
reason why it is difficult to design regulations to do this, and why it is
difficult to measure the benefits and costs of these regulations, is that
food safety itself is difficult to measure. Information about the various
quality attributes of food products is imperfect for consumers, producers,
government regulators, and researchers, and this is particularly true
when microbial pathogens are involved. These pathogens cannot be
readily observed or tested in the production process, and their health
effects are often difficult for consumers to identify after a food product
is consumed. Thus, a key challenge in modeling and measuring the
benefits and costs of food safety regulation is to devise methods that can
make the best use of the limited and imperfect data that are available. As
recent experience in the United States with regulatory impact assessment
shows, the data that are currently available provide, at best, highly
uncertain estimates of benefits and costs of new regulations.30
Measuring the benefits of health safety regulations is not a simple task and it
becomes even more difficult when we allow for the indirect health effects of
regulation-induced changes (reductions) in consumers’ income. This problem can
be explicated in the following way: food safety regulations impose costs which are
expressed as compliance costs, and which lead to price increases. This increase in
turn reduces people’s disposable incomes with adverse consequences for their
consumption choices. A given regulation may thus lead to a reduction of death (or
morbidity) by a given percentage, but if its implementation costs (joint compliance
and opportunity costs) are too high, the end result might be an offsetting (or even
greater) human loss due to increased death and morbidity resulting from the fall in
GDP and personal incomes.31 The comprehensive analysis of costs and benefits
requires that the scope of analysis be broadened from the effects of a regulation on
the likelihood of one hazard, to the analysis of its impact on other hazards and
eventually to the analysis of its impact on the society’s overall welfare.
2.6 Alternatives to Statutory Regulation
Statutory food safety regulations are not always the best (that is the most effective
and efficient) means of enhancing food safety. It is worth remembering that there
are alternatives to publicly mandated rules, and as a rule of thumb, before
embarking on the path of statutory food regulations one should analyze its least
restrictive alternatives whose comparative advantages should be assessed in the
                                                           
30 John M. Antle (1999) ‘Benefits and costs of food safety regulation’, in Food Policy, 24,
p. 605-623.
31 An accessible presentation of this argument can be found in W. Kip Viscusi (1998) Rational
Risk Policy, Clarendon Press.
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specific socio-institutional context. The list of the most important alternatives to
statutory regulations includes:
– Education and information. Consumers themselves may
influence the probability of contracting foodborne diseases by
properly handling food products. Foods should be properly
chilled and kept cold during processing, distribution, sale
and storage. Meat and poultry products should be kept
refrigerated until just prior to cooking.32 Informing the public
about the composition, proper ways of food handling and
probable health effects may be a voluntary action by food
producers or distributors or may be an obligation stemming from
public regulations.33
– Technology changes. New options for controlling pathogens in
food might come with the creation of new methods of food
treatment. One such method, which has been approved by the
American food safety agency but is still strongly contested by
consumer movements in the US and elsewhere, is irradiation.34
– Stimulating market responses to food safety problems. Some
food safety problems flow from the lack of consumer
information and from weak market incentives to provide this
information. A preliminary question before embarking on
government regulations is whether these market failures cannot
be diminished by altering the structure of the incentives that
market players face. The latter can be done by, for instance,
making changes in the liability law.35
Regulating food safety, it has to be repeated, is a complex issue, but public
authorities have various policy instruments, which they have to use to optimize the
combined outcomes of their interventions. The choice of proper ways to regulate
                                                           
32 A research by Neis and van Laanen (Nies, J. I. And P.G. van Laanen [1995] ‘Effect of Safe
Handling Programming on Participants’ Food Handling Behaviors’, in Family and Consumer
Science Research Journal, Vol. 24, No. 2, Dec., p. 161-179) showed that when consumers
were educated about food safety principles, the number of people consuming rare or pink
hamburgers (that is undercooked) fell by 73 percent and other unsafe behaviors decreased.
33 See the discussion about the food labelling of food produced with addition of transgenetic
components in the EU (http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/fl/fl_index_en.html).
34 Irradiation is a ionizing radiation composed of short wavelengths capable of damaging
microorganisms such as those that contaminate food or cause food spoilage and deterioration.
For the discussion of consumers resistance to irradiated food see: Nayga, R. M. (2003) ‘Will
consumers accept irradiated food products?’, in International Journal of Consumer Studies,
July, Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 220-220 (1).
35 Firms’ increased attention to food safety may also result their care for good reputation.
160
food safety should be made according to scientific analysis done by a community
of professional regulatory policies analysts and not because of short-term political
convenience or irrational public scares.36
In the perspective of this paper it is worth stressing that contemporary food
safety regulations increasingly rely on mixed solutions, the overall evaluation of
which requires an attention to institutional details and in particular to the
difficulties in implementing these regulations and limiting their plausible
unintended effects.
3. The EU and Food Safety: Between Reliance on Scientific Evidence
and Responsiveness to Public Fears
3.1 EU Food Safety Regulations in the Pre-BSE Era
It can hardly be said that EU food safety regulations have been shaped exclusively
by scientific evidence and careful policy analysis. Rather new European initiatives
in the area of food safety have been driven by food scares and especially
BSE crises.37
The question addressed below is how these recent developments in EU
food safety policies might have affected the capacity of the EU to effectively
influence the changes in food safety systems in candidate countries in the pre-
accession period.
Ellen Vos38 describes a pre-BSE crisis EU food safety regime as developed ad
hoc and predominantly under the influence of the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Justice. She points out that with regard to food safety assessment the
Community used to resort to committees and especially to the Scientific Committee
on Foodstuffs (SCF) composed of independent scientists; the Standing Committee
on Foodstuffs (StCF) consisting of national representatives; and the Advisory
Committee on Foodstuffs (ACF) composed of representatives of various interest
groups. The SCF supplied scientific evidence, the ACF supplied opinions of
interests involved, and the StCF ensured the political approval of the Member
States at the risk management stage.
                                                           
36 This observation seems obvious, but it should be repeated when one observes a disparity in
the expenditures on policy analysis between the US and Europe (see A. Martino [1996]
Aiutare lo Stato a Pensare, FGA Torino).
37 See Ellen Vos (2000) ‘EU Food Safety Regulation in the aftermath of the BSE crisis’, in
Journal of Consumer Policy, Vol. 23, p. 227-255; Sebastian Krapohl (2003) ‘Risk Regulation
in the EU between Interests and Expertise: the Case of BSE’, in Journal of European Public
Policy, April, p. 189-207, Skogstad Grace (2001) ‘The WTO and Food Safety Regulatory
Policy Innovation in the European Union’, in Journal of Common Market Studies,
September, Vol. 39, No. 3, p. 485-505 (21).
38 Op. cit. p. 229-240.
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Until the mid-1990s this pragmatic way of dealing with food safety issues
seemed to function relatively well, but the BSE crisis shattered the positive image
of the Commission’s regulatory actions. The report of the EP Temporary
Committee of Inquiry into BSE in February 1997, revealed the shortcomings of
‘the committee model’, highlighting the political pressure exercised on formally
independent members of the SCF, the scarce coordination and cooperation between
the various DGs of the Commission active in the field of food safety, and most
seriously, a true policy of disinformation on the part of the Commission.
3.2 The Commission’s New Approach to Food Safety
In response to the perception of crisis in the EU food safety regime, the European
Commission has laid down a conceptual and institutional basis for a new approach
to food safety issues.
The first change introduced might be called an institutional streamlining. This
consisted in bringing together all responsibilities for feed and food safety issues
within the Directorate General for Health and Consumer Protection called, for the
sake of simplicity, the DG Sanco.
Next, in a communication on ‘Consumer Health and Food Safety’, the
Commission formulated the three basic principles of its new approachnamely,
the separation of the responsibility for scientific advice from the responsibility for
legislation and for implementation control from information and communication
policies.39 This change might be called the separation of food safety policies into
risk assessment, risk management and risk communication.
In the following ‘Green Paper on the General Principles of Food Law in the
EU’,40 the Commission announced that it would like to ensure free movement of
foods within the internal market, science based risk assessment and greater
competitiveness of European food exports by placing greater responsibility for food
safety on the food processing industry and increasing the effectiveness of official
food control and enforcement. This line of changes is further developed in the
Commission’s ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on official feed and food controls’, which stresses the need to develop a
comprehensive audit system.41
Finally, in a White Paper on Food Safety published in January 200042 the
Commission announced that it would like to base its food safety policy on a
‘comprehensive and integrated approach’ which covers the whole food chain ‘from
farm to table’. It proclaimed that risk analysis will be the basis of its food safety
                                                           
39 ‘Co nsumer Healt h and Food Safety’ , in Communica tion (1997) 1 83 Fin al. of 30 Apr il 199 7.
40 The Gen e ra l Pri nc ip l es o f Foo d Law i n t he Eu ro pe a n Un io n COM (9 7) 1 7 6 30 Ap ri l 1 99 7.
41 COM/2003/0052 final–COD 2003/0030.
42 The White Paper on Food Safety of January 12, 2000 (COM [1999]) 719 final.
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regulatory policies, that risk analysis will be based on the best scientific advice
thanks to another institutional innovationthe establishment of the European Food
Safety Authority with the task of providing independent scientific advice on food
safety issues, collect and analyze data related to food safety issues, identify and
warn about emerging risks, support the Commission in the case of crisis and
communicate to the general public on food safety related issues.43
The direction of changes in the EU food safety regime is summarized in the
table below.
Table 1
Evolution of EU Food Safety Control: From Controlling to Auditing
Control approach Audit approach
(EU legal base Council Directive 93/43/EEC
of 14 June 1993), COM (2000) 438(03) and
Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on official feed
and food controls
/* COM/2003/0052 final – COD 2003/0030 */
Reactivity: controls mostly when food
has entered the market.
Precaution: controlling producers food
operators practices
Virtual comprehensiveness:
commitment to control all threats to
food safety
Selectivity: intervening in critical points
Sectoriality: controls of different risks
are handled differently
Completeness: Controls lacunas and
overlapping get canceled
Community financing: Costs of running
control system fall mostly on the EU
budget
Dispersed financing: Costs of running control
systems fall mostly on food businesses
                                                           
43 The Regulation of the Council of Ministers from 28th January, 2002, Regulation EC
(178/2002).
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3.3 Dilemmas of the EU Food Safety Regime
In spite of continuing reforms the present European food safety regime is not free
from conceptual and institutional ambiguities: it stresses the importance of science
in risk analysis, but at the same time, via a certain interpretation of the
precautionary principle,44 remains open to the influence of extra-scientific
considerations, the administration of food safety regulation is not free from
political interference, thus undermining the credibility of European food safety
regulations,45 it intends to rely more on food industry self-regulation and
companies’ social responsibility but it also tries to enhance the controlling power of
public inspectors and enforcement services and it struggles to reduce ‘the
implementation gap’ stemming from the fact that regulations are made
internationally, but executed nationally. The European Commission, in its
development of European food safety policy, is struggling to balance three goals: to
minimize the threat to public safety, to reduce regulatory tensions among the EU
member states and to minimize possible conflicts with the rest of the world over
food safety issues.
The creation of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) could have been
instrumental to balancing these goals as an independent regulator is better suited to
assure scientific excellence, to be impartial with regard to national interests and less
susceptible to the accusations of using regulations as a protectionist device.
However, the EU has not exploited the opportunity to create an independent
European food safety regulatory authority and has limited the tasks of the EFSA
chiefly to risk assessment.46
The conceptual and institutional drawbacks indicated above reduce the capacity
of the European Commission to act credibly and effectively vis-à-vis member states
and third countries. Nevertheless the European Commission possesses powerful
policy safety instruments which can be used to improve food safety risks to
European consumers. However, for reasons of space, only two of the numerous
policy instruments in the hand of the European Commission will be discussed here.
                                                           
44 Giandomenico Majone (2002) ‘The Precautionary Principle and its Policy Implications’, in
Journal of Common Market Studies, March, Vol. 40, No. 1, p. 89-109 (21), reprinted as
chapter 2 in this volume.
45 Giandomenico Majone (2000) ‘The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation’, in Journal
of Common Market Studies, June, Vol. 38, No. 2, p. 273-302 (30).
46 The EFSA could test among others the idea of regulatory network as many member states
have recently created national food safety agencies and have entrusted them the task of
regulating food safety. National food safety agencies were created in: Great Britain
(May 1997–the Food Standards Agency); in France (April 1999–the Agence française de la
sécurité sanitaire des aliments), in Finland (the National Food Agency), in Ireland (1998–the
Food Safety Authority of Ireland) and in Sweden (the Swedish National Food Administration
(NFA), in Belgium (February 2000–the Belgian Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food
Chain).
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The two which seem most symptomatic of the ongoing changes in the EU food
safety regime. The first instrument is applied to external trade partners (called
‘third parties’), the second is developed with view to being applied to internal agro-
alimentary businesses. The former instrument is referred to here as market access
requirements, the latter as an audit technique.
3.4 Market Access as a Food Safety Instrument
The core of this instrument consists of rules that are applied to the importation of
live animals and animal products from third countries.47 The rules impose safety
and supervisory standards which are equal or at least equivalent to the rules applied
in the trade among EU member countries. Before getting an approval for exports to
the EU countries a third country is inspected by the Food and Veterinary Office
(FVO), which checks whether the EU veterinary requirements are met. This policy
instr ument was applie d to EU ca ndida te countr ie s eve n bef or e the y applie d for the 
E U me mber ship. The Food and Ve ter ina ry Off ic e (FV O ) ha s ca r r ie d out seve r a l
inspe c tions in candidate countr ie s sinc e the la te 1990s.48 The ir pur pose is to
c e rtif ica te food pr oduc e r s in orde r to give the m ‘ma r ke t ac c ess’ to the EU .49 Beside s
‘ ordina ry missions’ , the FVO ha s conduc ted se ve r a l spe c ia l asse ssme nt missions
to the applica nt c ountr ie s w ith a view to assessing the ir food saf e ty system. 
                                                           
47 The list of veterinary rules applied in such cases has been recently updated and published in
the Food and Veterinary Office document entitled: ‘General Guidance to Third Country
National Authorities on the Rules to Be Followed For the Import of Live Animals and
Animal Products into EU from Third Countries’ 23 January 2003.
48 The missi ons ar e carr ied un der th e prov ision of the follo wing Communi ty leg al act s: Commissio n
Dec ision 86/474 /EEC o f 11 Septemb er 198 6; Commiss ion De cision 98/14 0/EC o f 4 Fe bruary 
199 8 and Counci l Deci sion 9 5/408/ EC of June 1 995.
49 The permission for imports of food (meat in particular) are issued based on the following EU
regulations:
Council Directive 72/462/EEC on health and veterinary inspection problems upon
importation of bovine, ovine and caprine animals and swine, fresh meat or meat products
from third countries (as last amended) – OJ No. L302, 31/12/1972, p. 28.
Council Directive 92/118/EEC laying down animal health and public health requirements
governing trade in and imports into the Community of products not subject to the said
requirements laid down in specific Community rules referred to in Annex A(I) to Directive
89/662/EEC and, as regards pathogens, to Directive 90/425/EEC – OJ No. L62, 17/12/1992,
p. 19.
Council Directive 94/65/EC laying down the requirements for the production and placing on
the market of minced meat and meat preparations – OJ No. L368, 31/12/1994, p. 10.
Cou ncil Directi ve 96/ 93/EC on the certi ficati on of animal s and animal produ cts – OJ No . 13 ,
1 6/ 01 /1 9 97 , p . 97 .
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Table 2
List of special veterinary missions to assess the conditions of food production in
Poland
03/04-07/04/2000 - Special mission to assess the conditions for production of fresh meat,
meat preparations and meat products
31/01-04/02/2000 - Special mission to assess the level of residues in live animals &
animal products
31/01-04/02/2000 - Special mission to assess the conditions for production of game and
rabbit meat
27/09-01/10/1999 - Special mission to assess the quality of fishery products
03/05-07/05/1999 - Special mission to analyze public health issues
23-25-26/03/1999 - Special mission to assess animal welfare during transport
08/06-13/06/98 - Special mission to assess the conditions for production of dairy
products
Source: FVO http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/inspections/index_en.html.
The task of ordinary missions is to assess the state of individual food processing
plants in order to issue them an export licence, whereas special missions serve to
assess a general state of food safety in a given industry in order to approve the
readiness of a country to join the single market. The former is a judgment about an
individual case; the latter is to a large extent a judgment about the shape of a food
safety regime.
EU veterinary missions are unlikely to have been misled by the host country’s
decisions where they should go, what they should see and whom they should meet,
since the programme of each mission is set by mutual agreement and mission
officers could change the programme at will.50 So meeting the requests of FVO
inspections is a test for loyal cooperation in assuring food safety.
In the particular case of candidate countries the outcomes of special missions
were of special importance as they were used to assess the progress of candidate
countries towards the fulfillment of membership conditions.51
                                                           
50 Accepting the wish of mission’s inspector to alter the route is in itself an act of signaling
good will and hence a credibility enhancing device. Just think: if the wish of inspectors is not
met, they would register this fact in the final report and suspicion will arise that some
irregularities are being hidden.
51 This falls under Heather Grabbe’s category of ‘gate-keeping mechanism’, in which the
outcomes of such controls are used to let candidate countries pass to further stages in the
accession process. See ‘Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU
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3.5 The Emergence of Regulatory Auditing
The second policy instrument which is increasingly applied in the interest of
food safety consists of the move from direct food controls to regulatory auditing.
This move has been facilitated by the propagation of HACCP (Hazard Analysis
and Critical Control Points) as a method of producer’s controlling themselves.
HACCP was originally developed by food businesses. Following the developments
in US food safety regulations, the EC has tried to promote indirect methods,
including HACCP, for the control of food safety. It does so by requiring all food
processing plants to implement HACCP as their own inspection system.52 The
HACCP system strives to reduce human exposure to foodborne pathogens by
requiring processing plants to scrutinize the critical control points in the production
process—points where food safety hazards can be prevented, reduced to an
acceptable level or eliminated.53
Placing HACCP at the core of food safety regulatory developments leads to two
major changes in food safety policies: firstly, food safety inspections can move
from direct food safety controls to regulatory audits; secondly, the costs of food
safety controls are shifted from the budget of the government to the food processor.
The implementation of HACCP requires that the results of the company’s
internal controls be registered at critical points. Inspectors of food safety agency
can then examine these records virtually ‘in real time’, as these reports can be
transferred via internet to the central files of the food safety agency. The auditing is
enhanced by a parallel, albeit rare sampling of the processed food for laboratory
examinations, but the proportions shift: food testing becomes above all own
responsibility of food processors. Furthermore, such a change alters the distribution
of costs stemming from food safety controls. The public food safety agency
initially invests in educating the industry in the HACCP method and then starts
controlling HACCP implementation plans and monitoring the way companies run
their own HACCP system. External controls are supposed first to certify the
HACCP and next to control the way it is run. This change of method trusts
producers, lowers the cost of controls, and allows a better targeting of the use of
control resources.54
                                                           (contd.)
Accession Process’, in K. Featherstone, C. Radaelli (eds.) (2003) The Politics of
Europeanization, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
52 EU Council Directive 92/46/EEC.
53 A si n g l e a n d a u t ho r i t at i v e f o o d s a f e ty a ge n c y wo u l d n o t o n l y a s s ume f ul l r es p o n si b i l it y fo r 
r i sk a s se s s men t an d r is k man a g e me n t , b u t i t wou l d he l p to s t re a mli n e th e i mp l e men t a t io n of 
i n du s t r y p r o ce s s s t a n da r d s s i n c e ‘ I n co n s is t e n t HACCP i mpl e me nt a t io n i s j u s t o n e o f n ume r ou s 
p r ob l e ms t h a t a r is e f ro m h av i n g s e v e ra l ag e n c ie s wit h s ep a r a te r es p o n si b i l it i e s f o r fo o d s a f e ty 
r e gu l a t io n ’ , Ca r ol i n e Smi t h De Wa a l ( 20 0 3 ) ‘ Sa f e f o od f r om a co n s u me r p er s p ec t i ve’ , i n Fo od 
Co nt r o l , Vo l . 14 .
54 Estimated benefits from the introduction of HACCP in the US vary very widely. Thus
for instance Stephen R. Crutchield et al. (S. R. Crutchfield, Jean C. Buzby, Tanya Roberts,
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It seems justified to say that the European food safety regime shows
characteristics of both an enforcement and a management regime55, since, as in a
typical enforcement regime, the European Commission can monitor and sanction
for misbehavior, and similarly to other international management regimes, the EC
can help member countries to enhance the technical and institutional capacities to
meet their commitments.
4. The Polish Food Safety Regime: Factors Influencing the Pace of its
Changes in Response to the EU Regulatory Requirements
Food safety regulations are a crucial element of Poland’s system for protecting
public health. As in all modern food safety regimes the basic responsibility rests
with producers, while the state (via its specialized services) issues general rules of
conduct and controls their implementation.
The accession to the EU has been influencing the developments in the Polish
food safety regime since the EU food safety regime is a ‘deep international policy
regime’56 and adjustments required from an accession country are deemed by local
food safety experts as significant.57
It is likely that changes in food safety regulations will affect developments in
the whole Polish agro-alimentary sector in the long run, but it seems also true that
the functioning of the food safety regime will be, at least in the short run,
influenced by peculiar features of the Polish agriculture and food industry.
It is thus important to sketch out the most important features of the Polish
agriculture and food industry (AFI) as the readiness to adjust the food safety regime
and the capacity to meet the requirements depend to a large extent on the structural
features of the Polish AFI.
                                                           (contd.)
Michael Ollinger and C-T. Jordan Lin [1997] ‘An Economic Assessment of Food Safety
Regulations’, in USDA, Agriculture Economic Report No. 755) estimate that economic
benefits from the introduction of HACCP controls may stay within the range of $1.9 billion
to $171.8 billion depending on the effectiveness of HACCP implementation.
55 Aft er Jon as Tal lberg, see: Jonas Tal lberg (2002) ‘Path to Co mplian ce: En forcement,
Man agemen t, and the Europea n Unio n’, in Internati onal Organiz ation, Summer, p. 609- 643.
56 The term ‘deep regime’ has been introduced by George W. Downs, David M. Rocke and
Peter N. Barsoom ‘Is the Good News about Compliance, Good News about Cooperation?’, in
International Organization, No. 3/1996, p. 379-406.
57 See D. Banati (2003) ‘The EU and Candidate Countries: How to Cope with Food Safety
Policies?’ in Food Control, No. 2, March, p. 89-93.
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Table 3
Size distribution of farms in Poland (as of 1996)
Size group (ha) Number Land area (ha) Average size (ha)
1-2 462,206 650,634 1.41
2-5 667,588 2,199,048 3.29
5-7 260,713 1,541,820 5.91
7-10 260,103 2,171,527 8.35
10-15 217,202 2,631,547 12.12
>15 173,568 5,064,957 29.18
Total 2,041,380 14,259,525 6.99
Source: Siemienski (1999) ‘The Change of property and area structure of Agriculture in Poland
and Wielkopolska Region between 1988 and 1996’, in S. Paszkowski (ed.) Determinanty
transformacji struktury agrarnej w rolnictwie polskim czesc I, Poznan, p. 327-338.
Table 4
Agro-alimentary products in Polish foreign trade according to destination
(in m USD)
Exports Imports Trade balance
1999 2000 2001 1999 2000 2001 1999 2000 2001
EU 1,277 1,287 1,456 1,615 1,622 1,790 -338 -335 -334
Former
SU
662 602 608 74 106 113 588 496 495
CEFTA 283 316 353 289 352 325 -6 -37 28
EFTA 29 30 40 150 140 174 -121 -110 -134
USA 100 107 116 108 74 81 -8 34 35
Others 317 308 457 1,139 888 923 -822 -581 -466
Total 2,668 2,650 3,030 3,374 3,183 3,406 -707 -533 -376
Source: GUS (Main Statistical Office)
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4.1 Structural Conditions: The Weight of Agriculture and Food Industry in the
Polish Economy
Agriculture accounts for 3.3 percent of the Polish GDP (as compared with 2
percent in the EU), but employs 18.8 percent of all working people (as compared to
4.4 percent in the EU).58 Agriculture productivity in Poland is much lower than in
the EU, but it has been steadily rising since the mid-1990s. In 1999 the Polish food-
processing industry employed 480,000 employees and the value of processed food
production amounted to 12 bl USD. By the late 1990s the productivity of the Polish
food industry was rising yearly by more than 10 percent.59
Polish agriculture is composed of 1.88 m individual farms of an average size
equal to 9.5 ha (as against an average size of farm equal to 18.4 ha in the EU).
About half of all Polish farms do not produce for the market but only for
themselves. Furthermore, it is estimated that agriculture activities of these farms are
value subtracting, that is, their owners subsidize agriculture production from
incomes derived from other sources.60 Only farms larger than 10 ha generate at
least part of their income from agricultural production.
Food expenditur es ac count for 30-35 per ce nt of fa mily budgets (as compar e d
w ith an aver a ge 17- 18 pe r ce nt in the EU c ountr ie s). Possible food pr ic e inc re ase s due 
to changes in f ood saf ety r egula tion will thus be str ongly f e lt by Polish c onsumer s. 61
Equally high market fragmentation characterizes the Polish food industry. Post-
communist economic transformations resulted in a myriad of small enterprises in
the food-processing industry. Out of more than 30,000 enterprises active in the
food industry, only 1523 (as of 2001) employ more than 50 persons. The process of
the concentration of food-processing industry in Poland is slow, apart from the
brewing industry, the production of vegetal oils and the production of feed for
animals, and small- and medium-size enterprises dominate all branches of the food
industry. Food processing is not very profitable and almost 1/3 of functioning
enterprises show financial losses.62 This makes these enterprises unwilling and
                                                           
58 The data come from Susan Senior Nello (2002) Food and Agriculture in an Enlarged EU,
EUI Working Papers, RSC No. 2002/58, p. 3.
59 These data come from the Polish diplomatic sources: http://www.poland.org.au/trade/pdf/
food.pdf.
60 UKIE (2003) The Balance of Costs and Benefits of Poland’s Accession the EU (Bilans
korzysci i kosztow przystapienia Polski do UE), April, p. 111.
61 According to the estimations done by the Office of the Committee for European Integration
(UKIE) the application of food safety regulations might result in the increase of food prices
by 4-5% and this mainly due to the forced change in the components used for food
production see: Costs of production might rise, in Rzeczpospolita, from 14 February 2003.
62 The data in this section come from the Report ‘Rolnictwo i gospodarka zywnosciowa w
Polsce w aspekcie integracji z Unia Europejska’, Warszawa, 2002, different pages.
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unable to invest much in the modernization of their production processes and in the
compliance costs of meeting food safety regulations.
Pol a nd a nd ot he r ca ndi da te count r ie s do not pl a y an y imp or ta n t ro le in the EU 
f oo d imp or ts. But the EU co untr i e s ac c oun t for 43 pe r c e n t of Poli sh ag r ic ul tur e 
e xp or ts and 48 pe r c e nt of a gr ic u ltur e imp or ts. The ma in ite m in Pola nd ’ s im por ts 
f r o m the EU c ount r ie s is an ima l fe e ds and in the co untr y ’ s ex por t s liv e ani ma ls
a nd me a t . 
Difficulties in meeting EU quality standards and low experience in international
marketing seem to be the main reasons for a poor performance of Poland’s exports
to the EU countries.
It is expected that the rise of productivity will lead to accelerated concentration
in farming and also in food production, causing problems with the dislocation of
the workforce, but at the same time facilitating the control of food safety.
4.2 Domestic Determinants of Food Safety Policy
4.2.1 Public Awareness of Food Risks
The European public has been always concerned about food safety, but especially
so since the outbreak of the BSE crisis.63 It is not surprising that the EC and
national politicians try to ensure the public that the current enlargement will not
compromise food safety purposes.64
The EC has a variety of instruments to reduce threats to food safety coming
from the current enlargement. But their task would be made easier if, among other
things, the food safety preferences of consumers in the present member states were
the same as those in the candidate countries. Here I look at the preferences of
Polish consumers.
These data seem to show that Polish society has a different perception of food
threats, with less fear of BSE and other (like swine fever and dioxin) food scares so
diffused in Western Europe. Responding to a survey made in December 2000, that
is, after scientists had established a high probability of a link between BSE and a
new variant of Creutzfeld-Jakob disease in humans, 58 percent Polish respondents
                                                           
63 It seems, moreover, that Europeans place their trust with regard to food safety in the hands of
public authorities. Thus, for instance, a Eurobarometer Survey from September 1998 reports
that foodstuffs inspire more confidence in consumers when they have undergone national
(66%) or European (43%) controls, as opposed to controls carried out by distributors.
64 Thus for instance, Laurens J. Brinkhorst, Dutch Minister of Agriculture, Nature
Management and Fisheries speaking on 21 March 2002 emphasised ‘Much more attention in
the accession process should be paid to food safety. Without safe food no market
performance, without market performance no (real) integration’ (http://www.minlnv.nl/
actueel/speech/2002/speech015.html).
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said that they did not feel threatened by BSE as they believed that Polish cattle had
not been affected by the disease. In June 2002, after the press reports that in May
2002 the first case of BSE had been identified 34% of respondents still said they
did not believe in the existence of BSE in Poland.
Table 5
Beliefs in the safety of domestic cattle
In some countries of the EU cases of BSE have been registered. Do you believe that
Polish cattle are affected by this disease?
Date of the survey December 2000 June 2002
Yes 19% 51%
No 58% 34%
Difficult to say 22% 15%
CBOS: December 2000 and June 2002, (CBOS–Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej).
In the case of Poland the perception of the BSE risk should be related to the
perception of domestic food safety practices, as imports of meat to Poland are low
and in the case of bovine insignificant (see the table below).
Table 6
Imports of meat to Poland (data for 1Q 2002)
Type of meat Imports in tons
Pork 1262
Beef 3
Sheep meet 146
Poultry 6298
Source: Glowny Lekarz Weterynarii (http://www.wetgiw.gov.pl/).
The information about BSE has not in fact provoked major changes in the
dietary habits of Poles. In December 2000 some 61 percent of respondents declared
that they had not ceased eating bovine, and in June 2002 (that is after the
identification of the first BSE case in Poland) this number had fallen only slightly
to 54 percent.
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Table 7
Modification of diet under the impact of BSE (in percentage)
The date of surveyHave you, in response to the
information about BSE,
limited or stopped the
consumption of bovine? January 1998 December 2000 June 2002
Yes, I have entirely stopped
eating bovine
6 15 10
I have limited my
consumption of bovine
16 24 17
I do not eat bovine for other
reasons like taste
16 21 17
I have not ceased nor
limited the amount of
bovine
61 37 54
Source: CBOS, December 2000 and June 2002.
The statistical analysis shows a high correlation between beliefs in the existence
of cattle affected by BSE and the decision to stop eating beef. Furthermore, as a
rule, a higher sensitivity to the threat of BSE has been registered among the
younger and better educated parts of the Polish population.
In a different survey people were asked whether they expect that accession to
the European Union will improve or deteriorate food safety.
Table 8
Expectations as to the changes in food safety after accession to the EU (in perce ntage) 
Will food in your
country after the
accession to the EU
become?
Safer Nothing will
change
Less safe Difficult to
say
Poles 29 29 27 15
Hungarians 41 41 9 9
Czechs 23 50 11 16
Lithuanians 37 31 14 18
Rumanians 45 26 17 12
Source: CBOS, Survey November 2001.
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The outcomes of this international survey suggest that Poles have ambiguous
expectations related to the changes in the level of food safety after accession to the
EU. A possible reason for this is that, feeling safe already, they pay little attention
to the problem of food safety.
This hypothesis needs further investigation but there are indications which seem
to confirm it. Firstly, (see Table 9) Poles consider food produced from domestic
components as safer than food composed of mixed components or food imported
from the EU countries.
Table 9
Perception of food safety according to its origin (in percentage)
Is food composed of: Safe Risky Difficult to say
Poles
Exclusively domestic
components
86 11 3
Containing imported components 57 35 8
Imported from the EU countries 44 46 10
Imported from the US 40 46 14
Imported from other countries 33 52 15
Hungarians
Exclusively domestic
components
70 27 3
Containing imported components 55 40 5
Imported from the EU countries 58 35 7
Imported from the US 49 40 11
Imported from other countries 32 58 10
Source: CBOS, November 2001.
The choice of food by Polish consumers is guided by beliefs that domestic
agriculture, which does not widely use the methods for the intensification of food
production, offers safer food. This might be true if we consider chemical pollutants
of foods due to the use of fertilizers, but it might not be true if we consider
microbiological pollutants which tend to spread when not enough attention is paid
to the hygiene of the production, transformation and distribution of food products.
Other data suggest that Poles do not seem to be cautious food consumers, as
only 31 percent of consumers say that they always check the date of product
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validity, only 7 percent check the composition of food products bought, and 7
percent buy products paying attention to its health claims.65
In general it seems justified to say that public opinion does not exert major
pressure for changes in the Polish food safety regulations. This weak public
attention to the issue might lead the government to place it low on the agenda of
domestic policy actions. The agenda of policy changes resulting from accession
negotiations does not coincide with the agenda of domestic policy actions. In such
a situation one can expect that a candidate country might incur significant delay in
implementing food safety measures.
4.2.2 Foreign Direct Investments as a Vehicle for Internationalization of Food
Safety Practices
Classical works on regulations point to multinational corporations and FDIs as an
important source of demand for the international harmonization of regulation.66
Thus, one would expect it to embrace EU food safety regulations more readily, if a
country’s agro-alimentary sector is significantly internationalized.67
In this regard we can ask what is the weight of FDIs in agriculture and food
processing in Poland, and could FDIs be of some importance for the decision of
how rapidly to introduce adjustments to the EU food safety rules?
Aggregate data show that as of mid-2002, FDIs in Polish agriculture reached
approximately 45 m USD, which is an almost negligible amount. On the other hand
in food processing FDIs amounted to almost 6 bl USD, and accounted for 21
percent of all FDIs in manufacturing.68 More than 60 percent of FDIs in
manufacturing come from the EU countries—a circumstance facilitating the
approval of EU food safety rules.
Furthermore, FDIs have often been linked with the privatization of the food
processing sector in Poland, which has led to the dominance of foreign (mostly EU)
food manufactures in the group of large food producers. If, as is assumed, large
multinational companies tend to apply uniform production standards across
countries in which their plants are located, a large presence of FDIs in the Polish
agro-alimentary industry facilitates the reception of EU food safety regulations.69
T h e ou tc om e s of se ve r a l f ie ld re se a r c he s se e m to co nf i r m tha t FD I s in the 
f o od se c t or he lp pr oc e s sin g fi r ms to upg r a de th e ir a g r i - f ood pr od uc ts to 
                                                           
65 See: Komunikaty z badan, CBOS, October 2001.
66 See Giandomenico Majone (ed.) (1996) Regulating Europe, Routledge.
67 Internationalization is measured not only by the role of FDIs, but also as a share of exports in
an industry’s output.
68 Data from the Polish Agency of Foreign Investments (PAIZ - http://www.paiz.gov.pl/
facts2_4.html).
69 Harmonized regulations help smoothing intra-company trade.
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in te r n a ti on a l st a n da r ds . 70 E U fo od sa f e t y re gul a t ion s mi ght ha ve c om e to the 
Po li sh f o od pr oc e s sin g se c to r wit h EU in ve sto r s , in an tic ip a t ion of Pol a n d’ s 
me mb e r shi p in th e EU . 
4.3 Polish Food Safety Law and Other Food Safety Requirements
Polish food safety regulations date back to the interwar period (the first
comprehensive food safety law was passed in 1929). The next major revision
of legislation on food safety, health and nutrition was passed in Poland in
November 1970.
Poland has been a member of the Codex Alimentarius Commission since its
beginning, and the Polish Agricultural and Food Quality Inspection (earlier the
Central Inspectorate of StandardizationCIS) has been participating in the work of
other international safety standard setting bodies. Basic food regulations as written
in the law under the communist regime did not deviate at all from international
standards. What was different, however, was how the food safety law was
implemented, and especially the communist state’s heavy reliance on
administrative and penal sanctions.
Economic transformations under way since the late 1980s have called for
changes in food regulations mostly because of the changed socio-economic context
in which they have been applied. Nevertheless it was not until the late-1990s, with
the beginning of the negotiations for accession to the EU, that these changes began
to take place.
The essence of these changes was the adjustment of the Polish food safety
regime to the EU food safety regulations as the EU opening negotiation position
was clear: ‘the adoption of the acquis communautaire is the precondition for
Poland’s accession to the EU.’71
This negotiating position was accepted by candidate countries with no objection
and no candidate country asked for transition periods in the transposition of EU
food safety law.
The changes to food laws to meet EU requirements, were accepted and
introduced by all candidate countries. Accordingly, on 11 May 2001 Poland
brought the food legislation in line with the EU acquis by passing the Law on
                                                           
70 See for instance J.F.M. Swinnen (2002) ‘Transition and Integration in Europe: Implications
for Agricultural and Food Markets’, Policy and Trade Agreements’, in The World Economy,
p. 481-501.
71 A comprehensive survey of legal issues related to the adoption of the acquis communautaire
can be found in A. Ott and Kirstyn Inglis (ed.) (2002) Handbook on European Enlargement,
The T-M-C-Asser Press: The Hague.
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Health Conditions of Food and Nutrition (Dz. U. No. 63, item 643, as amended),
hereinafter referred to as ‘the Food Law’.72
The ‘Food Law’ has modernized the system of food safety regulations in
Poland.73 Below I review its main provisions.
The Polish food law starts by defining food safety (Art. 3, p. 15) as ‘a set of
complex conditions, which must be met and activities which must be undertaken on
all stages of food production and food distribution in order to ensure safety for
people’s health and life’. These conditions and activities are translated into product
and process standards. Specific product and process standards are not part of this
basic law: their formulation has been delegated to the Ministry of Health. The
Ministry of Health also supervises the work of the General Sanitary Inspection
which carries out field controls with regard to all foods except food of animal
origin, the control of which is left to the State Veterinary Inspection under the
supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture.
The law recommends that the maximum allowed levels of food contamination
be based on ‘the outcomes of scientific research and in order to protect human
health and life’ (Art. 7, point 2). This statement can be read as positing the essential
role of scientific expertise in setting standards, but the law (Art. 45, point 2) relaxes
this condition by stating that ‘official inspection authorities can undertake
anticipatory and proportional to the threat preventive actions in order to protect
human life and health (the precautionary principle)’ in case ‘there are no scientific
proofs confirming non-harming characteristics of food items’ (Art. 45, point 2).
When searching for scientific expertise referenced laboratories should (Art. 44
point 2.7) transfer to state inspection authorities ‘information about research
methods applied in referenced laboratories in the countries – members of the EU’.
National standard setters should thus draw on the best knowledge and experiences
of EU referenced laboratories.
The law gives a definition of ‘new food’ (Art.3, point 26) as ‘substances or their
mixtures, which earlier have not been applied to feed people’. Genetically modified
                                                           
72 Earlier the Law of 24 April 1997 on control of infectious diseases of animals, examinations
of slaughter animals and meat, and on the Veterinary Inspection, (Dz. U. from the year 1999,
No. 66, item 752, as amended) was passed which contains provisions concerning food of
animal origin. And with regard to non-health related food quality, the most important is the
Law of 21 December 2000 on Commercial Quality of Agricultural and Food Products, which
replaces two former statutes and enters into force on 1 January 2003 r. (Dz. U. form the year
2001, No. 5, item 44, as amended). Latest modification of the Polish Food Law comes from
14 February 2003.
73 This law transposes more than 80 EU Directives. In general the EU food safety standards
were more stringent than Polish ones, but in some cases like a smaller number of additives
and preservatives and their lower permitted level of concentration, Polish food safety
requirements were more restrictive than UE standards. (See ‘Links to the West’, in Warsaw
Business Journal, 23 January 2003.)
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food is considered a subcategory of new food and neither its production nor sale in
Poland if 1) it is properly labeled (Art. 11, point 3 says that food product should be
marked with information, ‘product genetically modified’, and 2) it has gone
through a testing procedure with the General Sanitary Inspector, who, after
reviewing the opinion of experts and scientific centers (Art. 11, point 5), issues a
decision allowing or forbidding its production or sale. The firm wishing to produce
or to sell genetically modified food must cover the costs of testing and obtaining an
opinion from referenced experts and laboratories (Art. 11, point 6). This provision
can be read as being in opposition to the EU ban on the market approval of GM
foods But the lack of a precise threshold for the allowed content of GMOs and the
approval rights placed in the hands of the General Sanitary Inspector make the
introduction of genetically modified food to Poland time-consuming, costly and
hence difficult.
Art. 6 of the law forbids the production of food from animals treated with
hormones, or substances acting tyreostatically or beta-agonistically.
Art. 8 approves the production or sale of irradiated food, if ‘it does not pose a
threat to human health or life and if it is technologically justified’. The law adds
that irradiation should not substitute normal hygiene practices or be applied to food
which contains chemical substances serving to conserve or stabilize food (Art. 8,
point 2). Specific rules regarding irradiation are fixed by the Ministry of Health in
special rulings.
The General Sanitary Inspector should make publicly available the register of
taken decisions (Art. 14, point 13) with all the documentation of the admissibility
procedure, thus allowing for public control of the impartiality of decisions taken.
There is, however, no appealing mechanism which would create an opportunity to
contest its decision.
The power of the General Sanitary Inspector is enhanced by the fact that he can
(Art. 17, point 3) issue a decision waiving the requirement to go through the whole
testing procedure required for ‘new food’.
Art. 24 of the law requires that the packing of all food and nutritional products
should contain the information essential for the protection of human health and
life and in particular: the composition of food products, the nutritional value of
food products, the presence of permitted additional substances or food additives;
the expiry date of food’s nutritional usefulness; the instruction of use; the data
which identify the producer or the company which introduces the product to the
domestic market.
Furthermore, the information on the food ‘should not mislead a consumer with
texts or graphic signs’ or ‘should not attribute to the product nutritional values
which it does not possess’ (Art. 24, point 2). More specific rules for the labeling of
a product are established by the ruling of the Ministry of Agriculture prepared in
co-operation with the Ministry of Health.
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Art. 28 of the law imposes on companies producing and selling food the
obligation to meet food safety standards first and foremost by carrying out internal
inspections. The same article makes HACCP a basis for the internal inspection
system, and, states that all large companies should implement and document the
proper working of HACCP control system as of 1 January 2004 (small- and
medium-sized companies are not covered by this requirement). Art. 32 gives to the
Minister of Health (acting jointly with the Minister of Agriculture) the delegation
to define more precise rules for the working of HACCP and all internal inspections
in general. These precise rules should take into account the food safety
requirements of the European Union.
The application of HACCP is backed by a general rule (Art. 23) stating that
technological processes and methods of processing applied in the production and
distribution of foodstuffs should not cause the emergence of substances harmful for
human health and safety.
A food company must spontaneously withdraw foodstuff (Art. 31) if it
identifies food safety problems. The state of food produced or treated in a given
company can, however, be verified ex post since all food companies are required to
store samples of food products for certain period of time and allow food inspections
to examine them on request.
The law (Art. 35) stipulates requirements regarding the state of the health of the
employees of food safety companies. First of all, they must have a medical
certificate confirming the fact that they are not affected by infectious diseases.
They must also undergo training in food hygiene requirements in special courses,
the contents of which is specified by the ruling of the Ministry of Health.
Operators who produce foodstuffs or sell them in violation of food safety rules
are threatened with financial penalties or imprisonment up to two years (Art. 49).
In sum it might be argued that the Polish food law has been promptly modified
to include EU food safety requirements and that it contains provisions on all
important contemporary food safety issues. What may be called the nominal
harmonization of the Polish food law to EU standards has been largely achieved.
However, the EU requires from candidate countries not only nominal regulatory
harmonization, but also a faithful implementation of such regulations as a rule since
the first day of membership. But is nominal harmonization a sufficient criterion to
state that enlargement-related challenges to food safety in the EU have been
positively solved? This question brings us to the issue of controlling the
implementation of food safety standards since, as becomes more and more evident,
the same regulatory standards may produce different safety outcomes depending on
the way they are implemented and controlled.
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Recently the EU has been paying more and more attention to the problem of
effective implementation of EU legislation.74 As mentioned above, to enhance
implementation the EC applies both enforcement and management mechanisms,
but in the particular case of food safety in candidate countries the EC seems to rely
more on management instruments.75
Management instruments serve to strengthen the problem-solving capacity of
the countries which participate in an international policy regime. Two in particular
seem to be especially important in the context of the current EU enlargement: the
interpretation (mostly clarification) of rules and procedures, and capacity building
(creating institutions and assuring adequate resources for their functioning).
Before identifying the ways in which the EC can increase the likelihood that
food safety regulations will be properly implemented, it is necessary to look at a
particular political mechanism which weakens the link between the readiness of a
given government to transpose European regulations into national laws and its
willingness to implement them faithfully. This mechanism stems from the pro
tempore character of democratic governments, which may create a cleavage
between a government which signs to the agreement and a government which is
called to deliver upon the agreement. Democratic alternation might create
disturbances in the implementation of regulations. This mechanism seems to be of
special importance in candidate countries, which is why the EC pays special
importance to the continuity of policy commitment despite government changes.
4.4 Problems with Implementation of Food Safety Regulations
4.4.1 Institutional Setup and Procedural Rules of Food Safety Inspections
Transposition of law and nominal regulatory harmonization is not enough to ensure
meeting regulatory goals.76 These goals are pursued by the national food safety
administration and supported by the government. Contemporary research on
specialized public administration, as one of the main conditions for its effective and
efficient functioning, posits its insulation from political (elected) bodies by
statutory guarantees and procedural rules such as the technique of managers’
                                                           
74 Controls fall within the wider guardianship role of the Commission to ensure that Community
legislation is effectively applied and enforced within the Community as laid down in Article
211 of the EC Treaty.
75 The punishment of misbehaviour would consist in delaying accession and as such is deemed
to severe to be credible.
76 The full implementation of European regulations should encompass four consecutive stages:
Formal transposition; Practical application; Enforcement/control and outcomes/results. See
Stava, P. (1993) ‘Implementation of Community Law: Stronghold of National Control?’, in
Andersen, S.S. & Elinssen, K.A. (eds.) Making Policy in Europe: The Europeanization of
National Policy-making, London: Sage p. 60.
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appointment and the length of their tenure.77 Without meeting these criteria it is
unlikely that specialized public administration can take full advantage of its expert
knowledge and be able to act in the public interest.
What are the statutory and procedural arrangements that guarantee the capacity
for an independent regulatory action in the case of the Polish food safety inspection
system? Let us take as an example the veterinary inspection. The law of 24 April
1997 on Veterinary Inspection78 stipulates that the Chief Veterinary Inspector,
called the Chief Veterinary Doctor (CVD), is nominated (Art. 34) by the Prime
Minister and can be recalled by him at the proposal of the Minister of Agriculture.
In principle the CVD can be dismissed any time as his post is not protected by the
guarantees of minimum tenure, and he/she is therefore unlikely to keep his position
when there is a change of government. In fact, all government changes in Poland
(1993, 1997 and 2001) have resulted in the change of the person running the Chief
Veterinary Inspectorate.
Down the inspection ladder the Regional Veterinary Inspector is nominated
by the Governor of the Region (Art. 37), who in turn is appointed by the
government in agreement with the Chief Veterinary Inspector. But again the period
of his tenure is not specified and his position is weak, although in this case the
nominating organ (that is, the Governor of the Region) is a part of the structure of
the central government.
In Poland routine inspections of abattoir and food factories are conducted by the
Veterinary Inspector of Province (VIP) (powiat), who until March 2003 was
nominated by the President of the Province on the motion of the Regional
Veterinary Inspector. Again this position was not protected by formal provisions
guaranteeing the stability of the tenure, but, making it even weaker was its
subordination to the President of Province—the person elected by provincial
counselors. The data show that strongly represented on provincial councils are
business people often owning or running food enterprises and in principle able to
exert pressure on the decisions of the VIP. The drawback of this institutional design
was that instead of being autonomous with regard to local business interests, the
VIP was exposed to business pressure. Cases were in fact reported in the press of
the VIP succumbing to such pressure and the press reported the cases in which
succumbing to such pressure, especially, apparently, out of the desire, to preserve
jobs in a given locality.79 This situation was, however, changed by the amendment
of the Polish Food Law of 14 February 2003, which referred to the way the
Veterinary Inspector of Province is nominated. The VIP is now nominated by the
                                                           
77 See Murray Horn (1995) The Political Economy of public administration: institutional choice
in the public sector, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
78 Its full name is ‘The Law about the fight against infectious animal diseases, examination of
animals and meat and Veterinary Inspection’.
79 Solska Joanna (2002) ‘Strach przed miesem (Fearing Meat)’, in Polityka, 19.
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Governor of the Region on the motion of the Regional Veterinary Inspector, thus
vertically reintegrating veterinary inspection in Poland.
Veterinary (or sanitary) inspectors might decide that foodstuffs must be
withdrawn from the market, food production suspended or even a plant closed—in
sum, decisions, which might ruin an enterprise. They must thus be taken with
caution, but once taken they have to be backed by the government. Such backing is
a core factor for the credibility of food safety policies.
T he sa nctions for the violations of food sa f e ty rule s have to be ef f e ctive ly
imple me nte d sinc e the f ir st da y of the ir obliga tions sinc e all new re gula tions ar e pre - 
a nnounc ed and ma de va lid with a de la y whic h can be me a sur e d in months or eve n
ye ar s. Fir ms thus ha ve the time for ma king ne ce ssa ry inve stments, imple me nting
them and le a rning ne w sa f e ty pr oc e dure s. Fur the r more , gove r nme nts also subsidize 
a nd educa te fir ms to enha nce their capa c ity to smoothly apply re gula tor y
r e quir e me nts.80 How e ve r, once the de adline ar r ive s all re gulator y re quir e me nts
should be imple mente d. The cr e dibility of food sa f ety polic ies is impor ta nt since 
w ithout it fir ms and fa r me rs will imple ment food saf e ty rule s le ss fa ithf ully. 
T he cr ite r ion of cr e dibility wa s not, howe ve r , me t by the Polish gove rnme nt, whic h
w e re used to cha nging the de a dline to intr oduce ce rta in pr ovisions of food sa f e ty
r e gula tions unde r the pr e ssur e of industrie s or even la rge ente r pr ise s. 
The efficacy of food inspections is crucial both for preventing the outbreak of
foodborne diseases and for the external credibility of domestic food safety policies.
The latter become more and more important in the light of the food policy
proposals contained in a recent ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on official feed and food controls’.81 The main thrust
of the proposal is a shift from direct controls to auditing via the control of the way
the national control system operates. It is also increasingly important that national
control systems operate according to precise plans, that the outcomes of inspections
are properly documented and shown at the request of foreign partners. If the control
documentation does not raise doubts about its effectiveness the country sends
credible signals to its partners and strengthens international confidence in its
domestic policies.
An early example of such ‘control of control’ can be found in the assessment of
the Geographical BSE-risk of Poland done by the Scientific Steering Committee
(SSC) and published in March 2001 which highlighted several drawbacks in the
                                                           
80 Such a support is offered to Polish farmers within an accession package signed in
Copenhagen on 13 December 2003. According to the agreement in the years 2004-2006
Polish farmers can get repaid for the costs of adjustments introduced in order to meet
EU food safety standards up to 200 Euro per one hectar (Informacja na temat wyników
zako_czonych negocjacji akcesyjnych z UE w obszarze ‘Rolnictwo’ 6 January 2003’
http://www.minrol.gov.pl/Publikacje/negocjacje_rolnictwo.html).
81 COM/2003/0052 final – COD 2003/0030.
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working of veterinary inspections in Poland.82 The SSC identifies the following
deficiencies of the BSE inspection system in Poland:
– No documentation of control of slaughter and movement of
imported cattle (p. 3);
– No evidence that the Veterinary Inspectorate had excluded the
possibility that meat-and-bone meal (MBM) was fed to cattle
and not only pigs, poultry, fish and pets (p. 5);
– Late implementation of a ban for feeding MBM ruminants (the
feed ban has existed since March 1997, but the legal basis for
official controls of proper implementation of the MBM ban was
adopted only in March 1999 [p. 7]);
– No possibility to assess the efficiency of the procedure for
notification of BSE (compulsory since April 1997) (p. 10).
In addition, the SSC assessment warns about the possibility of cross-
contamination in the process of rendering the carcasses of fallen stock, as Polish
feed-mills prepare feeding stuffs for all animal species using the same production
lines with only separation in time of the production process.83
The SSC points also out to the intrinsic difficulties in inspecting 6 million cattle
dispersed over 2 million multi-species farms, each usually with only one cow, one
or some pigs and a few poultry.84
T he lac k of proce dur al sa fe guar ds for indepe ndent actions by food administr ation
and the deficiency of the food controlling system exemplified by negligence in
properly documenting inspection rules and activities can undermine the credibility
of the implementation of food safety rules in Poland.
There is, moreover, the barrier of limited resources which can be devoted to
food controls in Poland and in other candidate countries. Contemporary food
inspection is technologically intensive: ‘scratch and sniff’ examination of meat is
not effective. Often, only a full laboratory analysis can detect a dangerous
pathogen. Thus, for instance, the costs of cattle examination in the pre-BSE era in
Poland were minimal amounting to 2 Euros per cow. Now the examination of all
cattle older than 30 months is much more costly as the transportation of the
                                                           
82 Remember: the assessment is based on the data voluntarily supplied by the country’s
authorities. The document’s name is: Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-
Risk (GBR) of Poland, March 2001, http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/ssc/.
83 Basic regulation dates from 13 July 1939 with modifications from 24 April 1997.
84 The impact of farm structure on the implementation of food safety rules is discussed in the
section on safety regulations for milk production.
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material and examination in referenced laboratories costs as much as 40 Euros per
cow. Poland needs to test some 0.5 million cattle yearly for BSE, which would cost
some 20 million Euro.85
A country can improve the credibility of its commitment to the control of food
safety if it shows that it devotes enough resources to inspection services.86
4.4.2 The Size Distribution Effect: Phasing in UE Milk Safety Rules
The ability to meet safety requirements depends on the size distribution of firms
operating in a given industry since as a rule the relative costs of regulatory
compliance decrease with the increase of a firm’s size. The domination of small
food producers seems to diminish the likelihood of meeting food safety
requirements, since a) it increases the direct costs of inspections, and b) most small
food farm producers are unable to cover the costs of compliance with all food
safety regulations. Thus, it happens in various areas of social regulation that a
regulatory authority excludes small farms (or small producers) from such
obligations.87 Food safety regulations, and especially regulations aiming to reduce
microbiological risks, are, however, special as foodborne disease might spread
from even a small production site. Hence, in principle, food safety regulations
should be implemented uniformly with regard to the size distribution of firms.
But can food safety rules be applied uniformly if the industry is dominated by
small and very small producers? A possible answer can be found in the example of
milk production in Poland.
The quality of farm milk is influenced by a number of factors associated with
the technology of farm production.88
The microbiological contamination of raw milk during the production on the
farm may result in the presence of a variety of microorganisms, some of them
pathogenic. To limit the incidence of safety failure, minimum standards and
surveillance procedures are laid down in legislation. The table below presents milk
safety norms in Poland and in the EU.
                                                           
85 Andrzej Komorowski, Jacek Zak, Problemy bezpieczenstwa zywnosci w konteksie zdrowia
publicznego (Problems of food safety in the context of public health), mimeo, 2002.
86 Poland employs 13,500 persons in the institutions performing food controls. It is
comparatively less than an EU average. It is not enough to examine all cattle slaughtered as,
according to press report, some 5,5 million animals are slaughtered without being ante-
mortem examined by veterinary inspectors (see: Joanna Solska (2000) ‘Pasztet z miesem’, in
Polityka, 19).
87 Such ‘waivers’ are given most frequently in the area of environmental regulations and
occupational health and safety regulations.
88 In the paragraph I draw on the PhD dissertation by Waldemar Guba (2000) Competitiveness
of Polish Milk Processing Industry during the Integration to the European Union – Analysis
of Dynamic Competitive Advantages, University of Gottingen.
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Table 10
Milk safety standards in Poland and the EU (as of 1998)
Quality criteria Units EU quality categories (EU Directive
92/46/EEC)
Acceptable Unacceptable
Limits for the bacteria
number
1 000 per
ccm
<=100
Limits for the somatic
cells
1 000 per
ccm
<400
Freezing point C <=-0.515
Density g/ccm 1.028
Quality criteria Units Poland (Polish norm PN-A-86002:1995)
Class
Extra
Class I Class II Class
III
Limits for the bacteria
number
1 000 per
ccm
<100 100-
400
400-1000 >1000
Limits for the somatic
cells
1 000 per
ccm
<400 400-
500
500-1000 >1000
Freezing point C <=-0.515
Density g/ccm 1.028
Source: adapted from Waldemar Guba (2000) Competitiveness of Polish Milk Processing Industry
during the Integration to the European Union – Analysis of Dynamic Competitive
Advantages, University of Gottingen, p. 20.
As can be noticed, the strictest standards with regard to milk safety in Poland
are the same as those of the EU because the former have been modeled on the
latter. What differs, however, is the technique of diluting the rigor of these
standards by introducing subcategories for milk safety, which allows Polish farmers
to slow down (if not bypass) the adjustments needed to meet these standards.
The Polish milk safety and quality regulations distinguished four classes of milk
according to its safety/quality parameters, but only Class Extra has corresponded to
the quality standard acceptable in the EU.
In 1999 Poland eliminated Class III, but still in mid-2000 of the 450,000 farms
which were supplying milk to milk factories, only 160,000 were producing
e xc lusively milk of Class Extra Quality. Adjustme nt had, how eve r, ta ke n pla ce 
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quickly as in 1999 the re ha d only be e n 90,000 milk supplie rs who pr oduce d
exclusively milk of Class Extra quality.89
The average size of farms in Poland, however, limits further progress in this
regard as the analysis of the IERiGZ (1999) shows that investments in milk safety
are economically justified only in farms with at least five to six cows, but such
farms account only for 30-35 percent of farms functioning in Poland. 90
A similar situation can be observed one step up in the milk processing chain. In
Fall 2002 only 9 percent of milk processing plants (dairies) met EU milk quality
requirements, but a further 40 percent of them have declared to be ready for the
moment of accession. Poland has received a three year transition period for the next
28 percent of milk factories, but, according to all estimates, 23 percent of all milk
factories have to be closed.
In the accession period, Polish milk factories have been treated according to the
rule of market access; that is, the EC was worried about food safety standards only
in plants exporting to the EU, but once Poland becomes a member of the EU, the
EC wants to see EU food safety rules uniformly. However, in tune with ‘the
management approach’ to the international agreements, the EC do not impose rules,
controls and punish, but try to help to build domestic capacities to meet food safety
requirements. In the case of the Polish milk sector this is done in two ways: firstly,
by giving more time for adjustments by accepting ‘transition periods’, and,
secondly, by subsidizing the costs of regulatory compliance with EU funds.
Table 11
Transition periods for the Polish diaries agreed in the Treaty of Accession
Diaries, which: Number Share of the
total
Already meet EU food safety requirements 38 9.3%
Are expected to meet EU food safety requirements by 1 May
2004
178 43.5%
Are expected to meet EU food safety requirements by 31
December 2006
113 27.6%
Are unlikely to met EU ford safety requirements by 31
December 2006
80 19.6%
Total 409 100
Source: Mleczarnie i rzeznie zagrozone, Rzeczpospolita, 9 May 2003.
                                                           
89 FAPA (2000) Stereotypy w UE dotyczace polskiego sektora rolno-spozywczego, Warszawa,
p. 15.
90 IERiGZ (1999) Rynek mleka: stan i perspektywy, Warszawa.
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Table 11 shows that almost 28 percent of Polish dairies need a transitional
period, during which they will be treated as producing exclusively for local
(subnational) markets, and almost 20 percent are facing closure.
T he situ a tion in othe r ac c e ssion coun tr ie s (se e ta b le 12 ) , wi th the ex c e pti on
of La tvi a , is som e w ha t be tt e r , but in the futu r e th e EC ca n be te ste d in it s
de t e r min a c y to en f or c e its re qui r e me n ts, if tr a nsit iona l pe r i ods would expi r e 
w it hout pr omi se d cha ng e s. 
Table 12
Transitional periods for food processing establishments
Country Poland
Czech
Republic
Hungary Latvia Lithuania Slovakia
Meat plants
332 till XII
2007
44 till XII
2006
44 till XII
2006
77 till I
2006
14 till I
2007
1 till XII
2006
Milk plants
113 till XII
2006
 -  - 11 till I
2005
1 till I
2007
 -
Fish plants
40 till V
2007
7 till XII
2006
 - 29 till I
2005
5 till I
2007
1 till XII
2006
Egg
establishment
 -  - 1 till XII
2006
-  -  -  -
Source: The Treaty of Accession.
If the deadline is not met the EC can invoke the safeguard clauses of articles 53
and 54 of Regulation 178/2002 on the General Food Law91 (and Art. 38 of the
Accession Treaty) whose main sanction is the suspension of the placing on the
market or the ban on the consumption of the food in question.
The EC has eased its food safety requirements by granting transitional periods.
It is an important policy implementation instrument as it helps to smooth out over
time the distribution of adjustment costs.
4.5 HACCP and Regulatory Auditing in Poland
As has been stressed, the EC is building its new food safety controlling strategy by
relying on firms’ own control systems and their controlling the national control
systems. This strategy emphasizes safety and quality management techniques such
                                                           
91 Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January
2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the
European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety, OJ
L 031, 01/02/2002, p. 0001–0024.
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as those certified by Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP), Good Hygiene Practice
(GHP) or HACCP.
Accordingly HACCP is to become an important part of a new food safety
regime in Poland. By law all Polish food producers have to have implemented a
HACCP system no later than 1 January 2004. This obligation does not, however,
apply to small and medium sized enterprises, that is, enterprises employing less
than 50 people.92 The size distribution of food processing enterprises in Poland
creates a great problem for the implementation of HACCP control system, as, for
instance, of 4139 meat-processing firms functioning in Poland in 2000, only 350
employed more than 50 persons, 520 employed between 6 and 49 persons and the
remaining 3269 (that is 79 percent) employed lower than 5 persons. Of course,
larger companies process the bulk of meat sold on the Polish market, but because
the HACCP controlling will cover only 21 percent of all active companies, the
Polish regulatory system cannot rely on indirect controls via the mechanism of
regulatory auditing, but have to depend on the effectiveness of old style veterinary
inspections.93
The diffusion of HACCP is part of a broader change in the strategy of food
safety controls. This change consists in a greater reliance on companies’ food
quality and safety discipline94 and a greater use of courts in search of better
consumer protection,95 but this change can be successful only if firms and the food
industry structure change to meet new responsibilities.
                                                           
92 Still small food companies can apply HACCP on a non-binding basis and, if they do so, they
can count on the subsidies from the EU funds going up to 60 percent of incurred costs, but no
more that 25,000 Zloty per firm (HACCP–Safe Food, in Warsaw Business Journal, 29
November 2002).
93 According to the estimations done on the basis of firms survey the costs of implementing
HACCP in the meat processing industry amount to Zl 1.2m per enterprise. For small and
medium sized meat processing companies they seem to be prohibitively high. The same
research estimates that other costs of adjustments to EU regulatory standards amount to Zl
4m per one enterprise, see IKCHZ (2002) Udzial polski w jednolitym rynku–koszty I korzysci
dla poszczegolnych grup I wybranych produktow, December 2002.
94 Especially so since under the pressure of the European Commission candidate countries,
including Poland, have to limit the scope of formal approval of food before placing it on the
market (see for instance the speech by David Byrne, European Commissioner for Health and
Consumer Protection to European Business Summit on 6 June 2003 [Speech/02/260]).
95 Drawbacks in the Polish system of legal consumer protection has been evidenced by M.
Sengayen (2002) ‘Consumer Sales Law in Poland: Changing the Law, Changing Attitudes’,
in Journal of Consumer Policy, Vol. 25, p. 403-437.
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5. Conclusions: Enhancing Domestic Implementation of International
Regulations
This paper has analyzed the problems of adjusting the food safety regime of a
candidate country such as Poland to the EU food safety requirements, by, firstly,
discussing the problems intrinsic to food safety regulations and to the choice of
regulatory instruments in general, next, by sketching the main tendencies of the
development of EU food safety regime and, then, by discussing the factors which
have influenced the transposition of EU food safety regulation into domestic laws
and regulations and which might influence the implementation of such regulations
in the near future.
Without repeating the complex analysis which has led to such conclusions I
would like to restate its main thesis: the lack of disputes over the transposition of
EU food safety regulations seems to be a result of the low salience of food safety
issues in the perception of Polish consumers (they tend to believe that domestic
food is safe or even safer than imported food stuffs), and of the fact that democratic
alternation of governments de-links the act of committing a country to international
agreements from the responsibility for implementing the rules and delivering
expected regulatory outcomes. Furthermore, if one considers the enlargement
process as a kind of asymmetric bargaining between the EC and candidate
countries, it becomes immediately obvious that candidate countries had to accept
the requirement to transpose all acquis communautaire, if they were to be admitted
to the EU.
However, nominal regulatory harmonization is not enough; future member
states are also obliged to faithfully implement food safety regulations. It has been
stressed that the EC is changing its strategy to assure a reasonable food safety level
across member states by putting an increasingly stronger emphasis on the control of
the national control systems as well as the company control systems. This change,
although in tune with theoretical developments in the area of risk regulation, seems
to create special difficulties in a candidate country such as Poland whose agri-
alimentary sector is highly fragmented and whose institutional setup for food safety
control is still evolving. My analysis predicts problems with implementing food
safety rules in candidate countries, but the negative externalities of possible
violations of the EU food safety rules are attenuated by the fact that food trade
between Poland and the EU countries is at a relatively low level (especially trade in
food of animal origins). Recognizing the fact that any drawbacks in the Polish food
safety system are unlikely to spill over to other countries the EC has granted
transitional periods for the adjustment of food establishments. Furthermore, it is
expected that Poland will use a significant part of EU funds to upgrade its agri-
alimentary sector and its capacity to meet food safety regulations.
Besides developing a new framework for the control of national food safety
systems, the EC has introduced, in the Treaty of Accession, several safeguards
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which allow it to restrict food trade in the case of the inappropriate implementation
of food safety rules or in the case of outbreaks of foodborne diseases.
Furthermore, the actual membership of the EU is likely to change the relative
bargaining power of the EC and new member states. The EC will face the same
difficulties in controlling the implementation in new member states as it faces now
in ‘old’ member states.
The growing stress on the control of the implementation of international
agreements poses an enormous challenge to policy oriented research as theorizing
policy implementation and drawing policy lessons is an almost impossible
challenge due to the complexities of policy issues and several conceptual
problems.96 The continuation of research on the implementation of food safety
regulations in candidate countries is an important task not only as a support of the
task of creating a European framework to assure food safety, but also in the light of
possible contribution to a better understanding of conditions for successful policy
implementation.
Last but not least, it should be remembered that food safety is not only an
internal issue of the EU, but a broader problem in efforts to create such conditions
for international trade in foodstuffs, which would respect the rules of free trade,
while paying attention to the concerns for food safety. The increase of
internationalization will probably continue.97
                                                           
96 For a recent survey of policy implementation theories see: Peter deLeon and Linda deLeon
(2002) ‘What Ever Happened to Policy Implementation’, in Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory, No. 4, p. 467-492.
97 According to Silverman, ‘food regulation in the last half of the twentieth century has been
characterized in part by an accelerating shift from local regulation to a system of national
standards or national “uniformity”’. We see this trend take place during the next fifty years,
with national agencies giving up authority to international standard setting and scientific
organizations. ‘Emerging’ or third world war nations appear to expect this to happen. While
they do not seem to be creating their own independent scientific/regulatory infrastructure,
they seem to rely on Codex and organizations such as the Joint Expert Committee on Food
Additives to serve this function, Richard S. Silverman (2000) ‘Report on the Future of Food
Regulation’, in Food and Drug Law Journal, No. 11.
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